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Summary 
 
In models of economic behavior, assumptions about preferences are essential. Empirical knowledge 
about preferences is therefore important in explaining the behavior of individuals. This PhD thesis 
studies relationships between preferences and economic decision-making at the individual level. The 
work presented here is based on large-scale online experiments with more than 5,000 Danish 
respondents. The experiments involved incentivized intertemporal choices and investment choices 
designed to elicit measures of individual-level patience and risk aversion. The experimental 
preference measures are linked at the individual level to Danish third-party reported administrative 
register data. The work in this thesis distinguishes itself by facilitating a comparison between 
experimentally elicited preferences and long-term real-life economic behavior observed in the 
registers, while earlier studies have primarily evaluated the relationships between preferences and 
economic decision-making in short-term laboratory settings. 
The thesis consists of three self-contained chapters, which all contribute to the understanding of 
how heterogeneity in preferences relates to actual economic decision-making at the individual level. 
In chapter 1, I document that time and risk preferences are important for behavior on the loan market 
in terms of several outcomes: loan to income ratios, the timing of first debt incurrence, interest rates 
paid on debt, the choice of mortgage loan, and delinquencies on loans. Chapter 2 investigates the 
relationship between time discounting and wealth inequality. We find a strong positive correlation 
between measured patience levels and the respondents’ positions in the wealth distribution. In chapter 
3, I study the association between preference heterogeneity and insurance demand and find positive 
relationships between insurance purchases and levels of risk aversion as well as patience. 
The thesis establishes empirical evidence that experimentally elicited time and risk preferences 
are meaningfully correlated with observed real-life economic behavior. This suggests that 
experimental preference measures can be generalized to non-laboratory settings. Thus, the work 
presented here supports the external validity of such experimental preference measures. 
 
Chapter 1: Patience, risk aversion, and debt behavior 
This paper tests whether time and risk preferences are related to behavior on the loan market. 
Measures of patience and risk aversion are elicited for about 5,000 Danish participants in an 
incentivized online experiment. The experimental preference measures are matched to individual-
level debt behavior in the field as observed in detailed administrative register data. I find that patient 
individuals have lower ratios of non-mortgage loan to income, postpone the incurrence of their first 
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non-mortgage debt further, pay lower average interest rates on their non-mortgage debt, are less likely 
to choose mortgages with deferred amortization (interest-only mortgages), and are less likely to be 
delinquent on loans. Furthermore, the results indicate that risk averse mortgage holders are less likely 
to choose adjustable-rate mortgages. 
 
Chapter 2: Heterogeneous discounting behaviour and wealth inequality1 
with Thomas Epper, Ernst Fehr, Helga Fehr-Duda, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, David Dreyer Lassen, 
and Søren Leth-Petersen 
According to standard economic theory, differences in how much people discount the future generate 
differences in savings behaviour and thereby wealth inequality. To test this prediction, we use state-
of-the-art experimental methods to elicit discounting behavior for a large sample of middle-aged 
individuals in Denmark and link these experimental data to administrative register data holding 
information about their real-life wealth over a period of 15 years. We find that individuals with 
relatively low discount rates are consistently positioned higher in the wealth distribution. The 
correlation between heterogeneity in discounting behaviour and the position in the wealth distribution 
is significant and of the same magnitude as the correlation between education and wealth, and it exists 
after controlling for education, income, initial wealth and parental wealth, suggesting that the savings 
mechanism is important. Finally, we show that the least patient individuals are more likely to be 
affected by liquidity constraints, consistent with models where liquidity constraints are self-imposed. 
 
Chapter 3: Preference heterogeneity and insurance demand: Combining experimentally 
elicited time and risk preferences with data on insurance coverage at the individual level 
This paper investigates the relationship between preference heterogeneity and insurance demand by 
combining Danish administrative register data with data from an incentivized large-scale experiment. 
The experiment was conducted on the Internet with about 5,000 Danish participants and included 
intertemporal choices and investment choices designed to elicit time and risk preferences of the 
respondents. Models of insurance demand predict a positive relationship between an individual’s 
degree of risk aversion and the optimal level of insurance coverage, ceteris paribus, but are less clear-
cut on the effect of time preferences on insurance demand. I study insurance demand in two separate 
domains: unemployment insurance and health insurance. The results indicate positive effects of 
1 A small part of this chapter builds on ideas first presented in my master’s thesis. However, based on the collaboration 
with the co-authors of the chapter presented here, it has been completely rewritten and includes substantial new research 
results. 
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patience on the probability of having insurance coverage in both of the insurance domains and a 
positive effect of risk aversion on purchasing unemployment insurance. 
 
 
Resumé (Danish summary) 
 
Antagelser omkring præferencer er afgørende i modeller for økonomisk adfærd. Derfor er empirisk 
viden om præferencer vigtig for at forklare individers adfærd. Denne ph.d.-afhandling undersøger 
sammenhænge mellem præferencer og økonomisk beslutningstagen på individniveau. Afhandlingen 
er baseret på online-eksperimenter med over 5.000 danske deltagere. Eksperimenterne omfattede 
incitamentsbaserede intertemporale beslutninger og investeringsbeslutninger designet til at 
frembringe mål for tålmodighed og risikoaversion på individniveau. De eksperimentalle 
præferencemål sammenkædes med danske tredjepartsindberettede registerdata på individniveau. 
Denne afhandling skiller sig ud ved at muliggøre en sammenligning mellem eksperimentelt 
frembragte præferencer og længerevarende virkelig økonomisk adfærd observeret i registrene, mens 
tidligere studier hovedsageligt har evalueret sammenhænge mellem præferencer og økonomisk 
beslutningstagen i kortvarige laboratorieomgivelser. 
 Afhandlingen består af tre selvstændige kapitler, der alle bidrager til forståelsen af, hvordan 
heterogenitet i præferencer relaterer sig til virkelig økonomisk beslutningstagen på individniveau. I 
kapitel 1 dokumenterer jeg, at tids- og risikopræferencer har betydning for adfærd på lånemarkedet 
med hensyn til flere variable: Gæld relativt til indkomst, tidspunkt for første gældsstiftelse, renter 
betalt på gæld, valg af realkreditlån og misligholdelse af lån. Kapitel 2 undersøger sammenhængen 
mellem tidsdiskontering og formueulighed. Vi finder en stærk positiv korrelation mellem målte 
tålmodighedsniveauer og deltagernes placering i formuefordelingen. I kapitel 3 undersøger jeg 
sammenhængen mellem præferenceheterogenitet og efterspørgslen efter forsikring og finder positive 
sammenhænge mellem forsikringskøb og niveauer af risikoaversion samt tålmodighed. 
 Afhandlingen klarlægger empirisk evidens for, at eksperimentelt fremkaldte tids- og 
risikopræferencer er meningsfyldt korreleret med observeret økonomisk adfærd i virkelighedens 
verden. Dette tyder på, at eksperimentelle præferencemål kan generaliseres til omgivelser uden for 
laboratoriet. Dermed støtter afhandlingen den eksterne validitet af sådanne eksperimentelle 
præferencemål. 
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Patience, risk aversion, and debt behavior 
 
Gregers Nytoft Rasmussen, University of Copenhagen and CEBI* 
 
September 2017 
 
Abstract 
This paper tests whether time and risk preferences are related to behavior on the loan 
market. Measures of patience and risk aversion are elicited for about 5,000 Danish 
participants in an incentivized online experiment. The experimental preference measures 
are matched to individual-level debt behavior in the field as observed in detailed 
administrative register data. I find that patient individuals have lower ratios of non-
mortgage loan to income, postpone the incurrence of their first non-mortgage debt further, 
pay lower average interest rates on their non-mortgage debt, are less likely to choose 
mortgages with deferred amortization (interest-only mortgages), and are less likely to be 
delinquent on loans. Furthermore, the results indicate that risk averse mortgage holders 
are less likely to choose adjustable-rate mortgages. 
 
 
* Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, 
Denmark (e-mail: gregers.nytoft.rasmussen@econ.ku.dk). The experiment referred to in this paper was organized by the 
following research group: Claus Thustrup Kreiner, David Dreyer Lassen, Søren Leth-Petersen, and Gregers Nytoft 
Rasmussen (University of Copenhagen), Ernst Fehr and Helga Fehr-Duda (University of Zurich), and Thomas Epper 
(University of St.Gallen). I would like to thank David Dreyer Lassen and audiences at the Spring School in Behavioral 
Economics - University of California San Diego, University of Zurich, and the Summer School on Socioeconomic 
Inequality – University of Bonn for helpful comments. I am grateful to FinanceDenmark for providing data on mortgage 
loans and to the Danish tax authority for providing data on loan delinquencies. The activities of Center for Economic 
Behavior and Inequality (CEBI) are financed by a grant from the Danish National Research Foundation. Financial support 
from the ERC Advanced Grant (Foundations of Economic Preferences, Project ID: 295642) is gratefully acknowledged. 
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1. Introduction 
Access to the loan market is an important factor for many individuals in achieving goals such as 
smoothing consumption over time or purchasing a home. However, what drives individual debt 
behavior? The main contribution of this paper is to show empirically how time and risk preferences 
relate to behavior on the loan market. I measure levels of patience and risk aversion for approximately 
5,000 Danish respondents. They participated in an incentivized Internet-based experiment involving 
intertemporal choices and investment choices designed to elicit time and risk preferences. The 
resulting preference measures are linked at the individual level with real-world debt behavior 
observable in Danish administrative register data. I study aspects of debt behavior in both the 
mortgage and the non-mortgage domains to embrace the loan market broadly. Debt outcomes that I 
consider are 1) non-mortgage loan to income ratio, 2) age at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt, 
3) average interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt, 4) the chosen type of mortgage loan, and 5) 
delinquencies on loans. The register data are third-party reported which implies that potential biases 
of self-reported outcomes are avoided.1 
My results show that heterogeneity in individual-level patience and risk aversion is important 
for debt behavior. Patient individuals have lower ratios of non-mortgage loan to income, postpone 
the incurrence of their first non-mortgage debt further, and pay a lower average interest rate on their 
non-mortgage debt once incurred. Apart from the timing of first non-mortgage debt, these 
relationships are maintained when controlling flexibly for socio-demographic variables. Regarding 
the choice of mortgage loan, I find a negative relationship between a mortgage holder’s level of 
patience and the probability that he holds an Interest-Only Mortgage (IOM). Similarly, more risk 
averse mortgage holders are less likely to have chosen an Adjustable-Rate Mortgage (ARM). My 
finding that patience reduces the propensity to choose mortgages with deferred amortization coincides 
with the result that risk aversion reduces the probability of choosing mortgages with adjustable 
interest rates by being robust to controlling for a rich set of demographic, economic, and loan specific 
characteristics. I further show that individuals who are more patient are less likely to be delinquent 
on a loan. Again, this relationship is maintained when controlling for socio-demographic variables. 
1 For example, Zinman (2009) finds that survey respondents in the US Survey of Consumer Finances undercounted their 
credit card debt by at least 50 percent relative to industry data. Bucks & Pence (2008) use the same survey and compare 
self-reported information on mortgage terms with lender-reported data. They find that respondents tend to have imperfect 
recollection of mortgage contracts. 
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Given that I study aspects of debt behavior belonging to separate strands of literature, it is 
appropriate to describe how the paper relates to and contributes to existing works. This is the topic of 
the next section. 
 
Relationship to literature 
Several studies on debt-related outcomes have focused on the effect of financial literacy. For example, 
previous work finds that less financially literate individuals a) tend to use high-cost borrowing 
(Disney & Gathergood, 2013; Lusardi & de Bassa Scheresberg, 2013; Lusardi & Tufano, 2015; 
Stango & Zinman, 2009), b) are more likely to default on mortgages (Gerardi, Goette, & Meier, 
2013), c) get less favorable terms on credit contracts (Levinger, Benton, & Meier, 2011), and d) are 
more likely to exhibit irresponsible credit card behavior (Robb, 2011). However, in spite of the 
standard theory of intertemporal choice highlighting that debt holding is related to time preferences 
(Fisher, 1930), there is little empirical evidence on how preferences affect debt behavior. Likely, this 
is because preferences are normally unobservable. Notable exceptions include the work of Stephan 
Meier and Charles Sprenger. They match experimental time preference measures to individual credit 
reports and annual tax returns. Meier & Sprenger (2010) find that present-biased individuals are more 
likely to have credit card debt, and – conditional on borrowing – present-biased individuals have 
higher amounts of credit card debt. Meier & Sprenger (2012) discover a positive relationship between 
an experimental measure of individual-level patience and creditworthiness as measured by the Fair 
Isaac Corporation (FICO) credit score. 
It is conceivable that individual-level financial literacy is related to time preferences. The 
acquisition of financial knowledge can be seen as an investment in human capital in which the 
acquisition is costly in the present and is expected to give a positive return in the future. Given this 
intertemporal trade-off, heterogeneity in individual-level time preferences should play a role in 
determining how much an individual has invested in financial knowledge. Ceteris paribus, individuals 
who are more patient should be willing to invest more in acquiring financial knowledge. This is 
supported by Jappelli & Padula (2013). Meier & Sprenger (2013) provide evidence on this hypothesis. 
They conduct a field study in which individuals are offered the possibility to participate in a free, 
short financial education program. Time preferences are measured for individuals who choose to 
participate in the financial education program as well as for those who choose not to. The study finds 
that a) more patient individuals have higher levels of financial knowledge, and b) that more patient 
individuals are more likely to participate in the offered financial education program and acquire 
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financial knowledge. The latter correlation is maintained when controlling for socio-demographic 
characteristics and prior financial knowledge. 
In sum, previous literature informs that financial literacy is related to behavior on the credit 
market, but also that financial literacy is associated with deep preferences. In this paper, I investigate 
further the roles of time and risk preferences in debt behavior at the individual level. 
A growing body of research focuses on the choice of mortgage type. Campbell & Cocco (2003) 
focus on how households choose between a Fixed-Rate Mortgage (FRM) and an Adjustable-Rate 
Mortgage (ARM) in the context of a life-cycle model. Among other things, they study how risk and 
time preferences affect the optimal mortgage choice. The main disadvantage of ARMs is that 
payments may rise suddenly as the interest rate varies in relation to market conditions. If income does 
not increase accordingly, the buffer-stock savings of a household could be exhausted and force a 
reduction in consumption (cash-flow risk). With an FRM, the borrower pays a fixed interest rate each 
period. The disadvantage of an FRM is that the interest rate is usually higher than the interest rate on 
an ARM because the lender requires a term premium and a prepayment risk premium on the FRM. 
Furthermore, if inflation and nominal interest rates fall, the interest rate on an FRM will remain 
constant (inflation risk) whereas it will fall for an ARM. In Campbell & Cocco’s model, more risk 
averse households place higher importance on the cash-flow risk of ARMs (potential for higher 
interest payments) and thus ARMs are less beneficial to risk averse households. The effect of time 
preferences on the choice between an FRM and an ARM is ambiguous in Campbell & Cocco’s model. 
A more impatient household will accumulate a smaller buffer-stock of liquid financial assets. On the 
one hand, impatient households are therefore more exposed to the cash-flow risk of ARMs (have to 
reduce consumption more in case of an increase in the interest rate) which makes ARMs less 
beneficial. On the other hand, impatient households are also more exposed to the inflation risk of 
FRMs, as they have less money to pay refinancing/prepayment fees in the event of decreasing interest 
rates. This makes FRMs less beneficial. 
The determinants of mortgage choices have also been analyzed empirically. Some studies have 
focused on the repayment type (repayment mortgage vs. alternative mortgage product/IOM) (e.g. 
Cocco, 2013; Cox, Brounen, & Neuteboom, 2015; Gathergood & Weber, 2017; LaCour-Little & 
Yang, 2010), while others have studied the interest rate type (FRM vs. ARM) (e.g. Gathergood & 
Weber, 2017; Koijen, van Hemert, & van Nieuwerburgh, 2009). I contribute to this research by 
analyzing how time and risk preferences affect people’s mortgage choices with respect to the 
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repayment type as well as the interest rate type. The present paper is believed to be the first to combine 
incentivized, experimental preference measures with field data on mortgage choices.  
I also contribute to the literature on the determinants of credit default. Examples of prior papers 
that use household-level data to study defaulting behavior are Fay, Hurst, & White (2002) who find 
that households are more likely to default when the associated financial benefit is higher, and Gross 
& Souleles (2002) who conclude that lower costs of defaulting may increase the propensity to default. 
Thus, these studies support the idea that defaulting is a strategic decision. However, from an intuitive 
perspective, defaulting behavior can also be viewed as an intertemporal choice. The benefit of 
defaulting (not servicing one’s debt) is realized in the immediate future, while the costs of defaulting 
(future exclusion from the loan market and social stigma) must also be endured in the more distant 
future. Therefore, patient individuals, who assign a higher value to future costs, are expected to 
default less. Meier & Sprenger (2012) provide indirect support for this. They find that higher 
individual-level patience is associated with higher creditworthiness as measured by the FICO credit 
score. By combining in the present paper an experimental patience measure with administrative data 
on loan delinquencies reported by financial institutions, I further substantiate the hypothesis that 
individual time preferences are predictive for the repayment of borrowed money. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the design of the Internet-
based experiment and introduces the experimental preferences measures as well as the administrative 
data, section 3 presents and discusses the results, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design and data2 
The Internet-based experiment was conducted in two waves in February 2015 and June 2016. The 
main part of the experiment consisted of interactive saving and investment choice situations designed 
to elicit time and risk preferences of respondents. Besides choice tasks, respondents filled out an 
online questionnaire.3 We recruited respondents who satisfied the following two criteria: 1) born in 
the period 1973-1986, and 2) resided in Copenhagen Municipality (Københavns Kommune) when 
they were seven years old.4 Statistics Denmark, the central authority on Danish statistics, provided a 
dataset of all of the 36,047 individuals who met the sample criteria. The dataset contained names, 
2 The descriptions of the experimental design and the measures of patience and risk aversion are abbreviated versions of 
those found in Rasmussen (2017). 
3 For example, the online questionnaire asked the respondents to state their most recent math grade obtained in school 
and to self-report their level of risk aversion. 
4 This geographical screening was chosen to be able to merge the experimental data with the Copenhagen School Health 
Records Register for another research project. 
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current addresses, and civil registration numbers. We invited everyone in the gross sample to 
participate by sending personal invitation letters in hard copy. Each letter contained a unique 
username and password combination needed to log in.  
After logging in to the web page, respondents were presented with thorough instructions. 
Decisions in the choice tasks were incentivized such that respondents were motivated to reveal their 
preferences truthfully by making considered decisions. At the end of the experiment, one of the choice 
situations was drawn at random, and payoffs were paid out according to the choice of the respondent 
in the drawn situation. The payouts were transferred directly to the personal bank accounts of the 
respondents. The average payout was 251 DKK.5 See Rasmussen (2017) for further details on the 
experimental setup. 
Additional discussion on the saving choices in the experiment is given below. 
 
Measuring patience 
All respondents were presented with 5 saving choices to elicit their levels of patience.6 In each saving 
situation, we asked the respondents to distribute 10 blocks of points between two accounts. One 
account promised a smaller but sooner payout and the other promised a larger but later payout. 
Specifically, the sooner payout account would be paid out 8 weeks and two days after participation 
and the later payout account would be paid out 16 weeks and two days after participation. This front-
end delay was incorporated in the saving situations to elicit a longer-run patience measure. If the 
sooner payout account would have been paid out immediately after participation, hyperbolic 
discounting (present bias/decreasing impatience) might induce a bias in the longer-run patience 
measure (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). 
Appendix 5.1 shows a screenshot of one of the saving situations. In this example, the respondent 
has allocated five blocks to the 8 weeks’ account and five blocks to the 16 weeks’ account. Each 
block allocated to the 8 weeks’ account was worth 100 points and each block allocated to the 16 
weeks’ account was worth 105 points. 100 points corresponded to 25 DKK. If this saving choice was 
selected randomly at the end of the experiment, the respondent would receive 125 DKK 8 weeks and 
two days after participation and 131.25 DKK 16 weeks and two days after participation.  
The value of the blocks on the 8 weeks’ account was kept constant at 100 points throughout the 
five 8 vs. 16 weeks’ choices. The value of the blocks on the 16 weeks’ account varied between 105, 
5 1 USD ≈ 6.5 DKK during both experimental waves. 
6 The saving choices are inspired by Andreoni & Sprenger (2012). However, we used a graphical interface to present the 
saving choices and showed only one choice per page.  
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110, 115, 120, and 125 points. The order of the saving situations was randomized. The starting point 
for the five choice situation was that all 10 blocks were placed on the 8 weeks’ account. We then 
asked the respondents to choose a distribution of the 10 blocks between the two accounts.7 We 
deliberately framed the choice situation as a saving decision in order to make it less abstract. The 
instructions explained that you would get an interest income if you chose to save the blocks, i.e. place 
them on the 16 weeks’ account. See the last section of the thesis for an English transcript of the 
instructions. 
I measure the patience level for each respondent by computing the median number of saved 
blocks across the five 8 vs. 16 weeks saving situations and normalizing by 10.8 The research question 
of the present paper requires a reliable measure of the heterogeneity in patience between respondents 
while accurate estimates of the level of patience are not necessary. I will study between-respondent 
variation in patience levels and its relation to debt behavior directly in terms of how many blocks the 
respondents chose to save in the saving situations rather than estimating a discounting model for time 
preferences based on the choices. The advantage of this model-free approach is that I avoid 
introducing assumptions about parameter values. The left panel in figure 2.1 shows the distribution 
of the constructed non-parametric patience measure.   
 
Figure 2.1: Distributions of the patience and risk aversion measures. 
 
Notes: 5,082 respondents. Only respondents for whom a full set of register variables is available are included. 
Left-hand panel: Distribution of the patience measure. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
10
�. 
Right-hand panel: Distribution of the risk aversion measure.  
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 = 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏−𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 
10
�. 
7 To avoid status quo bias, we designed the user interface such that the respondent had to make an active choice. 
Specifically, as the respondent moused over one of the accounts vertically, a blue saving bar summarized the outcomes 
of each allocation (see appendix 5.1). The respondent was only able to confirm his decision and move on after actively 
choosing one of the allocations. 
8 The results presented in the paper do not change if I use the arithmetic mean to aggregate the five saving situations 
instead. 
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Measuring risk aversion 
The respondents were also given 5 separate investment situations in which they had to allocate 10 
blocks of points between a risky investment project and a risk-free account where the payout was 
certain.9 In each investment situation, there was a 50-50 probability that the investment project would 
turn out to be favorable or unfavorable (zero skewness).10 The order of investment situations was 
randomized. Appendix 5.2 shows a screenshot of a sample investment situation. In this example, the 
respondent has allocated five blocks to the risk-free account and five blocks to the risky investment 
project. The value of blocks on the risk-free account was kept constant at 100 points throughout the 
five investment situations, whereas the value of blocks in the risky investment project differed across 
the five situations. The expected value of the investment project as well as the spread between the 
point value in the favorable and the unfavorable outcome varied. The point values were 121 vs. 81, 
131 vs. 71, 135 vs. 75, 151 vs. 50, and 161 vs. 60 such that the expected value of a block allocated to 
the investment project was greater than the 100 points in the risk-free alternative in all five situations. 
Similar to the patience measure, I compute the level of risk aversion for each respondent by 
taking the median number of blocks allocated to the risk-free account across the five investment 
situations and normalizing by 10.11 The right panel in figure 2.1 shows the distribution of this non-
parametric risk aversion measure. 
 
Administrative register data 
The experimental sample consists of 5,207 respondents. The choice data from the experiment are 
linked with Danish administrative register data at the individual level.12 The register data can be 
9 Our procedure is inspired by Gneezy & Potters (1997), but we depict the investment situations graphically. 
10 The favorable vs. unfavorable outcome of an investment situation would only be determined if it was drawn at random 
to be the choice situation relevant for payout at the end of the experiment. 
11 Again, the results presented in the paper do not change if I use the arithmetic mean to aggregate the five investment 
situations instead. 
12 The participants were not informed that the data from the experiment would be linked with the administrative register 
data, and they were therefore not asked to give their consent to this. The Danish Data Protection Agency has approved 
the research project and this procedure. To merge the experimental data with the register data, the usernames provided in 
the invitation letters were translated into anonymized civil registration numbers. It is important for the linkage between 
experimental and register data that the respondents in the experiment are identical to the people who were actually invited. 
Since the experiment was executed online, one cannot be certain that the respondents in the experiment exclusively consist 
of people who were invited to participate. Though the invitation letter requested that the log in details were not passed on 
to others, it is possible that some of the invited subjects let e.g. a colleague or another member of the household participate 
instead. This is problematic in the sense that the experimental choices of individual x would be linked with register data 
for individual y. To reduce this source of error, the respondents were asked to state their gender and year of birth first 
thing after logging in to the experiment. 79 respondents for whom the stated gender and/or year of birth is not identical 
to the information in the register data are excluded from the analysis. The fact that the payouts from the experiment were 
transferred directly to the personal bank accounts of the invited individuals might have reduced the prevalence of such 
spurious respondents. 
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categorized into three different types. First, I apply data on mortgage loans provided by 
FinanceDenmark, the trade association for banks and mortgage institutions in Denmark. The 
mortgage institutions in Denmark lend both ARMs and FRMs with a maximum maturity of 30 years. 
Danish FRMs are similar to those known from the US with a fixed interest rate for the full term of 
the mortgage. Since 2003, the mortgage institutions have also offered IOMs with up to 10 years of 
interest-only payments allowing the lender to reduce the mortgage payments in the beginning of the 
mortgage period. When the period of deferred amortization expires, the principal is to be repaid over 
the remaining maturity unless the loan is refinanced. IOMs can be established as either ARMs or 
FRMs. The loans are secured on real property, and the legal lending limit is a loan to value (LTV) 
ratio of 80 percent for private residential property. Mortgage institutions are not allowed to charge 
individual-specific interest rates or fees. 
The dataset holds detailed loan information about every mortgage contract held by the 
experimental respondents at the end of year 2014, and it allows me to identify the repayment type 
(repayment mortgage vs. IOM) and the interest rate type (FRM vs. ARM) of respondents’ mortgages. 
These will be the dependent variables in the following analysis of mortgage choices. Furthermore, 
the data includes the year of mortgage origination and the mortgage institutions’ valuations of loan 
specific LTV ratios. The LTV ratio is defined as the mortgage institution’s assessment of the size of 
the remaining debt relative to the sales value of the property provided as collateral for the loan. In the 
analysis of mortgage choices, I will only consider mortgage holders whose mortgage loans are based 
on owner-occupied homes. This leaves 1,514 mortgage holders among the respondents.13 In 
Denmark, all mortgage loans are recourse, which implies that it is not possible to strategically default 
on a mortgage by walking away from the property. The debt follows the borrower, and he remains 
liable to repay the potential deficiency after a foreclosure auction. This makes it unattractive to default 
on mortgages. In fact, only one of 1,514 mortgage holders in the sample was delinquent on a mortgage 
by the end of 2014. 
The second type of register data is provided by the Danish tax authority and includes 
administrative register data containing information on any delinquencies on both non-mortgage and 
mortgage loans held by respondents at the end of year 2014.14 The dataset defines a loan to be 
delinquent if a payment obligation is more than 60 days overdue. 
13 24 of the 1,514 respondents with mortgage loans held mortgages on two owner-occupied homes. For these respondents, 
I use the highest LTV ratio over their two homes. 
14 Kreiner, Leth-Petersen, & Willerslev-Olsen (2017) have used the same data set to study the intergenerational correlation 
in financial trouble. 
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The third type of data includes demographic characteristics from public administrative registers 
and individual-level information from the income tax register. The income tax register holds 
information on annual income as well as values of assets and liabilities at the end of each year going 
back to 1987. Data are available up to and including 2014. 
A common feature of all the register data is that it is third-party reported. For example, 
employers report earnings, government institutions report transfer payments, and information on 
assets, liabilities, mortgage contract details, and loan delinquencies is reported by financial 
institutions. This is an advantage compared to related empirical literature that relies on self-reported 
survey measures, which makes the accuracy of such responses difficult to assess. 
I also have access to register data for any potential partners of the respondents. In the analyses 
of the relationships between preferences and mortgage choices, I will include several control variables 
at the household level to account for the fact that the financing of a home is often decided together 
with a partner. 
Table 2.1 reports means of the above-mentioned variables. I focus on the 5,082 respondents for 
whom a full set of register variables is available. Column (1) shows mean values for the full sample. 
Column (2) compares the subsample of mortgage holders with the subsample of non-mortgage 
holders. Mortgage holders make up about 30 percent of the full sample (1,514 respondents). The 
reported p-values refer to unconditional t-tests of equality of means. Compared to non-mortgage 
holders, mortgage holders are, on average, older, more likely to have a partner, and more likely to 
have children. Furthermore, mortgage holders have higher educational attainment, higher income 
(both at individual and household levels), and have more debt relative to income on average. 
Columns (3) and (4) focus on mortgage holders and divide them by mortgage repayment type 
and mortgage interest rate type, respectively. These divisions are relevant for the analysis of mortgage 
choice. 55 percent of the mortgage holders have at least one IOM, while 45 percent hold repayment 
mortgages exclusively. 68 percent hold at least one ARM and 32 percent hold FRMs exclusively. It 
is noted that column (3) shows that IOM holders, on average, have less liquid assets relative to their 
disposable income, pay higher average interest rates on their non-mortgage debt, and have higher 
mortgage loan to value ratios compared to the holders of repayment mortgages. In conclusion, this 
suggests that IOMs and the lower payments that they provide appeal more to households who are 
short of liquidity. Turning to the interest rate type, column (4) shows that holders of FRMs have 
refinanced their mortgage more recently than ARM holders. Across all mortgage holders, the average 
time since the most recent mortgage refinance is 2.5 years.  
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The lower part of table 2.1 presents means of relevant variables from the online experiment. 
Column (3) shows that holders of IOMs are, on average, less patient, and column (4) displays that 
holders of ARMs are less risk averse on average. In the results section, I use regression analysis to 
study the roles of patience and risk aversion in mortgage choices.
17
Table 2.1:  Summary statistics – comparison of means. 
 
Notes: The p-values are from unconditional t-tests of equality of means. Register variables are based on 2014 values. (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for 
respondents who satisfy the description given by the variable name. Liquid assets include bank deposits and market values of stocks and bonds. Income ratios are based on annual 
income. When determining the age at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt, I use age 28 as a cutoff to balance the sample. The youngest birth cohort in the sample (1986) is 28 years 
old in year 2014, which is the last year of observable non-mortgage debt. 91.4 percent of the sample was 28 years of age or younger at their first incurrence of non-mortgage debt. For 
the remaining respondents, I set the age at first non-mortgage debt incurrence to missing. In this table, the interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt is set equal to zero for 
individuals/households who do not hold non-mortgage debt. The table includes both the experimental measure of risk aversion and a self-reported risk aversion measure. The self-
reported measure will be introduced in the results section. Only 4,640 of the 5,082 respondents reported a math grade.
(1)
Full Mortgage Non-mortgage p-value Repayment Interest-only p-value Fixed-rate Adjustable-rate p-value
sample holders holders mortgage mortgage mortgage mortgage
Administrative data
Age                                        34.175                                   35.784                                    33.492                           0.000                                   36.192                                   35.445                           0.000                                35.288                                     36.020                           0.000
Woman (=1)                                         0.504                                   0.480                                    0.515                         0.025                                      0.480                                   0.480                         0.991                                   0.458                                     0.491                         0.235
Single (=1)                                         0.335                                   0.116                                    0.429                         0.000                                      0.127                                   0.108                         0.251                                   0.090                                     0.129                         0.028
Dependent children (=1)                                         0.486                                   0.708                                    0.392                         0.000                                      0.693                                   0.721                         0.236                                   0.669                                     0.727                         0.020
Years of education                                        14.408                                   15.188                                    14.077                           0.000                                   15.319                                   15.079                           0.043                                15.197                                     15.184                           0.916
Ln(total income)                                        12.633                                   12.916                                    12.513                           0.000                                   12.943                                   12.894                           0.083                                12.899                                     12.925                           0.392
Non-mortgage loan to income ratio 1.016 1.244 0.919 0.404 0.448 1.906 0.215 0.705 1.502 0.525
Ln(total household income)                                        13.090                                   13.538                                    12.900                           0.000                                   13.555                                   13.525                           0.257                                13.533                                     13.541                           0.787
Liquid assets to disp. income ratio, household level                                       0.530                                   0.426                                    0.574                         0.116                                      0.531                                   0.339                         0.000                                   0.437                                     0.421                         0.754
Loan to income ratio, household level                                         1.935                                   4.345                                    0.912                         0.000                                      3.264                                   5.243                         0.350                                   2.616                                     5.170                         0.258
Age at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt                                       21.095                                   21.336                                    20.990                           0.000                                   21.534                                   21.181                           0.014                                21.534                                     21.245                           0.059
Average interest rate, non-mortgage debt (%)                                        4.053                                   4.513                                    3.858                         0.000                                      3.797                                   5.107                         0.000                                   4.306                                     4.611                         0.124
Household average interest rate, non-mortgage debt (%)                                      4.129                                   4.590                                    3.934                         0.000                                      3.978                                   5.098                         0.000                                   4.450                                     4.657                         0.273
Mortgage loan to value ratio                                         0.753                                         0.699                                   0.799                         0.000                                   0.756                                     0.752                         0.742
Years since latest mortgage refinance                                         2.507                                         2.560                                   2.463                         0.458                                   1.650                                     2.916                         0.000
Loan delinquency                                         0.086                                   0.017                                    0.116                         0.000                                      0.007                                   0.024                         0.010                                   0.012                                     0.019                         0.371
Experimental data
Patience                                         0.633                                   0.655                                    0.624                         0.003                                      0.689                                   0.626                         0.000                                   0.661                                     0.652                         0.602
Risk aversion                                         0.571                                   0.557                                    0.577                         0.010                                      0.563                                   0.551                         0.352                                   0.579                                     0.546                         0.019
Self-reported risk aversion                                         4.208                                   4.211                                    4.207                         0.942                                      4.338                                   4.105                         0.002                                   4.481                                     4.082                         0.000
Self-reported math grade                                         8.764                                   8.944                                    8.686                         0.000                                      9.044                                   8.861                         0.066                                   8.906                                     8.961                         0.604
Observations                                          5082                                   1514                                    3568                         5082                                        687                                   827                       1514                                     489                                   1025                         1514
(3) Mortgage repayment type (4) Mortgage interest rate type(2) Mortgage vs. non-mortgage holders
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Having access to anonymized civil registration numbers of all individuals in the gross sample, I can 
compare the register-based characteristics of the respondents and the non-respondents. Column (1) in 
appendix 5.3 tests the significance of the differences in means across respondents and non-
respondents for everyone in the gross sample with a full set of register data available (t-tests). On 
average, respondents are less likely to be singles, more likely to be homeowners, have higher 
educational attainment, have higher income, and hold more liquid assets. To take into account the 
selection into the experiment, I have estimated the probability that an individual from the gross 
sample chose to participate based on the characteristics included in appendix 5.3. All regressions 
presented in the paper have been repeated weighting each observation with the inverse of the 
probability that the individual participated. This is done to inflate the weight for respondents who are 
underrepresented in terms of observable characteristics. If the observable characteristics predict the 
decision to participate sufficiently, the selection can be ignored when weighting with the inverse of 
the participation probability. The estimated effects presented in the paper are robust to this sensitivity 
analysis (not reported). 
The gross sample includes everyone who lived in Copenhagen Municipality when they were 
seven years old. Therefore, it is relevant to test whether the average characteristics of the gross sample 
differ from those of the rest of the population. Column 2 in appendix 5.3 compares the gross sample 
with a 10 percent random sample of the Danish population who are not in the gross sample (i.e., did 
not live in Copenhagen Municipality when they were seven years old), but who were born in the same 
period (1973-1986). Most notably, the table shows that the share of singles is larger, and the share of 
homeowners is smaller in the gross sample relative to the 10 percent sample. To allow for the 
differences between the 10 percent sample and the respondents in terms of the observable 
characteristics in appendix 5.3, I have also run the regressions in the paper using inverse probability 
weights to adjust for this (not reported). Again, the results do not deviate noticeably from what is 
presented in the paper.  
 
3. Results and discussion 
Patience and non-mortgage loan to income ratio 
The first and broadest debt outcome that I consider is the ratio of non-mortgage loan to annual income. 
Intertemporal choice theory (e.g. Fisher, 1930) predicts that patience is negatively related to debt 
accumulation. To test this prediction, figure 3.1 plots a local polynomial regression curve of the non-
19
mortgage loan to income ratio against the patience measure. The figure confirms the negative 
correlation predicted by the theory. 
 
Figure 3.1: Non-mortgage loan to income ratio plotted against patience. 
 
Notes: 5,082 observations. Local polynomial regression of non-mortgage loan to income ratio on the patience measure. 
Non-mortgage loan to income ratio is censored at p95. 
 
Next, I examine whether the negative correlation found in figure 3.1 is maintained when controlling 
for covariates. Table 3.1 presents results from OLS regressions of the non-mortgage loan to income 
ratio on the measure of patience and other covariates. Column (1) shows output from a regression 
that only includes the experimental preference measures. Column (2) extends the analysis by adding 
income, educational attainment, and other demographic characteristics. The negative effect of 
patience remains significant at the 1 percent level in column (2). Going from minimum to maximum 
patience (0 to 1) is associated with a reduction in the non-mortgage loan to income ratio of about 0.09 
on average. 
A potential confounding factor in the analysis is financial literacy/cognitive ability. It is 
conceivable that debt accumulation as well as measures of risk aversion and patience are correlated 
with cognitive ability. This might not be a problem in the present analysis, as I include income and 
educational attainment in the regressions, which are likely to serve as proxies for cognitive ability. 
However, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde (2010) studied a representative sample of the adult 
German population and found that people with higher cognitive ability are significantly more risk 
willing and significantly more patient. The correlations in their study remain significant when 
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controlling for personal characteristics, income, and educational attainment.15 Column (3) in table 
3.1 adds flexible dummies for the most recent math grade obtained in school to further control for 
financial literacy and cognitive ability.16 The inclusion of math grade dummies does not affect the 
estimate of the impact of the patience measure. 
 
Table 3.1: Non-mortgage loan to income ratio regressed on covariates (OLS). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent children, and homeownership. 
The number of observations decreases in column (3) due to some of the respondents not reporting a math grade. Non-
mortgage loan to income ratio is censored at p95. 
 
17.6 percent of the respondents do not have any non-mortgage debt. To take these corner solution 
responses into account, appendix 5.4 reproduces the results in table 3.1 using tobit regressions. The 
results in appendix 5.4 show that the estimated negative effect of patience on the non-mortgage loan 
to income ratio is robust to this exercise. 
 
  
15 Nevertheless, a recent experimental study suggests that cognitive ability is correlated with random decision making 
rather than with risk preferences (Andersson, Holm, Tyran, & Wengström, 2016). 
16 Agarwal & Mazumder (2013) find specifically that math scores are important for household financial decision-making. 
In their study, individuals with higher math scores are less likely to make well-defined financial mistakes. Additionally, 
a recent publication by PISA reports a strong correlation between students’ financial literacy and mathematics 
performance (OECD, 2017). 
 
Patience -0.127 *** -0.088 ** -0.090 **
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Risk aversion -0.041 -0.073 -0.047
(0.042) (0.041) (0.043)
Income decile dummies No Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No Yes
Constant 0.746 *** -1.683 * -1.413
(0.036) (0.823) (0.921)
Observations 5082 5082 4640
(1) (2) (3)
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Patience and timing of first non-mortgage debt 
Economic intuition suggests that time discounting and timing of first debt incurrence are related. One 
would expect individuals who are less patient to incur their first debt sooner in order to enjoy a higher 
current consumption. The longitudinal dimension of the administrative data enables tracking at which 
age respondents incurred their first non-mortgage debt. I only include loan amounts greater than 1,000 
DKK (≈ 154 USD). In this study, non-mortgage debt includes, e.g., credit cards, consumer loans, car 
loans, and regular bank loans, but excludes State education loans. The left panel in figure 3.2 shows 
the distribution of age at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt. The histogram shows a jump in first 
debt incurrence at age 18 when respondents become of legal age. The distribution peaks at age 19 
and decreases with age afterward. The fact that the peak is at 19 and not 18 years of age is explained 
by both age and non-mortgage debt being measured at the end of each calendar year. Hence, 
respondents born late in the year have had little time as 18-year-olds to borrow legally until the 
balance sheet date. The year in which the respondents turn 19 is the first year where they have been 
able to borrow legally during the entire year. 
 
Figure 3.2: Age at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt. 
  
Notes: Non-mortgage debt observed in the period 1987-2014. 4,646 out of 5,082 respondents (91.4 percent) were of age 
28 or younger when incurring their first non-mortgage debt. 
Left-hand panel: Distribution of age at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt. Truncated at age 16 and 37. 
Right-hand panel: Average value of the patience measure by age at first non-mortgage debt incurrence. Patience and age 
at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt are positively correlated: Spearman's rho = 0.105; p-value = 0.000 (using data 
from 4,646 respondents). 
 
The right panel in figure 3.2 shows the relationship between age at first incurrence of non-mortgage 
debt and the experimental patience measure. The panel plots the average value of the patience 
measure for each age group. The youngest birth cohort in the sample (1986) is 28 years old in year 
2014, which is the last year of observable non-mortgage debt. Consequently, I use age 28 as the cutoff 
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in the figure. 91.4 percent of the sample had incurred their first non-mortgage debt by age 28.17 The 
right panel shows a positive correlation: The longer the respondents postponed the incurrence of their 
first non-mortgage debt, the more patient they are on average (Spearman's rho = 0.105; p-value = 
0.000). This confirms the above-mentioned intuition. In addition, the association between the 
experimental patience measure and the timing of the respondents’ first debt incurrence observed 
several years prior suggests that the patience measure reflects fundamental and stable time 
preferences. 
 
Patience and interest rates paid on non-mortgage debt 
Empirical work by Disney & Gathergood (2013); Lusardi & de Bassa Scheresberg (2013); Lusardi 
& Tufano (2015); Stango & Zinman (2009) finds that less financially literate individuals are more 
likely to use high-cost borrowing. However, as documented by Meier & Sprenger (2013), the 
acquisition of financial literacy is related to time preferences. In this section, I explore whether 
individuals who are less patient tend to use high-cost borrowing. To do this, I consider the average 
interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt by each respondent, conditional on having non-mortgage 
debt. I approximate the average interest rate paid by each individual as 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖14∗1001
2
�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
13+𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
14�
, where 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟14 is 
the total non-mortgage interest payments for individual i during 2014, 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟13 is individual i’s amount 
of outstanding non-mortgage debt at the end of 2013, and 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟14 is the amount of outstanding non-
mortgage debt held by individual i at the end of 2014. I compute the average interest rates for those 
3,958 respondents for whom the denominator is greater than 1,000 DKK (≈ 154 USD). The resulting 
interest rates are censored at the 5th and the 95th percentiles.18 The left panel in appendix 5.5 shows 
the distribution of the computed interest rates. 
Table 3.2 shows results from OLS regressions of the computed average interest rate on the 
measures of patience and risk aversion and other covariates. Column (1) shows a negative relationship 
between patience and the paid average interest rate. Column (2) includes income decile dummies and 
17 The administrative information on non-mortgage debt is missing in the dataset for year 1994. This means that the 
analysis overvalues the age of first non-mortgage debt incurrence for respondents who took out their first non-mortgage 
debt in 1994. As a result, I have run a robustness check including only respondents who were born in the period 1977-
1986. These respondents were maximum 18 years old in 1995, which is the first year after the break in the time series. 
Consequently, this subsample became of legal age after the data break. The result is convincingly robust and shows a 
positive correlation between patience and age at first incurrence of non-mortgage debt (Spearman's rho = 0.098; p-value 
= 0.000).  
18 This approximation of the average interest rate is exact if the debt evolves linearly between 2013 and 2014. If it does 
not, the computation of the average interest rate may introduce a measurement error. 
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flexible dummies for educational attainment along with other demographic characteristics. The 
negative effect of patience remains significant at the 1 percent level. Going from minimum to 
maximum patience (0 to 1) is associated with a reduction in the paid interest rate of about 0.5 
percentage points on average. 
Column (3) adds self-reported math grades obtained in school as a supplementary proxy for 
cognitive ability. The inclusion of math grade dummies does not affect the estimated effect of 
patience on paid interest rates. 
 
Table 3.2: Average interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt (%) regressed on covariates (OLS). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent children, and homeownership. 
The number of observations decreases in column (3) due to some of the respondents not reporting a math grade. 
 
The documented negative relationship between patience and paid interest rates is interesting in itself 
as it suggests that behavior on the loan market relates to time preferences. People borrow money to 
increase current consumption at the expense of future consumption. Therefore, the interest rate on 
debt can be viewed as the price paid for being impatient, where individuals who are more patient pay 
a lower price on average. Furthermore, the relationship between patience and interest rates will be 
taken into account in the following section on mortgage choice. 
 
Preferences and mortgage choice 
The above analyses have shown that patient individuals have lower ratios of non-mortgage loan to 
income, postpone the incurrence of their first non-mortgage debt further, and that they pay a lower 
Patience -0.689 *** -0.526 ** -0.553 **
(0.179) (0.175) (0.182)
Risk aversion -0.567 * -0.189 -0.217
(0.236) (0.232) (0.241)
Income decile dummies No Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No Yes
Constant 5.954 *** -8.427 -8.111
(0.194) (4.748) (5.205)
Observations 3958 3958 3636
(1) (2) (3)
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average interest rate on their debt once incurred. This section studies relationships between the 
experimental preference measures and mortgage choices in the field. The left panel in figure 3.3 plots 
a local polynomial regression curve of the share of mortgage holders holding IOMs against the 
patience measure. The right panel plots the share of mortgage holders holding ARMs against the 
measure of risk aversion. The plots indicate a negative relationship between patience and the 
probability of holding an IOM and a negative (but less significant) relationship between risk aversion 
and ARM holding. 
 
Figure 3.3: Interest-only mortgage and adjustable-rate mortgage plotted against patience and 
risk aversion, respectively. 
 
Notes: 1,514 observations. Mortgage type identified based on detailed loan information from Danish mortgage institutions 
on every mortgage contract held by the experimental respondents at the end of year 2014. 
Left-hand panel: Local polynomial regression of the share of mortgage holders holding IOMs on the patience measure. 
Right-hand panel: Local polynomial regression of the share of mortgage holders holding ARMs on the risk aversion 
measure. 
 
Next, I estimate probit regressions to substantiate the relationships between the experimental 
preference measures and mortgage choices. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the type 
of mortgage (IOM vs. repayment mortgage and ARM vs. FRM, respectively). The independent 
variables will include the experimental preference measures and household-level control variables on 
income, liquid asset holdings, loan to income ratio (mortgage and non-mortgage loans combined), 
and the average interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt.19 These four control variables are included 
to attenuate potential bias stemming from affordability and liquidity constraints influencing mortgage 
choices as well as being correlated with patience.20 To maximize the number of observations, I set 
19 I follow earlier studies, including Zeldes (1989) and Leth-Petersen (2010), which have used the ratio of liquid assets to 
disposable income as a proxy for liquidity constraints.  
20 For example, Epper et al. (2017) find that more patient individuals are less likely to be liquidity constrained. 
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the interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt equal to zero for mortgage holders not holding non-
mortgage debt.21 The right panel in appendix 5.5 shows the distribution of the resulting interest rates. 
While patience and risk aversion are measured at the individual level, the above-mentioned control 
variables are constructed at the household level to reflect that the purchase of a home and the 
associated choice of mortgage are typically decisions made at the household level rather than at the 
individual level. When I run similar regressions (not reported here) replacing the household-level 
controls with their individual-level counterparts, the results are not affected. Furthermore, I control 
for the ratio of mortgage loan to property value and demographic characteristics. Finally, I include 
year of mortgage origination fixed effects and control for the mortgage interest rate type in the 
repayment type regression and vice versa.22 
Earlier studies have found that risk preferences are domain-specific (e.g., Weber, Blais, & Betz, 
2002). In the present paper, the experimental measure of risk aversion is based on respondents’ 
willingness to invest in a risky investment project, which is potentially distinct from a mortgage 
choice. Dohmen et al. (2011) find that the general risk question used in the German Socio-Economic 
Panel is a favorable all-around predictor of risky behavior in the field. The online questionnaire that 
respondents in the present study filled out included a version of this general question on risk-taking.23 
Thus, the following estimations will also include specifications where said more general survey-based 
risk question replaces the experimental measure of risk aversion. The two measures of risk aversion 
are positively correlated: Spearman's rho = 0.173; p-value = 0.000. 
 
Determinants of mortgage repayment choice 
Table 3.3 shows estimation results from probit regressions of mortgage repayment type on the 
measures of patience and risk aversion and other covariates. The reported coefficients are marginal 
21 As a robustness test, I have repeated the mortgage choice regressions shown below in tables 3.2 and 3.3 excluding 
those 189 mortgage holders (12.5 percent) not having any non-mortgage debt. The results from this exercise (not reported) 
do not change the relationships between preferences and mortgage choices presented here. 
22 Koijen et al. (2009) introduced a theoretical model in which the long-term bond risk premium (difference between 
current nominal long interest rate and the average expected future nominal short interest rate) is the key determinant of 
mortgage choice. Households trade off the lower expected payments on ARMs against the higher variability/uncertainty 
of the payments. The higher the long-term bond risk premium, the more attractive is an ARM relative to an FRM. They 
find empirical evidence that a simple proxy for the long-term bond risk premium is a strong predictor for the probability 
of choosing an ARM over an FRM. In the present study, I include year of mortgage origination fixed effects in the 
regressions to control for the variation in the long-term bond risk premium. 
23 Survey question on risk aversion: Are you generally willing to take risks or do you try to avoid risks? 
   1 = very willing to take risks 
   … 
   7 = not at all willing to take risks 
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effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent holds an 
IOM and 0 if the respondent only holds repayment mortgages. Column (1) shows output from a 
parsimonious specification that only includes the experimental preference measures and year of 
mortgage origination fixed effects. The results show no effect of the risk aversion measure but a 
negative effect of patience, which is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. The marginal 
effect of -0.148 implies that moving from minimum to maximum patience (0 to 1) is associated with 
a reduction in the probability of having an IOM of about 15 percentage points on average. 
Column (2) shows results from adding income, liquid asset holdings, loan to income ratio 
(mortgage and non-mortgage loans combined), the average interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt, 
mortgage LTV, a dummy for whether the mortgage holder has an ARM, flexible dummies for 
educational attainment, and demographic characteristics. In the previous section, I documented that 
individuals who are less patient tend to use higher-cost non-mortgage borrowing, which points out 
that non-mortgage interest rates should be included in the current regression. It is noted that when the 
household’s average interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt is included in table 3.3, a positive 
relationship with the likelihood of choosing an IOM is seen. The more expensive a mortgage-holding 
household’s non-mortgage debt is, the more likely the household is to have an IOM. The marginal 
effect implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the average non-mortgage interest rate increases 
the probability of holding an IOM by 1.4 percentage points on average. From a personal financial 
point of view, this makes perfect sense: The lower initial mortgage payments associated with the 
choice of an IOM over a repayment mortgage implies that the household will have more cash 
available for paying down the more expensive non-mortgage debt or reducing the necessity to incur 
new non-mortgage debt to finance current consumption. It further appears that an increase in the 
mortgage LTV ratio is associated with an increased probability of choosing an IOM. As is also evident 
from table 2.1, column (3), IOMs are primarily used to borrow larger amounts relative to house value. 
Moreover, the results in table 3.3, column (2) show a positive relationship between holding an ARM 
and an IOM. 
Cognitive ability is a potential confounding factor in the analysis. It could be that both mortgage 
choices and the measures of risk aversion and patience are correlated with cognitive ability.24 In order 
to address this concern, column (3) controls for the self-reported most recent math grade obtained in 
school as an additional proxy for cognitive ability besides educational attainment and income. Adding 
24 For example, van Ooijen & van Rooij (2016) find that homeowners with higher levels of debt literacy are more likely 
to hold riskier mortgages. 
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self-reported math grades has a negligible effect on the estimated relationship between patience and 
the probability of having an IOM. 
Column (4) substitutes the experimental measure of risk aversion with the more general survey-
based question on risk aversion. Because of few observations in some of the answer categories, the 
survey measure of risk aversion is aggregated into two dummy variables indicating whether a 
respondent stated a risk aversion below or above the medium value, 1-3 and 5-7, respectively. As the 
experimental measure, the survey-based risk aversion measure is insignificant in explaining the 
mortgage repayment choice. 
The estimated negative effect of the patience measure on the probability of having an IOM is 
remarkably stable across the four specifications. The negative relationship is intuitively appealing: 
Patient individuals, who discount the future less relative to the present, are to a lesser extent attracted 
to lower initial mortgage payments followed by larger future outstanding loan balances offered by 
IOMs. Put differently, patient individuals are more willing to sacrifice present consumption to repay 
a mortgage loan.25  
 
  
25 The negative effect of patience on the probability of having an IOM is consistent with the finding in Rasmussen (2017). 
That paper uses the same sample and the same experimental patience measure and relates differences in individual-level 
patience to the demand for insurance. Across two different insurance domains, the paper finds that individuals who are 
more patient are more willing to pay an insurance premium in the present in order to be covered by insurance that might 
benefit them in the future. 
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Table 3.3: Probit regressions of interest-only mortgage dummy regressed on covariates 
(marginal effects at means). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for respondents who satisfy the description given by the 
variable name. Income ratios are based on annual income. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital 
status, and dependent children. The number of observations decreases in columns (3) and (4) due to some of the 
respondents not reporting a math grade. 
 
Determinants of mortgage interest rate choice 
Table 3.4 shows estimated marginal effects from probit regressions in which mortgage interest rate 
type is the dependent variable. The control variables correspond to those in table 3.3, while the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a respondent holds an ARM and 0 if 
a respondent only holds FRMs. Column (1) in table 3.4 shows a negative relationship between risk 
aversion and the probability of holding an ARM. Going from minimum to maximum risk aversion (0 
to 1) is associated with a reduction in the probability of having an ARM of about 10 percentage points 
on average. This supports the model prediction of Campbell & Cocco (2003) that ARMs are less 
Self-reported risk aversion, 1-3 (=1) 0.047
(0.041)
Self-reported risk aversion, 5-7 (=1) -0.030
(0.040)
Risk aversion -0.063 -0.024 -0.038
(0.050) (0.053) (0.055)
Patience -0.148 *** -0.135 ** -0.148 *** -0.145 **
(0.039) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
Ln(total household income) 0.004 0.034 0.029
(0.042) (0.045) (0.045)
Liquid assets to disp. income ratio, household level -0.032 -0.028 -0.029
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Loan to income ratio, household level 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household average interest rate, non-mortgage debt (%) 0.014 ** 0.016 *** 0.015 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Mortgage loan to value ratio 0.645 *** 0.634 *** 0.636 ***
(0.084) (0.086) (0.087)
Adjustable-rate mortgage (=1) 0.349 *** 0.341 *** 0.335 ***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
Year of mortgage origination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 1514 1514 1400 1400
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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attractive to risk averse individuals because such individuals are more concerned with the cash-flow 
risk of ARMs (i.e., the potential for higher future interest payments). There is no significant effect of 
the patience measure on ARM holding. Again, this is consistent with Campbell & Cocco’s model, 
where the effect of time preferences on the choice between an FRM and an ARM is ambiguous. 
However, after adding further covariates in columns (2) and (3) of table 3.4, the estimated effect 
of the risk aversion measure decreases and is no longer statistically significant. Instead, the results 
show that higher income households are more likely to choose ARMs. Additionally, there is a 
negative relationship between the mortgage LTV ratio and the probability of holding an ARM. This 
is in keeping with higher income households and households with smaller mortgage LTV ratios being 
less vulnerable to the potentially higher future interest payments of ARMs. Nevertheless, the 
likelihood of holding an ARM is increasing in the loan to income ratio (mortgage and non-mortgage 
loans combined) – possibly because households with high loan to income ratios who are financially 
hard up are willing to accept the cash-flow risk of ARMs to attain the lower debt service. In agreement 
with the result in table 3.3, homeowners with an IOM are more likely to hold an ARM. 
In column (4) of table 3.4, the more general survey-based question on risk aversion replaces the 
experimental measure. I do this to accommodate the conjecture that the experimental risk aversion 
measure is too domain-specific to have explanatory power on mortgage interest rate choices. 
Supporting Campbell & Cocco’s model, the results show that more risk averse respondents (those 
who stated a level of risk aversion above 4 on the 7-point scale) are less likely to have ARMs. In this 
specification with all control variables included, more risk averse respondents have 9 percentage 
points lower probability of holding an ARM relative to the respondents who self-reported the medium 
value of risk aversion (significant at the 1 percent level). 
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Table 3.4: Probit regressions of adjustable-rate mortgage dummy regressed on covariates 
(marginal effects at means). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for respondents who satisfy the description given by the 
variable name. Income ratios are based on annual income. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital 
status, and dependent children. The number of observations decreases in columns (3) and (4) due to some of the 
respondents not reporting a math grade. 
 
Patience and loan delinquencies 
As mentioned above, only one of the 1,514 mortgage holders in the sample was delinquent on a 
mortgage loan by the end of 2014. Considering delinquencies on all loans (mortgage and non-
mortgage) registered by the Danish tax authority, table 2.1 shows that the delinquency rate in the full 
sample is 8.6 percent, whereas it reduces to 1.7 percent for mortgage holders. Interestingly, when 
dividing mortgage holders into two groups according to the repayment type of their mortgages, table 
2.1 shows that IOM holders are significantly more likely to have a loan delinquency relative to the 
group with repayment mortgages (p-value = 0.01). It is therefore relevant to test whether patience, 
Self-reported risk aversion, 1-3 (=1) -0.010
(0.032)
Self-reported risk aversion, 5-7 (=1) -0.087 **
(0.031)
Risk aversion -0.102 * -0.062 -0.051
(0.048) (0.040) (0.041)
Patience -0.003 0.023 0.021 0.027
(0.037) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Ln(total household income) 0.190 *** 0.189 *** 0.179 ***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Liquid assets to disp. income ratio, household level 0.006 0.026 0.026
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Loan to income ratio, household level 0.044 *** 0.043 *** 0.042 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Household average interest rate, non-mortgage debt (%) 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Mortgage loan to value ratio -0.217 *** -0.198 *** -0.201 ***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.058)
Interest-only mortgage (=1) 0.223 *** 0.214 *** 0.210 ***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Year of mortgage origination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 1514 1514 1400 1400
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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having been shown to affect the choice between repayment mortgages and IOMs, is also a driver of 
loan delinquencies. Figure 3.4 plots a local polynomial regression curve of the share of respondents 
with loan delinquencies against the patience measure. The figure shows a negative relationship 
between patience and loan delinquency. 
 
Figure 3.4: Loan delinquency plotted against patience. 
 
Notes: 5,082 observations. Local polynomial regression of the share of respondents with loan delinquencies on the 
patience measure. 
 
Table 3.5 examines whether the negative correlation found in figure 3.4 is robust to controlling for 
covariates. The table shows estimation results from probit regressions of loan delinquency on the 
measures of patience and risk aversion and other covariates. The reported coefficients are marginal 
effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent is 
delinquent on a loan at the end of 2014 and 0 if the respondent does not have a loan delinquency. 
Column (1) shows output from a regression that only includes the experimental preference measures. 
The results show negative effects of both the patience and the risk aversion measures. Column (2) 
extends the analysis by adding income, educational attainment, and other demographic 
characteristics. Income and educational attainment serve in part as proxies for cognitive ability to 
control for the possibility that patience and repayment behavior are both affected by cognitive ability. 
The marginal effects of the preference measures decrease, but patience remains statistically 
significant at the 0.1 percent level. The marginal effect of -0.025 implies that going from minimum 
to maximum patience (0 to 1) is associated with a reduction in the probability of having a loan 
delinquency of 2.5 percentage points on average, which is economically significant compared to the 
baseline probability of being delinquent on a loan of 8.6 percent in the sample. To further control for 
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cognitive ability, column (3) controls for the self-reported math grade obtained in school. The 
estimated marginal effect of the patience measure is largely unaffected. In sum, the empirical results 
support the hypothesis outlined in the introductory section that there is an intertemporal aspect of 
repayment behavior. Individuals who are more patient are less likely to have loan delinquencies.  
 
Table 3.5: Probit regressions of loan delinquency dummy regressed on covariates (marginal 
effects at means). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent children, and homeownership. 
The number of observations decreases in column (3) due to some of the respondents not reporting a math grade. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper presents evidence that time and risk preference are closely related to debt behavior. 
Methodologically, I link individual-level preferences elicited in an incentivized online experiment to 
objectively measured heterogeneity in real-world debt behavior. I show that individuals who are more 
patient have lower ratios of non-mortgage loan to income, postpone the incurrence of their first non-
mortgage debt further, pay lower average interest rates on their non-mortgage debt, are less likely to 
choose mortgages with deferred amortization (interest-only mortgages), and are less likely to be 
delinquent on loans. Similarly, more risk averse mortgage holders are less likely to choose adjustable-
rate mortgages. Apart from the timing of first non-mortgage debt, I find that these relationships are 
maintained when controlling for socio-demographic variables. 
Since the onset of the global financial crises in 2008, macroprudential regulators have focused 
on the systemic risk imbedded in the mortgage market. On the one hand, households with ARMs or 
IOMs are – ceteris paribus – more exposed to situations with increasing interest rates and decreasing 
Patience -0.076 *** -0.025 *** -0.022 **
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Risk aversion -0.050 *** -0.015 -0.019 *
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
Income decile dummies No Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No Yes
Observations 5082 5082 4640
(1) (2) (3)
33
house prices potentially leading to low disposable income and technical insolvency. This would 
appear to warrant regulation to limit the penetration of these mortgage types in order to mitigate the 
risk to the financial system as a whole. On the other hand, this paper has shown that borrowers choose 
mortgages to match their preferences. IOMs are chosen to a greater extent by impatient individuals 
who are less willing to sacrifice present consumption to repay the mortgage. Choosing an IOM can 
be used as a means to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. Thus, IOMs can enhance the welfare 
of individuals who expect their future income to be higher. Another benefit of the lower initial 
mortgage payments associated with choosing an IOM over a repayment mortgage is that the 
household will have more cash available for paying down more expensive non-mortgage debt. 
Alternatively, the extra available cash can reduce the necessity to incur new non-mortgage debt to 
finance current consumption. The paper provides evidence that households who pay higher interest 
rates on non-mortgage debt are more likely to have an IOM. Furthermore, lower initial mortgage 
payments can enable IOM holders to invest more in financial assets other than real estate and thus 
benefit from portfolio diversification. ARMs can also enhance welfare by providing a lower current 
interest rate to individuals who are willing to accept the risk of potentially higher future interest 
payments.  
The desire to limit ARMs or IOMs due to the consideration for systemic risk should be balanced 
with welfare costs associated with such a limitation, as the scope of choosing mortgage contracts to 
match preferences would be reduced. However, although individuals can benefit from being able to 
choose mortgages that match their preferences, the present study also finds that IOM holders are more 
likely to have non-mortgage loan delinquencies relative to a group holding repayment mortgages. If 
it is conceivable that the reported negative relationship between patience and loan defaults would also 
apply to mortgage defaults in the event of a recession, then this could call for more regulation to limit 
the latitude with which borrowers are able to choose mortgage types to match their time preferences. 
As an example, the Danish government recently urged mortgage institutions to limit new ARM and 
IOM lending to borrowers with the highest loan to income ratios in areas where house prices have 
increased most rapidly. This action was based on a recommendation from the Danish Systemic Risk 
Council (2017). This approach was intended to reduce the available mortgage products for those 
borrowers who are most vulnerable to increasing interest rates and decreasing house prices, while 
others can still benefit from a complete selection of mortgage products. 
As a concluding remark, this paper supports the external validity of experimental preference 
measures. Few studies have been in a position to link experimental data to objectively measured 
34
financial behavior in the field. The finding in the present work that experimentally elicited preferences 
can be used to explore the relationship between preferences and real-world financial behavior is, 
therefore, promising from an experimental perspective. 
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5. Appendix 
Appendix 5.1: Screenshot of a saving choice. 8 vs. 16 weeks. 
Notes: The blue saving bar summarizes the outcome of the allocation. In this case, the respondent chose to keep 500 
points in the 8 weeks account (left) and save 500 points (right) such that he would get 525 points in 16 weeks. 
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Appendix 5.2: Screenshot of an investment choice. 
 
Notes: The blue investment bar summarizes the outcome of the allocation. In this case, the respondent chose to keep 
500 points on the risk-free account (left) and invest 500 points in the risky investment project (right) such that he would 
get 750 or 1255 points in total depending on the outcome of the investment project. 
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Appendix 5.3: Means of selected characteristics. 
 
Notes: The p-values are from unconditional t-tests of equality of means. Variables are based on 2014 values. The random 
10 percent sample of the Danish population is drawn among those who are not in the gross sample (i.e., did not live in 
Copenhagen Municipality when they were seven years old), but who were born in the same period (1973-1986). (=1) 
indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for individuals who satisfy the description given by the variable name. 
Liquid assets include bank deposits and market values of stocks and bonds. The table includes individuals for whom a 
full set of register variables is available. 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.4: Non-mortgage loan to income ratio regressed on covariates 
(tobit, lower limit = 0). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent children, and homeownership. 
The number of observations decreases in column (3) due to some of the respondents not reporting a math grade. Non-
mortgage loan to income ratio is censored at p95. 
 
 
  
Respondents Non- p-value Gross sample Population p-value
respondents
Age                                         34.17                                34.03                                0.011                                        34.05                                34.97                                0.000
Woman (=1)                                          0.50                                0.49                              0.058                                         0.49                                0.50                              0.001
Single (=1)                                          0.34                                0.41                              0.000                                         0.40                                0.31                              0.000
Dependent children (=1)                                        0.49                                0.48                              0.377                                         0.48                                0.55                              0.000
Homeowner (=1)                                         0.33                                0.29                              0.000                                         0.29                                0.51                              0.000
Years of education                                        14.41                                13.79                                0.000                                        13.88                                14.33                                0.000
Ln(Total income)                                        12.63                                12.51                                0.000                                        12.52                                12.63                                0.000
Ln(Liquid assets)                                        10.35                                10.03                                0.000                                        10.07                                10.24                                0.000
Observations                                          5082                              30611                                35693                                        35693                                83464                              119157
(1) Respondents vs. non-respondents (2) Gross sample vs. 10 % of population
Patience -0.173 *** -0.128 *** -0.132 **
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Risk aversion -0.062 -0.086 -0.053
(0.051) (0.049) (0.052)
Income decile dummies No Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No Yes
Constant 0.692 *** -2.434 * -2.093
(0.042) (0.984) (1.100)
Observations 5082 5082 4640
(1) (2) (3)
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Appendix 5.5: Distributions of computed interest rates paid on non-mortgage debt. 
 
Notes: Average interest rates are computed based on non-mortgage interest payments during 2014 and amounts of 
outstanding non-mortgage debt at the end of 2013 and 2014. The computed interest rates are censored at the 5th and the 
95th percentiles. Bin width: 0.5 percentage points. 
Left-hand panel: 3,958 individual-level observations. Average computed interest rate: 5.2 percent. 
Right-hand panel: 1,514 household-level observations for mortgage holders. The interest rate paid on non-mortgage debt 
is set to zero for those 189 mortgage holders not holding non-mortgage debt. Average computed interest rate: 4.6 percent.  
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1 Introduction
Wealth inequality is significant. The share of total wealth owned by the 10 percent wealthiest is in the range of
60-90 percent over the last 150 years in both the US and in Europe (Piketty and Saez 2014), and wealth inequality
is the focus of much public and academic debate (see e.g. the symposium on wealth and inequality in the 2015
winter volume of the Journal of Economic Perspectives). Work on understanding the driving forces behind wealth
inequality has focused on differences across people in income processes, wealth transfers, saving propensities,
capital returns and public policy (e.g. Heathcote et al. 2009; Piketty 2014; Hubmer et al. 2016; Boserup et al. 2016,
2017; Fagereng et al. 2016; De Nardi and Fella 2017). Yet, knowledge is still limited. Standard textbook theory
predicts that differences in how much people discount future consumption/utility generate wealth inequality.
Patient individuals have lower discount rates, save more, and therefore become more wealthy. This paper is the
first to test this hypothesis directly by relating discounting behaviour of individuals to their actual position in
the wealth distribution. Experimental evidence points to pervasive heterogeneity in discounting behaviour (e.g.
Mischel et al. 1989; Barsky et al. 1997; Andreoni and Sprenger 2012; Toubia et al. 2013), but without relating it
to wealth inequality. Macro models suggest that heterogeneity in discounting behaviour may have significant
effects on wealth inequality (Krusell and Smith 1998; Carroll et al. 2017), as well as having consequences for the
propagation of business cycle shocks and the effects of stimulus policy (Carroll et al. 2014; Krueger et al. 2016), but
without measuring discounting behaviour directly.
To test whether differences across people in subjective discounting can explain observed wealth inequality, we
combine experimentally generated data providing information about preferences of individuals and administra-
tive data providing detailed information about their wealth in real life. The analysis is carried out in Denmark
where this data collection strategy is possible. People born during 1973-1983 in the capital city of Copenhagen
were invited to participate in online, incentivized experiments in February 2015, giving information about prefer-
ences for about 3,600 individuals, which is a large sample in an experimental context. We select cohorts who are
in mid-life at the time where we elicit discounting behaviour. This is at a point in the life-cycle where we suspect
the ranking of wealth to be less influenced by the timing of education and retirement and where observed income
is arguably a good proxy for permanent income (Haider and Solon 2006). We elicit time and risk preference pa-
rameters using state-of-the-art experimental methods similar to Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Gneezy and
Potters (1997). In the time preference experiments, subjects choose between receiving a sum of money paid out
in eight or in sixteen weeks, and the money is paid out automatically to their bank accounts. The data collected
in the experiment are merged at the individual level to longitudinal income and wealth records as well as other
administrative registers covering the period 2000-2014. The income and wealth components are third-party re-
ported directly from employers, banks, financial intermediaries etc. to the tax authorities who use them for tax
assessment and selection for audit, and they are therefore of a high quality (Card et al. 2010; Kleven et al. 2011).
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Our results reveal a strong correlation between experimentally elicited patience and the individuals’ positions
in the wealth distribution, measured by the percentile rank of the individual in the time-conditional within-cohort
distribution (e.g. Chetty et al. 2014b). The 1/3 of the subjects who are most patient lie on average six percentiles
higher up in the wealth distribution than the 1/3 of the subjects who are least patient, and the 1/3 of the subjects
in the middle group lie, on average, in between the two other groups in the wealth distribution.
A standard assumption in economic theory is that individual preferences are fixed (Stigler and Becker 1977).
Consistent with this assumption we show that the relationship between our elicited patience measure and the
position in the wealth distribution is stable over the 15 year period where we measure wealth.
To assess the magnitude of this relationship, we compare with the association between wealth inequality and
educational attainment, which Huggett et al. (2011) argue to be one of the most important factors contributing
to life time inequality. When comparing the 1/3 of the subjects with the lowest education level (compulsory
schooling level or only slightly more) to the 1/3 with the highest education level (college degree or more), we find
a difference of seven percentiles in the wealth distribution. This suggests that preferences are roughly as important
as education in determining a person’s position in the wealth distribution. Taken at face value this could simply
reflect that discounting and educational attainment are correlated, but we show in a multivariate analysis that the
relationship between discounting and position in the wealth distribution is only slightly smaller when controlling
for education. This is also the case when holding other factors such as school grades, income, initial wealth
and parental wealth fixed thereby controlling for other mechanisms that might confound the correlation between
discounting and wealth. This indicates that there exists a significant relationship between discounting and wealth
operating through the savings channel as predicted by theory.
Our sample is large in an experimental context, but too small to study the dynamics in the very top of the
wealth distribution. However, we do find a significant relationship between patience and the propensity to be in
the top 10% of the wealth distribution, and we also show that patience is correlated with different sub-components
of net wealth.
Net wealth may be constrained from below by borrowing limits. The presence of credit constraints is a leading
theoretical and empirical explanation of why fiscal stimulus policy may be effective (Zeldes 1989; Johnson et al.
2006). Individuals may become credit constrained because of income shocks, but as pointed out by recent research
credit constraints may also be self-imposed because relatively impatient individuals have less savings and are
more likely to be affected by credit constraints (Carroll et al. 2014, 2017). More generally, the propagation of
shocks is typically stronger in an environment where discount factors are heterogeneous because more people are
affected by credit constraints (Krueger et al. 2016). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that individuals who
are relatively impatient are more likely to be affected by credit constraints. This is documented using two tests
for being affected by constraints. In one test we follow the previous empirical literature (e.g. Leth-Petersen 2010)
and consider people as being affected by constraints if they are observed holding liquid funds worth less than
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one month of disposable income (hard credit constraint), and in the other we consider people as being affected by
constraints if they face a high interest rate on borrowing (soft credit constraint).
The next section provides a more detailed description of the relationship to existing literature. Section 3 illus-
trates within a basic life-cycle savings model why we should expect heterogeneity across individuals in subjective
discounting to generate differences in their wealth levels at all ages, and the key potential confounders when
testing this hypothesis. Section 4 presents the empirical setup, including the sampling scheme, the experimental
design, and the register data on wealth and characteristics of the participants. Section 5 goes through the main
results and presents additional analyses and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relationship to literature
Our work is related to at least three different strands of literature, the experimental literature concerned with
eliciting subjective preference parameters, the macro economic literature on inequality and its causing factors, and
a literature attempting to quantify the intergenerational transmission of savings behaviour. In this section we go
through each of them in turn.
Experimental literature: An early experimental result revealing differences in the degree of patience is the fa-
mous marshmallow test conducted with young children (Mischel et al. 1989). The experimental literature has
made much progress on quantifying preferences at the individual level through experimental methods, e.g. Epper
et al. (2011); Attema et al. (2016), and several studies using experimental methods to elicit preference parameters
have found evidence suggesting that there is pervasive cross sectional heterogeneity in preferences. Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012), whose basic elicitation methods we apply, find vast individual-level heterogeneity in their data,
as do Abdellaoui et al. (2009); Epper et al. (2011); Abdellaoui et al. (2013); Bleichrodt et al. (2016), albeit the focus
in these studies is not on relating preferences to the wealth distribution. A standard concern about extrapolating
the result from experimental studies to real-life is that experimental studies are often based on relatively small
samples, often consisting of students (see e.g. the discussion in Exadaktylos et al. 2013). Another concern is that
experimentally elicited measures of preferences are potentially context-specific and the result of the specific lab-
oratory setting applied. Frederick et al. (2002) summarize the early experimental literature measuring subjective
discount rates and go through a number of challenges associated with the measurement of preferences. To allevi-
ate these concerns, some studies confront elicited preferences with real-life data. However, these studies typically
do not focus on savings behaviour,1 and very few studies have been able to confront elicited subjective discount
factors with data on real-life wealth. Exceptions are Meier and Sprenger (2010) who find that (present biased) time
preferences correlate with credit card borrowing, and Meier and Sprenger (2012) who find that the degree of time
discounting predicts repayment of credit as measured by FICO credit scores.
1For example, Chabris et al. (2008) show that individual discount rates predict inter-individual variation in health-related field behaviours,
for example exercise, BMI, and smoking. Lawless et al. (2013) find that elicited time preferences for money predicts smoking cessation and
obesity. Backes-Gellner et al. (2017) confront elicited patience with real-life data on student outcomes such as program completion and find
that elicited patience predicts real-life outcomes.
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Macro models of inequality: Traditional macro-economic models of consumption and savings with heteroge-
neous agents assume agents are homogeneous in terms of preferences and the stochastic properties of the income
process (Heathcote et al. 2009; De Nardi and Fella 2017). A common feature of this class of models is that in-
dividuals face different shock sequences and thereby realizations of income, which lead them to make different
consumption-savings decisions. Initial conditions may vary across individuals, for example by allowing for het-
erogeneity in initial wealth or innate productivity, which add additional potential for heterogeneity in consump-
tion and savings choices. As relatively good data on earnings are widely available, this has been the preferred way
to introduce heterogeneity. An alternative way to introduce heterogeneous “initial conditions” is to let preferences
vary across individuals, keeping the assumption that preferences of each individual is fixed. Krusell and Smith
(1998) present one of the earliest examples of models featuring heterogeneous discount factors, and they show
that a limited degree of discount heterogeneity can generate a significant increase in wealth inequality compared
to the reference case with homogeneous preferences. More recently, Carroll et al. (2017) present a model where
discount heterogeneity is needed for fitting the wealth distribution. Economists have historically been treating
preferences as stable over time and as similar among people, see for example Stigler and Becker (1977), and have
been reluctant to introduce preference heterogeneity in order to make models fit the data better. The background
for this position is that it is difficult to discipline such an exercise when no direct information about preferences is
available (Heathcote et al. 2009).
Intergenerational literature: Our study is also related to two recent papers examining the correlation across gen-
erations in wealth and savings behaviour. Black et al. (2015) and Fagereng et al. (2016), using Swedish and Nor-
wegian adoption data, find that children are persistently influenced by the savings behaviour of their adoption
parents suggesting that economic behaviour is different among people and that it plays an important role for the
accumulation of wealth later in life and hence for wealth inequality.
3 Theory
This section first illustrates within a simple neoclassical, deterministic life-cycle savings model why we should
expect heterogeneity across individuals in subjective discounting to generate differences in their wealth levels at
all ages, and shows some key potential confounders when testing this hypothesis. Afterwards, we discuss various
extensions of the simple framework.
3.1 A basic neoclassical model of individual life-cycle savings
Assume an individual chooses spending c(a) over the life-cycle a ∈ (0, T) so as to maximize the discounted utility
function
U =
ˆ T
0
e−ρau (c (a)) da, u (c (a)) ≡ c (a)
1−θ
1− θ (1)
where u (·) is instantaneous utility, θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ρ is the time preference
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rate/subjective discount rate reflecting the degree of impatience. The flow budget constraint is
w˙ (a) = rw (a) + y (a)− c (a) , (2)
where y (a) is income excluding capital income, w (a) is wealth, r is the real interest rate yielding capital income
rw (a). Utility (1) is maximized subject to the budget constraint (2), a given level of initial wealth w (0) and the
No Ponzi game condition, w (T) ≥ 0. The solution is characterized by a standard Euler equation/Keynes-Ramsey
rule, which may be used together with the budget constraint to derive the following closed-form relationship
between the wealth level of an individual at age a in the life-cycle and the different wealth determinants (see
Appendix A):
w (a) = Y
γ (a)− 1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ a
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
 era, (3)
where Y is lifetime resources equal to the present value of income over the life-cycle plus initial wealth, while γ (a)
is the share of lifetime resources received by the individual up to age a:
Y ≡
ˆ T
0
y (a) e−rada+ w (0) , γ (a) ≡
´ a
0 y (τ) e
−rτdτ + w (0)
Y
.
From the wealth equation (3) follows that the wealth level of an individual w (a) starts at the given initial value
w (0) and goes to 0 at the end of the life span. The wealth level may both increase or decrease when going through
the life-cycle (higher a), and it may become negative (this happens for example, if initial wealth is zero, w (0) = 0,
and income equals zero, y (a) = 0, at the beginning of the period, in which case wealth starts by decreasing from
its initial level of zero).
From expression (3) follows the main prediction (see Appendix B):
Differences in discounting across people (ρ) generate differences in savings behaviour (c (a) profiles) that generate inequal-
ity in wealth (cross-sectional variation in w (a)), with patient people having most wealth at all points in the life-cycle (a)
conditional on the other wealth determinants (Y,γ (a) , T, r, θ).
This shows that subjective discounting and wealth is related through the savings channel, and that when mea-
suring this correlation empirically the potential confounders are differences across people in permanent income
Y, time profile of income γ (a), (expected) lifetime T, real interest rate r on savings, and the CRRA parameter θ
reflecting the degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption.
If, for example, patient individuals attain higher education levels and therefore higher permanent income Y
then this creates a positive relationship between patience and wealth beyond the savings mechanism. On the
other hand, more education would normally also imply a steeper income profile (lower values of γ (a)), which in
isolation reduce the level of wealth at a given age.
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Note that differences in the CRRA preference parameter θ have ambiguous effects on wealth as shown in
Appendix C. A higher θ reduces wealth if r > ρ and increases wealth if r < ρ. Intuitively, a higher θ implies a
stronger preference for consumption smoothing, which flattens the consumption profile. If the initial consumption
profile is increasing (decreasing), occurring when r > ρ (r < ρ). then this increases (decreases) consumption in the
first part of life leading to lower (higher) wealth over the life-cycle.
Note also that the theory does not point to a clear relationship between differences in patience and the cross-
sectional variation in consumption levels. Patient individuals have, ceteris paribus, lower consumption levels
early in life, but higher consumption levels later in life compared to impatient individuals.
3.2 Extensions
Income shocks: The model allows only for deterministic variation in income over the life-cycle. This is in con-
trast to standard macro models of wealth inequality where income develops stochastically and is uninsurable
(De Nardi and Fella 2017). This gives variation in wealth beyond the income determinants in the above model
(Y,γ (a)). Krusell and Smith (1998) show that heterogeneity in discounting behaviour may improve the ability of
the basic macro model to explain wealth inequality and, as described in the introduction, many other papers have
afterwards included heterogeneous discounting in macro models of wealth inequality.
Borrowing constraints: The model has a perfect capital market with the same real interest rate r for all borrowing
and savings. A large literature has examined theoretically and empirically the role of borrowing constraints to
explain the persistent effects of business cycle shocks and the effectiveness of stimulus policy (Zeldes 1989; Leth-
Petersen 2010; Krueger et al. 2016).
To see the implications of including (hard) borrowing constraints, consider in our simple model the special
case where consumers can never have negative wealth, i.e. w (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ (0, T). Assume initial wealth w (0)
is zero and income is constant, y (a) = y for all a. For patient individuals with ρ < r, the constraint is not binding,
because they would wish to have an increasing consumption profile, implying that the wealth equation (3) still
applies.
For impatient individuals with ρ > r, wealth becomes zero at all points in the life-cycle, w (a) = 0 for all a.
These individuals would prefer a decreasing consumption profile over the life-cycle implying borrowing over the
life-cycle. However, since this is not possible because of the borrowing constraint they will end up consuming
their current income. All individuals with ρ > r, but different degrees of impatience ρ, will then end up having
the same wealth at all points in time (zero in this case). Thus, borrowing constraints may imply that impatient
individuals (ρ above some threshold) are constrained from borrowing, and this implies that wealth is uncorrelated
with impatience for this group.
A more "soft" version of borrowing constraints is that the interest on loans is larger than on deposits and that
more borrowing implies higher (marginal) interest rates, reflecting that marginal lending is less likely to be covered
by collateral and more likely to be subject to default. This implies that the marginal interest rate on additional funds
50
for consumption is (weakly) decreasing in the level of wealth, corresponding to r (w) where r′ (w) ≤ 0. As more
impatient individuals are more willing to pay a higher interest rate, we would ceteris paribus expect a correlation
between subjective discounting and the marginal interest rates across individuals.
In the empirical analysis, we use measures of both hard and soft borrowing constraints to examine whether
there exists correlation between subjective discount factors and the propensity to be borrowing constrained.
Endogenous income and human capital formation: We have assumed exogenous income. Work effort and human
capital accumulation may well be related to impatience (Blinder and Weiss 1976), which would affect wealth
beyond the savings mechanism described in the above model. However, this does not necessarily change the
above result. Consider for example the following extension of the basic model where an individual chooses the
share of time spent on work ly (a), human capital formation lh (a) and leisure lu (a) at all ages a such that ly (a) +
lh (a) + lu (a) = 1. Income now depends on hours worked and the level of human capital h (a), which depends on
time spent on education:
y = f (h (a) , ly (a)) ,
h˙ (a) = g
(
h (a) , lh (a)
)
, h (0) given,
where f (·) and g (·) are production functions with standard properties. Finally the utility function is extended
with utility from leisure such that
U =
ˆ T
0
e−ρa [u (c (a)) + v (lu (a))] da,
where v (·) is a convex function. In this case, the first order condition for spending gives again the standard
Keynes-Ramsey rule and when combined with the budget constraint (2), we again obtain the wealth expression
(3). Hence, in the extended model it is still the case that a correlation between wealth and subjective discounting
reflects the mechanism going through the savings channel if we just condition on the other wealth determinants,
since the mechanisms going through income and human capital are captured by controlling for permanent income
Y and the income profile parameter γ (a).
Wealth transfers: Inter vivo transfers and bequest influence wealth inequality (De Nardi 2004; Boserup et al.2016;
2017). The model does not explicitly include wealth transfers, but wealth transfers received may be included in
y (a), in which case the wealth expression (3) is unchanged. In a similar vein, we may interpret c (a) as spending
including transfers. From an empirical point of view, transfers only matter if they are correlated with subjective
discounting (after controlling for income and the other wealth determinants described above). If, for example,
more patient individuals are also more prone to save in order to leave bequests then this creates a positive rela-
tionship between patience and wealth running through savings. Thus, the main prediction is the same. The only
difference is that the savings are motivated by giving consumption possibilities to others in the future rather than
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own future consumption.
4 Data, experimental design and empirical approach
Our overall approach is to measure preferences using experimental techniques for a stratified sample drawn from
the population and linking this information at the individual level to administrative records with third-party re-
ported longitudinal information about wealth, income and demographic characteristics covering the period 2000-
2014 in order to explore whether differences in elicited patience are predictive of differences in observed wealth.
Combining experimental data with administrative register data is made possible by the unique Danish research
infrastructure, whereby data can be linked across modes of data collection using social security numbers.
In order to test the hypothesis that preference heterogeneity is related to the position in the wealth distribution,
we maintain the assumption that preferences are stable across time and (potentially) only vary across individuals.
Inherent to the basic theory is that discount factors impact savings decisions, and the theory consequently predicts
that preference heterogeneity, i.e. variation in patience across individuals, will be related to wealth inequality. The
theory also suggests that the association between preferences and the accumulation of wealth may be confounded
by factors such as the individual earnings path, initial conditions, e.g. ability and initial wealth, and transfers. Our
approach is to document that elicited patience predicts the position in the wealth distribution over an extended
period, 15 years, and to investigate whether this relationship is confounded by any of these factors. An important
aspect of the empirical approach is to confront the experimental measures with real-life data in order to ensure
that experimentally elicited preference measures are relevant for describing real-life decisions. Before turning to
the results the remainder of this section describes the sampling scheme, the experimental design and its imple-
mentation. Also, a description of the register data with longitudinal information about wealth, income and a host
of characteristics of the individuals in our sample is provided.
4.1 Sample and recruitment for the experiment
We recruited respondents by sampling from the Danish population register individuals satisfying the following
two criteria: (i) born in the period 1973-1983, and (ii) residing in the municipality of Copenhagen (Københavns
Kommune) when they were seven years old, i.e. we sent out invitations to the complete birth cohorts meeting the
sampling requirements. Statistics Denmark, the central authority on Danish statistics, provided a data set of all
individuals who met the sample criteria. The data set contained names, current addresses, and civil registration
numbers. We invited everyone in the gross sample to participate by sending personal invitation letters in hard
copy. Each letter contained a unique username and password combination needed to log in to a web page through
which the experiments was conducted. Upon receiving the invitation letter invitees could decide to participate by
logging in to the web page.
We invited a total of 27,613 subjects for participation in our online experiment taking place in February 2015.2
2Only 424 (1.54 percent) of the 27,613 invitation letters bounced back.
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4,190 (15.17 percent) of all invitees logged in to our experimental platform. The vast majority (3,717 or 88.71
percent) of subjects who did so successfully completed the experiment and received a payment. Our analyses
include a total of 3,634 subjects. 83 subjects had to be dropped from our data because of data protection issues and
mismatches of socioeconomic characteristics with register data.3
We employed the following recruiting procedure: Subjects received an official invitation from the University
of Copenhagen by letter mail.4 It informed subjects about the login details, the expected time to complete the
experiment and contact information for support.5 Subjects were informed that the payment for participating in
the study would depend on their choices, and that the final payment would, on average, correspond to a decent
hourly wage.6
Subjects who followed the web link in the invitation letter arrived at a login page. Upon successful login, a
single page with introductory instructions appeared. These instructions described the outline of the experiment
and payment modalities. Subjects were also presented with a graphical depiction of a wheel they had to spin at
the end of the experiment. They were told that the spin of the wheel at the end determines the choice situation
that counts for payment, and, hence, that all choices they make during the course of the experiment could be
picked and were relevant. There were three elicitation tasks, a time task, a risk task and a social task. Each
task was accompanied by short video instructions and comprehension questions.7 The three blocks appeared in
individualized random order. Within each block, the set of choice situations was once again randomized. Our
main focus in this paper is the time task, which is described in detail in the next subsection. A description of the
risk task can be found in Appendix F. The present study does not use data from the social task.
The average completion time was 46.85 minutes. It took the fastest subject 21.25 minutes to complete the
experiment. The distribution of completion times has positive skew. We did not prevent subjects from taking
breaks during the experiment session. However, once they logged in for the first time, they were required to
finish the experiment within a two week time frame. Our elicitation tasks involved real monetary incentives.
During the study, we used an experimental currency. 100 points corresponded to 25 Danish kroner (DKK).8 This
provided us more flexibility for calibration of the choice situations. To determine the choice situation relevant for
payment, subjects spun a wheel containing all the choice situations they were confronted with. The random choice
situation at which the wheel stopped was then displayed together with the subject’s decision. Then, the points
were exchanged into money. Payment was done via direct bank transfer at the relevant date (details follow below).
When converting from points to DKK, we rounded the amount up to the next unit. Possible payments considering
all three tasks ranged from 88 to 418 DKK. The average amount paid out was 245.23 DKK. A distribution of
3For checking whether the person participating corresponded to the person who was invited we initially asked check questions about the
age and gender of the person participating.
4An English translation of the invitation letter is available in Appendix D.
5The main experiment was preceded by an extensive pretesting phase. This phase comprised of focus groups and a series of pilot experi-
ments. We used these pretests to improve the task presentation, to calibrate the choice situations and to obtain expected times for completion.
6We left the exact range of amounts open to not induce reference points.
7An English transcript of the relevant parts of the video instructions can be found in the last section of the thesis.
81 USD ' 6.5 DKK at the time of the study.
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payments can be found in Appendix G.
4.2 Measuring patience
To elicit an index for time preferences we exposed subjects to a series of choice tasks. The data generated by these
tasks serve as an input for our behavioural measure of patience, which we describe in more detail below.
4.2.1 Time task
To elicit intertemporal choice behaviour, we use convex time budgets (CTBs for short; Andreoni and Sprenger
2012). Our presentation format differs from what has been originally proposed in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012).
Specifically, we depict intertemporal choices graphically and present only a single allocation choice per page.9 We
used a total of 15 independent choice situations that differed in terms of payment dates and interest payments.
Figure 1 depicts screenshots of a typical choice situation. The left panel shows a typical choice screen in its
initial state. The right panel presents the same situation after selection of an allocation.
Figure 1: Example of choice situation
(a) Initial screen
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
today in 8 weeks in 16 weeks
Bekræft
save less -
save more +
Confirm
(b) Selected option
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
you keep 400 you save 600 you receive 630
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
100 105
today in 8 weeks in 16 weeks
Bekræft
save less -
save more +
Confirm
Notes: The figure shows screenshots of a typical choice situation. The left panel shows a typical choice screen in its initial state. The right panel
presents the same situation after selection of an allocation.
At the beginning of each choice situation, each subject was endowed with ten colored 100-points blocks. These
ten blocks were allocated at the earlier of the two payment dates (in Figure 1a: “in 8 weeks”). The subject then
had the possibility to move some (or all) of these ten blocks at the later date (in Figure 1a: “in 16 weeks”). When
shifting a block into the future, the subject was compensated by a (situation-specific) interest payment. That is,
each 100-points block’s value increased once it was deferred to the later point in time. In the example depicted in
Figure 1, each block allocated at the later point in time has a value of 105 points. The subject thus had to decide
how many of the ten blocks he wanted to keep for earlier receipt, and how many of the blocks he wanted to
9We also avoid the simultaneous presentation of dates and delays. This is motivated by previous results (Read et al. 2005) reporting be-
havioural differences between these two presentation formats.
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postpone for later receipt. Figure 1b presents an example selection. In this example, the subject chose to allocate
four 100-points blocks in 8 weeks, and save the remaining six 100-points blocks for receipt in 16 weeks. Deferring
the receipt of the latter six blocks led a total interest payment of 30 points. Choices were made by clicking (or
touching) the respective block, and then moving around the horizontal savings bar. Alternatively, it was possible
to use the keyboard or the buttons at the very top. Once a definitive choice was made, the subject clicked on the
“Confirm” button at the bottom right. The decision was then stored in the database and it was no longer possible
to revert the choice. The next (randomly selected) choice situation was presented thereafter. Once all 15 choice
situations were presented, the experiment continued with the next task or the end-of-experiment questionnaire.
Choice situations involved three different payment dates: “today”, “in 8 weeks”, and “in 16 weeks”. Com-
binations of all three payment dates were used in the experiment. We decided to state delays in terms of weeks
(instead of months) to prevent possible weekday effects. The interest rates applied varied across choice tasks. For
example, for the five choice tasks asking subjects to choose between receiving payments in 8 weeks or 16 weeks
we applied interest rates in the interval 5-25 percent.10 The payments were consolidated on a per-day basis. The
compiled list of transactions were then sent electronically to the bank for implementation of the payout. Subjects
knew that the payment was initiated either at the same day, or exactly 8 or 16 weeks later. Hence, the payment
dates shown on screen refer to the point in time where the transaction was actually initiated. It took one day to
transfer the money to the subjects “NemKonto”, which is a publicly registered bank account that every Danish
citizen possesses. Exceptions were non-banking days, such as weekends or holidays. In this case, the transaction
occurred at the subsequent banking day.
4.2.2 The patience measure
The collected choice task data enable us to calculate a non-parametric measure of patience.11 That is, we construct
a measure that is specific to each individual in our sample, and this measure is based on choice data only and does
not involve auxiliary assumptions on the structure of individual preferences. Our patience index is constructed
by taking the choice variable z, i.e. the number of blocks saved for late receipt. We then normalize and aggregate
the measure across the various choice situations. Aggregation is performed using the median, and it ensures that
our measure is robust to single outliers in choice.12 For constructing our patience measure, we take the five choice
situations that involve allocations between t1 = 8 weeks and t2 = 16 weeks.13 We do this to remove any potential
confound caused by including the present. In the robustness section we show that our results are robust to using
indices based on trade-offs between “today” and “in 8 weeks”, or “today” and “in 16 weeks”.
10These rates amount to annualized interest rates in the range of 16-282%. The population discount rate, estimated using a random parameter
model, equals to 36.1% per annum. The rates we find therefore lie in a similar range as those reported in the original paper introducing CTBs
(Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)) and other studies reviewed in the literature section. It can be expected that discount rates for larger stake sizes
are considerably lower. This “magnitude effect” (see Frederick et al. (2002)) would change the size of the discount rates, but not the relative
position of subjects in the distribution. The latter is what we are interested in.
11We explicitly refer to our index as “patience” and not “time preferences” (see e.g. Andreoni and Sprenger 2012) to make clear that many
other factors than deep preferences affect revealed discount rates (see e.g. the discussions in Frederick et al. 2002 and Epper 2015).
12As we deal with an ordinal index, the median is the proper aggregator. Our results, however, do not change if we take the arithmetic mean
instead.
13These are labeled choiceId ∈ {11, ..15} in Table A1 of Appendix E.
55
Our patience index is defined as follows:
φpatience = median
( z
10
)
, (4)
where z denotes the number of blocks allocated at the later point in time, i.e. in 16 weeks.
φpatience is an index of (longer-run) patience with φpatience ∈ [0, 1]. Due to the discreteness of our measures
(10 blocks were allocated), our index can take values in 1/10th steps. Higher values of φpatience indicate greater
patience and a φpatience of one indicates timing indifference. As a consequence of the way φpatience is constructed
censoring occurs at both ends of the scale, i.e. it is not possible to detect negative values or values larger than what
the experimental scenarios span. Our non-parametric measure displays substantial heterogeneity. The histogram
in Figure 2 depicts the distribution of our patience index. The vertical lines indicate tertile cut-off points. In many
of our empirical analyses we split the patience index in tertiles of high, medium and low patience in order to
facilitate visualization. Importantly, we find substantial individual-level variation in our sample, and it is this
variation which we expect will be able to predict wealth inequality.
Figure 2: Histogram of patience index
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the patience index computed from expression (4) using the experimental data. The vertical lines
indicate tertile cut-off points.
4.3 Register data and the measurement of wealth and other characteristics
The choice data from the experiment are linked with Danish administrative register data at the individual level.14
14The participants were not informed that the data from the experiment would be linked with the administrative register data. The Danish
Data Protection Agency has approved the research project and this procedure. To merge the experimental data with the register data, the
usernames provided in the invitation letters were translated into anonymized civil registration numbers. It is important for the linkage between
experimental and register data that the people who participated in the experiment are identical to the people who were invited. To check that
the correct person participated in the experiment, the respondents were asked to state their gender and year of birth as the first thing after
logging in to the experiment. 38 respondents for whom the stated gender and/or year of birth is not identical to the information in the register
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The register data contain demographic characteristics and information from the income tax register. The income
tax register includes information on annual income as well as the values of assets and liabilities at the end of each
year. The value of assets includes assessed property value, market value of stocks, bonds and mortgage deeds in
deposit and bank deposits. The value of liabilities includes all debt except debt to private persons. All the register
data are third-party reported. For instance, employers report earnings, government institutions report transfer
payments, and information on assets and liabilities is reported by financial institutions. The data in the registers
are organized as a panel data set so that it is possible to observe income, assets, and liabilities back in time for
the respondents in the experiment. The data are available for the period 2000-2014. There are two components of
wealth that the data described so far does not include. One is wealth accumulated in pension accounts and the
other is wealth kept in cars. These two components have become available as of 2014, and in the robustness section
we examine if the inclusion of these two components affect our findings when we confine the analysis to be based
only on wealth observed in 2014.
In total, we sent out 27,613 invitations and reached 3,634 participants giving a gross participation rate of 13%.
Participation rates at this level are common for similar experimental studies (e.g. Andersson et al. 2016 report
11%). The sample selected to receive invitations to participate in the experiment was sampled from the population
register. We therefore know the identity of participants as well as invitees who did not respond to the invitation.
As a result, we are able to compare the characteristics of the participants and non-participants. Results from doing
this are presented in Table 1, panel 1. Compared to non-participants, participants are slightly older, less likely to be
single, more likely to be homeowners and have slightly longer education. The magnitude of the differences appear
to be relatively small. Participants, however, have a significantly higher level of income, net wealth and liquid
assets than non-participants. In Table 1, column d we list the corresponding statistics for a 10 percent random
sample from the Danish population in order to assess how representative our sample is of the Danish population
at large. Compared to the random sample from the population, the sample of respondents is on average slightly
younger and less likely to have children staying at home. They have slightly longer education, are less likely
to be home owners, have higher income, but less net wealth. However, the magnitude of these differences are
relatively small, and, incidentally, the respondents appear to be more similar, on average, to the random sample
from the population than the gross sample. In section 5.4, we will investigate whether our results are sensitive to
the differences in sample composition documented in Table 1.
data are excluded from the analysis.
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Table 1: Summary of selected characteristics
(1) Respondents vs. non-respondents (2) Respondents vs. 10 % of population
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Respondents Non-respondents Difference, (a)-(b) Population Difference, (a)-(d)
Means
Age 36.32 35.45 0.87 36.38 -0.06
Woman (=1) 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.50 0.00
Single (=1) 0.29 0.39 -0.10 0.29 0.00
Dependent children (=1) 0.57 0.52 0.05 0.60 -0.03
Homeowner (=1) 0.40 0.33 0.07 0.56 -0.16
Years of education 14.65 13.93 0.72 14.46 0.19
Medians
Wealth 386146.00 251551.40 134594.60 397204.50 -11058.50
Non-capital income 369923.40 331215.30 38708.10 350046.80 19876.60
Liquid assets 29898.90 21641.40 8257.50 26940.20 2958.70
Observations 3634 23823 27457 67588 71222
Notes: Variables are based on 2014 values. The random 10 percent sample of the Danish population is drawn among those who are not in
the gross sample (i.e., did not live in Copenhagen Municipality when they were seven years old), but who were born in the same period
(1973-1983). (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for individuals who satisfy the description given by the variable name.
The value of the car stock and wealth held in pension accounts are included in the measure of wealth. Furthermore, the tax assessed values of
housing is adjusted by the average ratio of market prices to tax assessed values among traded houses. These ratios are calculated for each of
98 municipalities. Non-capital income refers to annual income. Liquid assets include bank deposits and market values of stocks and bonds.
The table includes individuals for whom a full set of register variables is available.
5 Results
5.1 Basic association between discounting behaviour and wealth inequality
The basic neoclassical model of individual life-cycle savings presented in section 3, predicts that differences in
discounting behaviour across individuals generate differences in savings behaviour which, in turn, generate dif-
ferences in wealth. A basic premise of this proposition is that preferences are stable across time but can vary among
individuals. In this section, we present the basic set of results where we investigate whether the experimentally
elicited patience measure is predictive of the individual position in the wealth distribution. Wealth data are notori-
ously noisy and in order to construct the cleanest evidence we calculate the position in the net wealth distribution
within the sample, measured by the percentile rank of the individual in the within cohort×time distribution (e.g.
Chetty et al. 2014b). Figure 3a presents graphical evidence of the association between the elicited patience measure
and the position in the real-life net wealth distribution of the individuals in the sample for each year in the period
2000-2014. In the figure, the sample is split into three equally sized groups according to the size of the patience
measure such that the ‘High’ group includes the most patient individuals in the sample, ‘Low’ the least patient
individuals and ‘Medium’ includes individuals with patience measures between the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups. The
figure shows that the patience ordering of the individuals predicts the position in the net wealth distribution, so
that the group consisting of the most patient individuals are at a higher position in the net wealth distribution on
average, followed by the group with medium patience, and the group consisting of the most impatient individuals
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on average attain the lowest position in the net wealth distribution.
An important and standard assumption in economic theory (Stigler and Becker 1977), also underlying the
basic model presented in section 2, is that preferences are reasonably stable across time. The stable relationship
between elicited patience measures and the position in the wealth distribution is consistent with this assumption.
One important caveat to mention is that patience is measured after the wealth data. This implies that we cannot
rule out that historical savings and spending decisions have actually influenced our measurement of patience.
However, the fact that the relationship between patience and the position in the wealth distribution is so stable
over the period 2000-2014 suggests that this is not the case, at least within this 15-year period.15
Figure 3: Discounting behaviour, educational attainment and wealth inequality
(a) Patience and position in the wealth distribution 2000-14
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(b) Patience vs. education
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Notes: Panel a shows the association between elicited subjective discount factors and the position in the wealth distribution. The position
in the wealth distribution is computed as the percentile. The sample has been split into three approximately equally sized groups according
to the tertiles of the subjective discount factor such that ‘High’ includes the 33 percent most patient individuals in the sample, ‘Low’ the 33
percent most impatient individuals and ‘Medium’ the group in between the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups. Cut-offs for the patience groups are:
Low [0.0, 0.5]; Medium [0.6, 0.9]; High [1.0]. Panel b shows the association between the position in the wealth distribution and educational
attainment, where the individuals in the sample have been split into three equally sized groups according to how many years of education
they have completed. Cut-offs for the education groups (years): Low [8, 14); Medium [14, 16]; High (16, 21] where the numbers refer to years
of completed education.
The basic theory suggests that heterogeneity in the degree of patience generates differences in savings be-
haviour that lead to wealth inequality. The theory is, however, simplistic and omits many realistic features, such
as uncertainty, and including these would arguably mute the relationship between subjective discount factors and
the position in the wealth distribution. Comparing the percentile rank position among the most patient with the
rank position among the least patient in Figure 3a reveals a difference of about five to six rank points.
In order to assess whether this is a substantial magnitude we compare with the difference in wealth rank
position between subjects with different educational attainment levels. Huggett et al. (2011) argue that educational
attainment is one of the most important factors contributing to life time inequality, and we therefore think of
15Krupka and Stephens (2013) find, using a survey-elicited measure of time preferences, that measured discount rates reflect market inter-
est rates faced by the individuals at the time of the survey rather than their pure rate of time preference. Eliciting discounting behaviour
using experimental methods, as is done in the current study, arguably results in measures of patience that are robust to this and hence more
closely related to the underlying theoretical concept. The stability of the relationship between elicited patience and the position in the wealth
distribution shown in Figure 3a is consistent with this.
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educational attainment as a useful comparison. In Figure 3b, we have split the sample into three equally sized
groups according to educational attainment as measured by the number of years of completed education. The
groups with least education has completed 8-14 years of education while the group with most education has
completed 16-21 years of education. Comparing the groups with the lowest and the highest level of educational
attainment shows a difference in the wealth rank position of six to seven rank points, which is quite similar to the
difference in wealth rank positions between the most and the least patient groups. This finding suggests that the
magnitude of the differences in wealth ranks between the most and the least patient groups is first order.
Figure 3 presents bivariate relationships and these can potentially be confounded by omitted factors. We there-
fore now turn to regression techniques and sequentially add potential confounders as control variables to the
regressions in order to learn whether the relationship shown in Figure 3 is robust to these potential confounders.
In the regressions, we focus on the wealth rank positions during the period 2012-2014. We do this because we
would like to characterize the association between the elicited patience measure and wealth for individuals who
have reached into a life stage where their current income is as close to its ‘permanent level’ as possible and where
economic affairs are not dominated by early life decisions such as undertaking education and entering the labour
market.16 The results are presented in Table 2.
16We have also run the regression presented in Table 2 using the wealth data covering the period 2000-2014. The results are presented in
section 5.4, and they confirm the results presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Patience and wealth inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 8.14*** 6.62*** 6.45*** 6.88*** 6.46*** 5.89*** 6.09*** 6.35***
(1.44) (1.46) (1.47) (1.54) (1.51) (1.50) (1.51) (1.49)
Risk aversion 2.99 3.13
(1.92) (1.91)
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort non-capital income decile dummies, 2012-2014 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-reported school grades decile dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort net assets at age 18 decile dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort parental net asset decile dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No No No No No No Yes
Constant 44.68*** 42.86*** 43.93*** 43.09*** 37.26*** 35.31*** 33.70*** 33.07***
(1.03) (1.67) (1.97) (2.47) (2.66) (3.09) (3.26) (3.37)
Observations 3634 3634 3634 3360 3360 3360 3360 3360
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09
Notes: OLS regressions. Dep. var.: Within-cohort average net asset percentile rank, 2012-2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The measurement of
patience is described in expression (4). Parental net assets are measured when the respondents were 7-14 years old. ‘Additional controls’ include four variables: a gender dummy and share of
the period (2012-2014) as single, with dependent children, and as homeowner. The number of observations decreases in columns 4-8 due to some of the respondents not reporting school grades.
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We start out in Column 1 presenting the results from a simple bivariate regression of the net wealth rank
position on patience. Consistent with the graphical evidence, we find that moving from the lowest to the highest
level of patience in the sample is associated with a difference of eight wealth rank points, and this relationship is
highly statistically significant. In Figure 3b, we compared the magnitude of the association between patience and
the position in the wealth distribution with the magnitude of the association between schooling and the position
in the wealth distribution. However, as discussed in the theory section the most patient individuals might be
more prone to delay income by choosing more education. In fact, the data show a statistically significant positive
correlation between educational attainment and patience. The average years of education for the low patience
group is 14.3, while it is 15.3 years for the high patience group. In this way, education would simply be another
marker for patience as suggested by Lawrance (1991).
In column 2, flexible dummies for educational attainment are included as control variables. The coefficient
on the patience measure decreases a bit, but remains highly significant and not statistically different from the
coefficient in column 1. Thus, the relationship between patience and wealth exists beyond education. According
to the basic theory, the cross-sectional variance in wealth potentially also depends on permanent income and the
profile of income over time. In Figure 4a, we plot the position in the within-cohort income distribution for the
respondents across different ages and separately for the three patience groups that were defined in Figure 3. The
panel shows that the most patient group on average has a steeper income profile over the age interval 18-40. They
start out being ranked lower in the income distribution than the less patient groups, but they pick up and by age
40 they are positioned about 6 rank points higher, indicating that their permanent level of income is higher. Such
a pattern, where patient individuals choose relatively steep income profiles while less patient individuals choose
relatively flat income profiles, is consistent with the theoretical conjecture that preferences are associated with the
choice of education. The fact that more patient individuals have higher permanent income potentially implies
that a correlation between wealth and patience can exist beyond the pure savings channel, i.e. without these
individuals saving more relative to their permanent income. Arguably, we control for the effect of income timing
and differences in permanent income by including flexibly for educational attainment in regressions reported in
Table 2. To motivate this, consider Figure 4b which is analogous to Figure 4a except that we have now controlled
for a set of fully flexible dummies for educational attainment. The figure shows that the differences across the
three patience groups in level and slope of income are washed out by controlling for educational attainment. This
suggests that including a detailed set of dummies for educational attainment in Table 2, column 2, adequately
controls for differences in permanent income and for differences in the timing of income that are observed in the
raw data.
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Figure 4: Relationship between discounting behaviour and income over the life-cycle
(a) Unconditional
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Notes: Panel a shows the position in the within-age-group-and-year labor income distribution for the respondents over the life-cycle separately
for three patience groups. The sample has been split into three approximately equally sized groups according to the tertiles of the subjective
discount factor such that ‘High’ includes the 33 percent most patient individuals in the sample, ‘Low’ the 33 percent most impatient individuals
and ‘Medium’ the group in between the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups. Cut-offs for the patience groups are: Low [0.0, 0.5]; Medium [0.6, 0.9]; High
[1.0]. Panel b plots coefficients from regressions of ’within-age-group-and-year labor income percentile rank’ on the patience groups and fully
flexible ‘years of education’ dummies. ‘M’ and ‘H’ indicate the ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ patience groups, respectively. ‘Low’ patience is the base
group. Capped spikes represent 95% CI. The panel shows that the income paths for the three patience groups are leveled out when controlling
for education.
In column 3 of Table 2 we include decile dummies controlling for the average position in the (non-capital) income
distribution among people belonging to the same cohort across the period 2012-2014. This can be considered
as an additional way to control for permanent income. The parameter on our measure of patience is, however,
hardly affected by the inclusion of these dummies.17 The theory points towards initial conditions being important
potential confounders. Ability constitutes one such important ‘initial condition’. Recent evidence has suggested
that cognitive ability correlates with preferences, both risk aversion and impatience (Dohmen et al. 2010).18 In
order to control for cognitive ability we include decile dummies for school grades in column 4, but this does not
change the estimate of our parameter of interest. Initial wealth is another potential confounding factor according
to the basic theory. Figure 5 plots the net asset percentile rank in year 2014 (last year of available data) against
the percentile rank of net assets in year 2014 less net assets held at age 18, the age of majority. In constructing this
figure, we have compounded net assets at age 18 with a considerable real interest rate (5 percent) to make sure
that we do not underestimate the potential effect of initial wealth. The figure shows that the compounded wealth
level at age 18 has a negligible effect on the relative wealth distribution in year 2014.
17We have also tried to construct a figure corresponding to Figure 3, but where net wealth is normalized by average income 2012-2014 before
calculating the position in the net wealth distribution. This graph also showed that the most patient individuals are persistently located higher
in the net wealth distribution than the less patient.
18The association between risk preferences and ability has recently been questioned (Andersson et al. 2016).
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Figure 5: Importance of initial wealth at age 18
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Notes: Local polynomial regression of net asset percentile rank (2014) on the percentile rank of net assets in 2014 less net assets held at age 18.
Net assets at age 18 have been compounded by a real interest rate of 5 percent.
In Table 2, column 5 we include decile dummies for the within-cohort net asset rank at age 18. Consistent with the
graphical evidence presented in Figure 5, the inclusion of these controls does not affect the parameter on patience
in any important way. Wealth accumulation can, of course, also be influenced by transfers from parents. We do
not directly observe bequests and inter vivo transfers in the data. However, such transfers are probably correlated
with initial wealth and parental wealth. In column 6 we add decile dummies for the within-cohort parental net
wealth, but this does not affect the parameter estimate associated with our patience measure significantly. While
we do not directly observe transfers from parents to children we are able to exploit the longitudinal aspect of
our administrative data. If parents make transfers to their children then that should create a negative correlation
between adjustments in parental wealth and child wealth (Kolodziejczyk and Leth-Petersen 2013). This test is
reported in Appendix I, and it does not show evidence of transfers from parents to children. As part of the
experimental procedure we have also elicited risk preferences. Theoretically, the association between risk aversion
on wealth is not clear. According to the theory presented in section 3, the CRRA parameter has ambiguous effects
on wealth depending on the relative size of the rate of time preference and the real interest rate on savings. The
model predicts a positive effect of the CRRA parameter on wealth if the rate of time preference is greater than the
real interest rate on savings and a negative effect if the rate of time preference is smaller than the real interest rate
on savings. In Appendix H we perform an implicit test of this prediction: For each patience group, we regress the
net wealth percentile rank on the experimental measure of risk aversion. Consistent with the model prediction,
the less patient the group is, the more positive the effect of risk aversion on relative wealth is. Irrespective of
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the theoretical association between risk aversion and wealth, previous studies have shown evidence that risk
aversion and patience are correlated (e.g. Leigh 1986; Anderhub et al. 2000; Eckel et al. 2005). In our data elicited
risk aversion is also correlated with elicited patience, and risk aversion could therefore potentially confound the
association between wealth and patience. In column 7 we include our experimental measure of risk aversion
among the control variables. Again, our parameter of interest is left virtually unchanged and remains strongly
significant.
Finally, in column 8 we include a set of additional controls for gender, single status, dependent children and
homeowner status, but the inclusion of the variables does not impact the parameter estimate on our patience
measure either. In summary, we find that the pattern depicted in Figure 3 is statistically significant and that the
relationship between patience and the position in the wealth distribution is robust to the inclusion of a number
of important potential confounders. We find that there is a positive relationship between the position in the net
wealth distribution such that comparing the bottom third with the top third in the patience distribution is associ-
ated with an difference in the position of the net wealth distribution of about 6 rank points.
5.2 Top 10 percent wealthiest
A sizable literature has studied the concentration of wealth at the top of the distribution. For example, Piketty
and Saez (2014) find that the share of total wealth owned by the 10 percent wealthiest have been in the range
60-90 percent over the last 150 years in the US and Europe. In order to examine whether there is an association
between our patience measure and the propensity to be in the top end of the wealth distribution we display in
Figure 6 the fraction of respondents who belong to the ten percent wealthiest within the three patience groups
defined in the previous section. The figure shows that in the least patient group about six percent belong to the ten
percent wealthiest in the sample whereas 15 percent of the individuals categorized to be among the most patient
individuals belong to the wealthiest ten percent in the sample. Again, we compare the association with that for
education, and while the association between patience and the propensity to be among the ten percent wealthiest
is not quite as stark, it is of the same order of magnitude and significant in economic terms. In Appendix J, we
show regressions corresponding to the regressions presented in Table 2, but where the dependent variable is a
dummy variable indicating whether the respondent belongs to the ten percent wealthiest. The results indicate that
patience is statistically significant, even when we control for the most comprehensive set of control variables as in
Table 2, column 8, and the parameter of interest attains a value that is close to what we see in the main analysis.
Due to the limited sample size, it is impossible to credibly examine how patience is related to the propensity to
belong to the group of very wealthy, say, top 0.1%.
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Figure 6: Relationship between patience and being among the top 10% wealthiest
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
S
ha
re
 in
 to
p 
10
%
 o
f w
ith
in
-c
oh
or
t n
et
 a
ss
et
di
st
rib
ut
io
n,
 2
01
2-
20
14
 (p
er
ce
nt
)
Medium
Patience Educational attainment 95% CI
Low High
Notes: The white bars show the association between elicited patience and the propensity to be among the ten percent wealthiest in the sample.
The sample has been split into three approximately equally sized groups according to the tertiles of the patience index such that ‘High’ includes
the 33 percent most patient individuals in the sample, ‘Low’ the 33 percent most impatient individuals and ‘Medium’ the group in between the
‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups. Cut-offs for the patience groups are: Low [0.0, 0.5]; Medium [0.6, 0.9]; High [1.0]. The grey bars show the association
between the propensity to be among the ten percent wealthiest in the sample and educational attainment, where the individuals in the sample
have been split into three equally sized groups according how many years of education they have completed. Cut-offs for the education groups
(years): Low [8, 14); Medium [14, 16]; High (16, 21] where the numbers refer to years of completed education.
5.3 Heterogeneous discounting and liquidity constraints
Theory informs that people who are relatively patient will save relatively more and will therefore face a smaller
risk of being liquidity constrained, or, conversely, that people who are relatively impatient are more likely to be
affected by liquidity constraints. In this section, we explore the relationship between our measure of patience and
two proxies for liquidity constraints. Liquidity constraints are inherently difficult to measure as they are defined by
the shadow value of liquidity, which is not observed. We follow the previous literature and explore two different
proxies for liquidity constraints. Our first measure is a dummy variable for the respondent holding liquid financial
assets corresponding to less than one month’s worth of disposable income. This measure has routinely been
applied in the literature (e.g. Zeldes 1989; Johnson et al. 2006; Leth-Petersen 2010). However, it is not necessarily
a good measure of the shadow value of liquidity as people can have different access to credit, which we do not
observe, and therefore effectively face constraints that affect them with different intensity even if they are otherwise
observationally equivalent. We therefore also construct a measure of the marginal interest rate, which is arguably
a better proxy for the marginal price of liquidity. To construct a measure of the marginal interest rate we exploit
that we have access to account level data with information about outstanding debt and interest payments during
the year. We use this to calculate an average interest rate for each account that we observe for the individual. For
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people with debt accounts we pick the highest interest rate among debt accounts as the marginal interest rate. For
people who do not have debt we pick the lowest interest rate among their deposit accounts based on the logic that
this is the cheapest source of liquidity. This measure has been proposed by Kreiner et al. (2016) who document that
it is able to match the interest rate on accounts where banks report nominal interest rates and to predict spending
responses to a stimulus policy. In Appendix K we present more details about the construction of the marginal
interest rate.
In order to illustrate the association between patience and the indicators for being affected by constraints, we
do as before and split the sample into three equally sized groups depending on the magnitude of the experimental
patience measure and calculate the fraction who are observed with liquid assets worth less than one month of
disposable income, Figure 7a, and the average marginal interest rate, Figure 7b. Panel a shows that 33 percent of
the individuals in the most patient group are observed with a low level of liquid assets in real-life while 45 percent
are observed with a low level of liquid assets in the least patient group. This is consistent with the theoretically
motivated proposition that impatient people save less and hence are more likely to end up in a situation where
they are affected by liquidity constraints. In order to gauge the magnitude of this association we compare with
education. To do this we split the sample into three equally sized groups (as we did in Figure 3b) depending on
educational attainment. For each educational attainment group we have calculated the fraction observed with a
low level of liquid assets. As is seen from Figure 7a, the low liquid asset gradient observed by moving from the
highest to the lowest patience groups is about 12 rank points where as it is about 25 rank points when moving
from the group with the highest level of educational attainment to the group with the lowest level of educational
attainment. Turning to the association between the patience measure and the marginal interest rate, Figure 7b, the
overall pattern is confirmed. The most patient group faces, on average, a marginal interest rate of about 7 percent
while the least patent group faces a marginal interest rate of about 8.5 percent. Comparing with educational
attainment, the group with the highest level of educational attainment faces, on average, a marginal interest of
6 percent while the group with the lowest level of educational attainment faces a marginal interest of about 10
percent on average. So, also for this measure is the schooling gradient stronger than the patience gradient, but
the magnitude of the association between patience and the prevalence of people affected by liquidity constraints
still appears to be substantial when measured with two different variables approximating for the importance of
liquidity constraints.
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Figure 7: Discounting behaviour and the probability of being credit constrained
(a) Hard budget constraint
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(b) Soft budget constraint
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Notes: Panel a: The white bars show the association between elicited patience and the propensity to hold liquid assets worth less than one
month of disposable income. The sample has been split into three approximately equally sized groups according to the tertiles of the patience
index such that ‘High’ includes the 33 percent most patient individuals in the sample, ‘Low’ the 33 percent most impatient individuals and
‘Medium’ the group in between the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups. Cut-offs for the patience groups are: Low [0.0, 0.5]; Medium [0.6, 0.9]; High
[1.0]. The grey bars show the association between the propensity to hold liquid assets worth less than one month of disposable income and
educational attainment, where the individuals in the sample have been split into three equally sized groups according how many years of
education they have completed. Cut-offs for the education groups (years): Low [8, 14); Medium [14, 16]; High (16, 21] where the numbers refer
to years of completed education. Panel b: The white bars show the association between elicited patience and the marginal interest rate for the
three patience groups defined in panel a. The grey bars show the association between the marginal interest rate and educational attainment,
where groups are defined like in Panel a.
Figure 7 presents bivariate evidence. In Table 3 we show results from regressions where the dependent variable is
the measure for holding low levels of liquid assets and the explanatory variables include patience as well as the
same sets of control variables that we applied in the regressions presented in Table 2. Irrespective of the control set
applied, the estimations suggest that patience is significantly associated with the propensity to be observed with
low levels of liquid assets, and the magnitude suggest that the fraction with low liquid assets is ten percentage
points lower for the group with the highest level of patience in the sample than for the group with the lowest level
of patience in the sample. The analysis in Appendix K shows that the association between patience and marginal
interest rates is also robust to controlling for covariates. In summary, we find clear evidence that elicited patience
is correlated with the propensity to be affected by liquidity constraints, or more generally with the intensity of
such constraints.
68
Table 3: Patience and liquidity constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Risk aversion 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort non-capital income decile dummies, 2012-2014 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-reported school grades decile dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort net assets at age 18 decile dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort parental net asset decile dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No No No No No No Yes
Constant 0.49*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.82*** 2.26
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (1.19)
Observations 3626 3626 3626 3353 3353 3353 3353 3353
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13
Notes: OLS regressions. Dep. var.: Dummy for holding liquid assets worth less than one month of disposable income, 2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Parental net assets are measured when the respondents were 7-14 years old. ‘Additional controls’ include six variables: age, age^2, and dummies for gender, marital status, dependent children,
and homeowner status. The number of observations decreases in columns 4-8 due to some of the respondents not reporting school grades.
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The theoretical description of preference heterogeneity is that preferences can vary among people but are relatively
stable across time for each individual. However, when it comes to the measurement of the relationship between the
indicators for being affected by liquidity constraints and elicited patience one important caveat applies: Patience
is measured after the data used for constructing the indicator for holding low levels of liquid assets has been
collected. This opens for the possibility that elicited patience is, in fact, a response to an adverse shock which has
lead the individual to drive down his liquid assets and, consequently, transitorily behave as if he is not relatively
patient even if he actually is. Figure 8 shows the fraction of people who are recorded with liquid assets worth
less than one month of disposable income for the period 2000-2014 for each of the three patience groups. The
graph shows that the propensity to be observed is generally declining for all three groups over time. This reflects
the fact that people in the sample are in the early stages of their life-cycle and accumulate more assets as they
get older. However, the figure shows a compelling pattern, where people who are classified as relatively patient
are persistently, i.e. over a period of 15 years, recorded as being less likely to be affected by constraints. Such
persistence is difficult to rationalize with short term shocks having appeared shortly before the point in time
where patience has been elicited. We cannot rule out that very persistent shocks having appeared earlier than 2000
have affected the financial position of our respondents and that this could have affected elicited patience.
Figure 8: Prevalence of liquidity constraints across levels of patience, 2000-2014
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Notes: The figure shows the association between elicited patience and the frequency of individuals within each patience group who are
observed with liquid assets corresponding to less than one month of disposable income. The sample has been split into three approximately
equally sized groups according to the tertiles of the patience index such that ‘High’ includes the 33 percent most patient individuals in the
sample, ‘Low’ the 33 percent most impatient individuals and ‘Medium’ the group in between the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups. Cut-offs for the
patience groups are: Low [0.0, 0.5]; Medium [0.6, 0.9]; High [1.0].
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5.4 Additional analyses and robustness checks
The results presented so far are potentially sensitive to a number of choices made in order to operationalize the
empirical analysis. In this section, we present a series of robustness checks to corroborate our findings, and the
results from these are presented in Table 4. The first column in Table 4 reproduces column 8 from Table 2, i.e.
the specification with the richest set of control variables included. The dependent variable in this specification is
based on net wealth ranks calculated over the period 2012-2014. In that analysis, we focus on the latest years in
the sample, because we want to characterize the association between elicited patience and wealth for individuals
who have reached into a life stage where their current income is as close to its ‘permanent level’ as possible
and where their financial position is not dominated by early life decisions such as undertaking education and
entering the labour market. However, Figure 3a showed evidence that the bivariate association between patience
and wealth is stable over a much longer period, 2000-2014. In Table 4, column 2, we re-estimate the reference
model reported in column 1 using annual observations for the entire data period 2000-2014. Consistent with the
impression provided by Figure 3a, the multivariate results are robust to this change. The association between the
position in the asset distribution and patience is highly statistically significant and of the same magnitude as the
corresponding estimate in Table 2.
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Table 4: Patience and wealth inequality. Robustness analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 6.35*** 4.76*** 6.82*** 5.93*** 5.79*** 4.61*** 5.63*** 5.68***
(1.49) (1.00) (1.28) (1.40) (1.37) (1.25) (1.52) (1.66)
Risk aversion 3.13 0.35 1.16 3.06 2.31 2.60 3.75 4.17*
(1.91) (1.27) (1.64) (1.81) (1.74) (1.57) (1.96) (2.11)
Year dummies for educational attainment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort non-capital income decile dummies, 2012-2014 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-reported school grades decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort net assets at age 18 decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort parental net asset decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes No No No No No No
Within-cohort non-capital income decile dummies No Yes No No No No No No
Constant 33.07*** 44.86*** 12.04*** 29.15*** 27.42*** 15.83*** 33.75*** 32.25***
(3.37) (3.06) (2.95) (3.20) (3.14) (2.85) (3.56) (4.01)
Observations 3360 49473 3360 3360 3360 3360 3275 3275
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.31 0.20 0.24 0.39 0.08 0.09
Notes: OLS regressions. Column 1 reproduces column 8 form Table 4.1. Column 2 includes annual data on net assets for the period 2000-2014. For this column standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Column 3 considers only financial assets, ie. stocks, bonds, and deposits. Column 4 adjusts tax assessed values of housing by the average ratio of market prices to tax assessed
values among traded houses. These ratios are calculated for each of 98 municipalities. Column 5 includes value of the the car stock. Dependent variable measured only for 2014. Column 6
includes both the value of the car stock and wealth held in pension accounts. In this column the dependent variable is measured only for 2014. In column 7 the dependent variable is based on
average net assets, 2012-2014 (as in column 1), but the equation is estimated using inverse probability weighting where probability weights are based on respondents vs. non-respondents. In
Column 8 results from estimating using inverse probability weighting where the weights are based on respondents vs. population. The number of observations is slightly lower in columns 7-8
as some of the respondents do not have strictly positive non-capital income or liquid assets.
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The theory presented in section 2 characterizes wealth as being held in just one asset. A natural interpretation
is that it reflects net wealth, which is the wealth concept we have used in the analysis so far. An alternative inter-
pretation is that it reflects financial assets. In column 3 the reference specification is re-estimated using financial
assets, consisting of stocks, bonds and deposits, as the basis for constructing the position in the wealth distribution.
Also for this outcome we find that the positive relationship between patience and the ranking in the financial asset
distribution is similar to the result obtained in the reference specification based on net wealth.19 Column 4 adjusts
tax assessed values of housing by the average ratio of market prices to tax assessed values among traded houses.
These ratios are calculated for each of 98 municipalities. The estimate of the patience parameter is largely unaf-
fected relative to the reference estimate in column 1. The wealth data, including housing and financial wealth, are
consistently third-party reported for an exceptionally long period. However, they lack two components of wealth
that are potentially important for assessing wealth inequality, wealth kept in the car stock and wealth accumulated
in pension accounts. Data documenting these two components has recently become available, but only for 2014.
In column 5, we include the value of the car stock among assets and calculate the net wealth rank based only on
2014 data. The patience parameter is slightly smaller than the reference estimate presented in column 1 but not
significantly different from it. In column 6 also wealth kept in pension accounts is added. This addition mutes the
point estimate of the patience parameter additionally, although it is not significantly different from the reference
estimate in column 1. Even if the difference is not statistically different there are, in fact, good reasons why adding
pension wealth would attenuate the result. 90 percent of contributions to pension accounts are made to illiquid
employer organized pension accounts (Kreiner et al. 2017), and the contributions are predominantly determined
by collective labour market agreements. As documented by Chetty et al. (2014a) the majority responds passively
to these savings mandates, i.e. they do not adjust other types of savings in response to these savings mandates.
Only a fraction of the subjects that we invited to participate in the experiment took up the invitation, and this
can potentially imply that our sample is selected and not representative of the population at large. In column 7
we re-estimate the reference specification from column 1 using propensity score weighting, where the propensity
scores measure the propensity to participate in the experiment for all the subjects that have been invited, and the
propensity scores have been estimated using the variables included in Table 1. The results presented in column 7
are close to the estimate from the reference specification. In Column 8 we construct propensity scores measuring
the propensity to be in the experiment compared to the population at large. Also in this case, do we not find
any important deviation from the benchmark model. The propensity score weighting approach is based on the
assumption that the selection into the experiment can be adequately captured by the variables included Table 1.
To the extent that this is a reasonable assumption, our results do not appear too specific to the sample that we have
elicited patience measures for. In total, Table 4 presents a series of alternative estimates designed in order to check
the validity of our main finding showing that elicited patience is associated with wealth inequality and that the
19In agreement with the results presented in Figure 3, the more patient respondents are persistently ranked higher in the financial asset
distribution relative to their less patient peers over the period 2000-2014 (not reported).
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magnitude of the association is non-trivial.
Our patience measure is based on the subset of choice tasks where the subjects where asked to choose between
payouts 8 and 16 weeks from the experiment date. However, as described in section 4 we also confronted subjects
with trade-offs that involved payouts made as soon as possible after the experiment, where the delay only per-
tained to the time required to administer the transfer to the participant’s account. In table 5 we construct patience
measures based on all possible combinations of the payment dates that we have exposed subjects to ( “today”,
“in 8 weeks”, and “in 16 weeks”). Column 1-3 show bivariate correlations between net wealth ranks and patience
for all the combinations of payout days that subjects were asked to complete choice tasks for. Across all three
combinations of payout days we observed a correlation of similar magnitude. In column 4-6 we add the full set
of control variables as in Table 2, column 8. Across all patience measures the estimated parameter on patience is
stable and only slightly smaller than for the case where no control variables are included.20
20In order to test for the existence of present-biased preferences we have constructed an index that compares near-present trade-offs with
more remote trade-offs, i.e. choice situations which vary in their remoteness relative to the point in time the decision is made, holding all other
things fixed. Specifically the index is φpresent bias = median
(
z[choiceID=i])−z[choiceID=j]
10
)
, where the difference in the numerator is calculated for
each choiceId-pair (i, j) ∈ {(1, 11) , (2, 12) , (3, 13) , (4, 14) , (5, 15)} with i indexing the 0 vs. 8 weeks trade-offs and j indexing the 8 vs. 16 week
trade-offs, cf Table A1. The distribution of φpresent bias is centered at and is symmetric around zero (not reported) and does hence not indicate
that present-biased preferences are important in our data. There could be several reasons that we do not detect present bias. First, similar to
the majority of previous studies on time discounting, our setting does not involve immediacy, but instead makes use of a short time delay prior
to the earliest possible payment date. Present bias is generally found to be much less pronounced if such a delay is added (see Balakrishnan
et al. (2015) for a setting using CTBs). Second, the payments were not carried out in cash, but instead transferred to participants’ bank account.
A general critique on intertemporal choice experiments is that elicited discount rates do not reflect the marginal propensity to consume earlier
rather than later (see Frederick et al. 2002 for a discussion). This might have worked against detection of a significant present bias. Third,
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) discuss another point: “[i]f subjects have access to even modest amounts of liquidity, researchers should be
surprised to measure any present bias in experiments with monetary rewards” (p. 3335). This idea is formalized in Epper (2015) which shows
that present bias could indeed be a result of liquidity constraints together with positive income expectations.
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Table 5: Patience and wealth inequality. Alternative patience measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patience, 8 vs. 16 weeks 8.14*** 6.35***
(1.44) (1.49)
Patience, 0 vs. 8 weeks 8.79*** 6.74***
(1.48) (1.53)
Patience, 0 vs. 16 weeks 8.97*** 7.03***
(1.55) (1.59)
Risk aversion 3.13 3.01 3.20
(1.91) (1.90) (1.91)
Year dummies for educational attainment No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort non-capital income decile dummies, 2012-2014 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Self-reported school grades decile dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort net assets at age 18 decile dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort parental net asset decile dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 44.68*** 44.16*** 43.73*** 33.07*** 32.66*** 32.21***
(1.03) (1.06) (1.15) (3.37) (3.38) (3.42)
Observations 3634 3634 3634 3360 3360 3360
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.09
Notes: OLS regressions. Dep. var.: Within-cohort average net asset percentile rank, 2012-2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. “Patience, 8 vs. 16 weeks”
is the standard measure referred to as “Patience” in the other tables and figures. Parental net assets are measured when the respondents were 7-14 years old. ‘Additional controls’ include four
variables: a gender dummy and share of the period (2012-2014) as single, with dependent children, and as homeowner. The number of observations decreases in columns 4-6 due to some of the
respondents not reporting school grades.
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As a final robustness check we assess the degree of inter vivo wealth transfers from parents to children. A
reason for the wealth inequality that we see in the data could be that parents make transfers to their children
during adulthood. To investigate whether there is significant inter vivo transfers from parent to children of a
magnitude that significantly affects wealth accumulation of the respondents we link parents and children and
exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data to examine whether adjustments of parents’ wealth are correlated
with adjustments to their children’s wealth. Specifically, we regress the first-difference of the child’s (log) liquid
assets on the first difference of the parents’ (log) liquid assets using annual data for the period 2000-2014. If
monetary transfers from parents to children are widespread, we should expect to find a significant and negative
coefficient reflecting that a relative decrease in parents’ liquid assets is accompanied by a relative increase in the
respondent’s liquid assets. The results, reported in Appendix I, show no evidence of a significant relationship
between changes in parental liquid asset holdings and changes in respondent liquid asset holdings. This finding
is robust to the definition of parental and child wealth, including debt.
6 Concluding remarks
According to standard economic theory, differences in how much people discount the future generate differences
in savings behaviour and thereby wealth inequality. We test this proposition by analyzing a unique combination
of data with information about subjective patience attitudes and real-world wealth levels for a large sample of
middle-aged individuals in Denmark. Subjective measures of patience are elicited using state-of-the-art experi-
mental methods and linked to longitudinal administrative wealth records for a period covering 15 years. We find
substantial heterogeneity in elicited patience across individuals, and that individuals with a relatively high level
of patience are positioned relatively high in the wealth distribution consistently over the 15 year period. The corre-
lation between patience and the position in the wealth distribution is significant and of the same magnitude as the
correlation between education and wealth, and exists after controlling for education, income, initial wealth and
parental wealth, suggesting that the savings mechanism is important. We also find that people with a relatively
low level of patience are more likely to be persistently affected by credit constraints. This is consistent with models
where impatient people run down their assets in order to keep current spending relatively high, implying they
face a higher risk of becoming credit constrained (Krueger et al., 2016; Carroll et al., 2017). In this sense, credit
constraints are to some extent self-imposed in these models.
Overall, our results point to the importance of incorporating heterogeneous time discounting in models of
consumption and savings behaviour as originally suggested by Krusell and Smith (1998) and recently applied
by Hubmer et al. (2016), Krueger et al. (2016), Carroll et al. (2017), De Nardi and Fella (2017) and Alan et al.
(2017). In this paper we have shown that the ordering of elicited patience predicts the position in the real-life
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wealth distribution. To make a direct link between experimentally elicited discounting behaviour and discount
rates entering models of aggregate savings behaviour would be a natural next step. Converting choice task data
of the type collected in this study into discount rates can be done by imposing structure on the shape of the
utility function. However, taking this step is likely to be a challenge in practice. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
elicit discounting behaviour on a sample of college students using similar techniques as applied in this paper,
but highlight that experiments involving relatively small stakes, i.e. much smaller than the stakes involved in
most real-life settings, require the use of very high interest rates in the context of the experiment. Consequently,
estimated discount rates become much higher than what is implied by aggregate models of discounting. However,
insofar as the ordering of patience derived from small stake choice tasks is the same as it would be in a setting with
large stakes, the experiments can credibly elicit the ordering of individuals in terms of their discounting behaviour.
Our results suggest that this is the case.
Preference heterogeneity may also have important implications for the design of redistribution policies. Dif-
ferences in wealth originating purely from the budget constraint, such as ability differences, income shocks, and
transfers, reflect differences in lifetime consumption possibilities, but differences in patience generate wealth in-
equality for individuals even if they face similar lifetime consumption possibilities. If the goal of redistribution
and social insurance policy is to reduce inequality in consumption possibilities then, viewed through the lens of
a neoclassical model, policies targeting savings and wealth may not be ideal because such policies lead to differ-
ences in lifetime consumption of people having the same economic resources. On the other hand, a high degree of
impatience may reflect present-bias or other behavioural biases, which might call for forced savings schemes that
reduce wealth inequality (Chetty et al. 2014a). We do not find evidence suggesting present-biased behaviour, but
cannot rule it out.
The relationship between patience and wealth documented in this paper also has other implications. It is stan-
dard practice to assume that preferences are stable, at least through adult life. However, recent evidence point
towards the idea that preferences are potentially malleable in childhood. A recent field experiment in Turkey by
Alan and Ertac (2017) finds that teaching to make children understand the long-term consequences of decision-
making has persistent effects on the degree of patience in future intertemporal decisions of the children. Combined
with our results, this suggests that school curriculum and education policy may have important long term impli-
cations for consumption behaviour and wealth inequality.
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A Derivation of (3)
The solution to the maximization problem is characterized by the standard Euler equation/Keynes-Ramsey rule
c˙ (a)
c (a)
=
r− ρ
θ
, (5)
and the transversality condition w (T) = 0.
By integrating the flow budget constraint (2), we obtain the following intertemporal budget constraint
w (a) = era
[
w (0) +
ˆ a
0
y (τ) e−rτdτ −
ˆ a
0
c (τ) e−rτdτ
]
, (6)
showing that wealth at age a of an individual equals the discounted value of initial wealth plus the discounted
value of income (excluding capital income) earned over the life up to age a and minus the discounted value of
total consumption up to age a.
By evaluating (6) at a = T and using w (T) = 0 in the optimum, we obtain
Y ≡ w (0) +
ˆ T
0
y (τ) e−rτdτ =
ˆ T
0
c (τ) e−rτdτ.
By integrating (5), we obtain
c (a) = c (0) e
r−ρ
θ a, (7)
which is substituted into the above equation in order to get
Y (0) = c (0)
ˆ T
0
e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ τdτ.
By solving the integral and isolating c (0), we obtain
c (0) = Y (0)
ρ+ r (θ − 1)
θ
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
) . (8)
Next, we substitute equation (7) into (6), which gives
w (a) = era
[
w (0) +
ˆ a
0
y (τ) e−rτdτ − c (0)
ˆ a
0
e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ τdτ
]
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= era
[
w (0) +
ˆ a
0
y (τ) e−rτdτ − c (0) θ
r (1− θ)− ρ
(
e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ a − 1
)]
Next, we use expression (8) to substitute for c (0), which gives
w (a) = era
w (0) + ˆ a
0
y (τ) e−rτdτ −Y 1− e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ a
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
 .
Finally, this equation is rewritten to (3) by using the definition of γ (a).
B Relationship between wealth and impatience
Differentiating (3) with respect to ρ gives:
∂w (a)
∂ρ
= −Y
a
θ e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ a
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
)
− Tθ e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ T
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ a
)
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
)2 era (9)
∂w(a)
∂ρ ≤ 0 iff
ae
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ a
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
)
− Te r(1−θ)−ρθ T
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ a
)
≥ 0 ⇐⇒
a
(
e
ρ−r(1−θ)
θ T − 1
)
− T
(
e
ρ−r(1−θ)
θ a − 1
)
≥ 0 ⇐⇒
ekT − 1
T
− e
ka − 1
a
≥ 0
where k ≡ ρ−r(1−θ)θ . The function e
ka−1
a equals k when a→ 0 (which may be seen by applying l’Hôpital’s rule) and
is increasing in a for all values of k 6= 0.21 For T > a, this implies that ekT−1T > e
ka−1
a .
C Relationship between wealth and the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution
Differentiating (3) with respect to θ gives:
∂w (a)
∂θ
= −Y
a
θ e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ a
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
)
− Tθ e
r(1−θ)−ρ
θ T
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ a
)
(
1− e r(1−θ)−ρθ T
)2 era r− ρθ
=
r− ρ
θ
∂w (a)
∂ρ
,
21The derivative equals e
ka(ka−1)+1
a2 , which is never zero if k 6= 0 and positive for ka = 1 and also positive for ka = −1. Thus, the derivative is
always positive implying that the function is increasing in a.
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where the last equality comes from equation (9). We know from Appendix B that ∂wa/∂ρ ≤ 0. Hence, ∂wa/∂θ ≤ 0
if r > ρ, ∂wa/∂θ ≥ 0 if r < ρ and ∂wa/∂θ = 0 if r = ρ. QED.
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D Invitation letter
Figure A1: Invitation letter
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English translation of the invitation letter:
Dear «name»,
University of Copenhagen invites you to participate in a study on the Internet. The study is part of a research
project about understanding the basis for the Danes’ financial decisions. We already know a lot more about
people’s personal financial decisions than we did before the financial crisis, but there is still much we need to
understand - and that is why we are asking for your help.
It takes about 30-50 minutes to complete the study. When you are finished, you will typically receive prize
money and it will be automatically transferred to your NemKonto. The amount depends, i.a., on the choices that
you make during the study and will on average correspond to a decent hourly wage.
The study is conducted on the Internet. You will consider questions concerning savings and investments,
among other things. The rules will be explained once you have logged in. The study is open for participation
through «date».
The Data Protection Agency has approved the research project, which means that our procedures comply with
the Act on Processing of Personal Data. An important part of the Data Protection Agency’s requirements is that
your answers will be treated anonymously. To ensure anonymity, we have formed a random username for you.
To participate, please log in at the following website: analyse.econ.ku.dk.
Username: «username» Password: «password»
The invitation is personal and we therefore ask you not to pass on username and password to others. Please feel
free to contact us if you are having trouble logging in or have any further questions. You can call project coordi-
nator Gregers Nytoft Rasmussen at phone number 35 33 02 77 Monday-Thursday 2:00 p.m. – 5:30 p.m. or write to
the address analyse@econ.ku.dk.
Sincerely yours,
Søren Leth-Petersen
Project manager, professor
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E Choice situations for time task
Table A1 presents a list of all choice situations in the time task. ‘x1’ is the value of a block allocated at ‘t1’. ‘x2’ is the
value of a block allocated at ‘t2’. ‘t1’ and ‘t2’ are delays in months. As mentioned above, however, the presentation
of delays occurred in weeks. ‘delay’ is equal to the difference between ‘t2’ and ‘t1’. ‘rate’ is the annual discount
rate imputed by the relative values of the blocks. It is defined as
(
x2
x1
) 12
t2−t1 − 1. ‘slope’ denotes the slope of the
budget line in (‘x1’, ‘x2’)-space, i.e. − x2x1 .
Table A1: Time choice situations
choiceId x1 x2 t1 t2 delay rate slope
1 100 105 0 2 2 0.340 -1.050
2 100 110 0 2 2 0.772 -1.100
3 100 115 0 2 2 1.313 -1.150
4 100 120 0 2 2 1.986 -1.200
5 100 125 0 2 2 2.815 -1.250
6 100 105 0 4 4 0.158 -1.050
7 100 115 0 4 4 0.521 -1.150
8 100 125 0 4 4 0.953 -1.250
9 100 135 0 4 4 1.460 -1.350
10 100 145 0 4 4 2.049 -1.450
11 100 105 2 4 2 0.340 -1.050
12 100 110 2 4 2 0.772 -1.100
13 100 115 2 4 2 1.313 -1.150
14 100 120 2 4 2 1.986 -1.200
15 100 125 2 4 2 2.815 -1.250
F The risk task and risk aversion measure
The risk task
We also elicited measures of risk aversion. To do so, we used investment games (IGs) similar to Gneezy and Potters
(1997). The main differences to their setup is (i) that we used a graphical interface to present the investment choice,
and (ii) that we varied both probabilities of winning and rate of returns across the choice situations. A typical
choice situation is depicted in the figure below. The left panel shows the initial state of a choice situation. The
subject was endowed with ten 100-points blocks positioned at the very left of the screen. He could then decide
how many of these blocks he wished to invest in a risky asset. The (binary) risky asset, depicted on the right-hand
side of the choice screen resulted in either a good outcome or a bad outcome. In the example, the good outcome
occurred with probability 60% (illustrated by the wheel on top of the risky asset) and yielded 130 points for each
invested 100-points block. The bad outcome occurred with probability 40% and yielded 70 points for each invested
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100-points block. The interface worked the same as in the time task.
Figure A2: Risk choice task. Initial screen (a) and selected option (b)
(a)
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
40%
60%invest less -
invest more +
Confirm
(b)
in 40 of 100 cases 
you receive a total 
of 760
in 60 of 100 cases
you receive a total
of 1240
100 70 130
100 70 130
you keep 200 you invest 800 you receive 560 you receive 1040
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
100 70 130
40%
60%invest less -
invest more +
Confirm
A total of 15 choice situations were implemented. They varied in terms of probabilities and rates of return. Table
A2 presents a list of all choice situations in the risk task.
Table A2: Risk choice situations
choiceId vb m1 m2 p mev msd mskew slope
1 100 1.21 0.81 0.5 1.010 0.200 0.000 -0.905
2 100 1.41 0.91 0.2 1.010 0.200 1.500 -0.220
3 100 1.11 0.61 0.8 1.010 0.200 -1.500 -3.545
4 100 1.31 0.71 0.5 1.010 0.300 0.000 -0.935
5 100 1.61 0.86 0.2 1.010 0.300 1.500 -0.230
6 100 1.16 0.41 0.8 1.010 0.300 -1.500 -3.688
7 100 1.35 0.75 0.5 1.050 0.300 0.000 -0.714
8 100 1.65 0.90 0.2 1.050 0.300 1.500 -0.154
9 100 1.20 0.45 0.8 1.050 0.300 -1.500 -2.750
10 100 1.50 0.40 0.6 1.060 0.539 -0.408 -1.200
11 100 1.72 0.62 0.4 1.060 0.539 0.408 -0.528
12 100 1.45 0.35 0.6 1.010 0.539 -0.408 -1.444
13 100 1.67 0.57 0.4 1.010 0.539 0.408 -0.642
14 100 1.51 0.50 0.5 1.005 0.505 0.000 -0.980
15 100 1.61 0.60 0.5 1.105 0.505 0.000 -0.656
Like in the other tasks, choice situations in the risk task appeared in individualized random order. If the random
choice situation picked in the payment stage was a risky choice situation, the subject was again confronted with her
choice. The choice could not be reverted at this stage, however. The subject was then asked to resolve uncertainty
in the present situation. This was done by spinning the wheel on top of the risky asset. What was paid out, was
the sum of the sure account and the resolved outcome of the originally risky account. Payments were transferred
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directly to their NemKonto on the next banking day.
Risk aversion measure
Our risk aversion index is constructed as follows: We take all choice situations with zero skewness, i.e. with
probability 0.5 (see Table A2). We then normalize and aggregate using the median.22
We define:
φrisk aversion = median
( z
10
)
,
where z denotes the number of blocks kept in the safe account in each choice situation. φrisk aversion is an index of
risk aversion with φrisk aversion ∈ [0, 1]. Higher values of φrisk aversion indicate greater risk aversion and a φrisk aversion
of zero indicates minimum risk aversion (or, more precisely, a degree of risk aversion below the one implied by
z = 1 in all situations).
G Distribution of payments from the experiment
Figure A3: Distribution of payments from the experiment
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Theoretically, the association between risk aversion and wealth is not clear. According to the theory presented
in section 3, the CRRA parameter has ambiguous effects on wealth depending on the relative size of the rate of
22Once again, taking the arithmetic mean does not change our results.
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time preference and the real interest rate on savings. The model predicts a positive effect of the CRRA parameter
on wealth if the rate of time preference is greater than the real interest rate on savings and a negative effect if the
rate of time preference is smaller than the real interest rate on savings. Here we perform an implicit test of this
prediction: For each of the three patience groups, we regress the net asset percentile rank on the experimental
measure of risk aversion. The results are presented in Table A3. Comparing the estimated coefficients on risk
aversion in columns 1-3 it appears that the less patient the group is, the more positive is the effect of risk aversion
on relative net wealth. This is consistent with the model prediction. Columns 4 and 5 control for the variation
in the patience measure within the ‘Low’ and ‘Medium’ patience groups (recall from Figure 2 that there is no
variation in the patience measure for the ‘High’ patience group). Controlling for the variation in patience within
the patience groups increases the trend that the positive effect of risk aversion on relative net wealth is strongest
for the least patient group.
Table A3: CRRA
Low patience Medium patience High patience Low patience Medium patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk aversion 6.06+ 5.00 0.46 6.45* 5.15
(3.16) (4.10) (2.82) (3.14) (4.09)
Patience 8.54* 9.22
(3.82) (8.21)
Constant 43.58*** 47.85*** 52.62*** 40.90*** 41.14***
(1.97) (2.28) (1.74) (2.31) (6.40)
Observations 1355 1044 1235 1355 1044
Adj. R-squared 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: OLS regressions. Dep. var.: Within-cohort average net asset percentile rank, 2012-2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10,
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Columns 4 and 5 control for variation in the patience measure within the ‘Low’ and ‘Medium’ patience groups,
respectively. In the ‘High’ patience group, there is no variation in the patience measure (=1 for all).
I Inter vivo transfers
Table A4 uses annual data for the period 2000-2014 to analyze whether adjustments of parents’ wealth are cor-
related with adjustments of their children’s wealth. The children comprise the respondents in the experiment.
Columns 1-3 report results from regressing the first-difference of the child’s (log) liquid assets on the first dif-
ference of the parents’ (log) liquid assets and other covariates. Column 1 presents the bivariate relationship and
shows a positive correlation between the changes in child and parental liquid assets. If monetary transfers from
parents to children were widespread, this should be reflected in a negative coefficient indicating that a decrease
in parents’ liquid assets is accompanied by an increase in the child’s liquid assets. Column 2 further controls for
the first-difference of the child’s (log) non-capital income, age of the child, educational attainment of the child,
and year fixed effects. This makes the effect of changes in parental liquid assets insignificant. Column 3 adds the
first difference of the parents’ (log) bank debt to allow for parents incurring debt and passing on the money to the
child. The results show no evidence of this.
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Columns 4-6 present results from regressing the first-difference of the child’s (log) bank debt on covariates
similar to those in columns 1-3. If monetary transfers from parents to children were used to reduce the bank
debt of children to a great extent, we would expect a positive relationship between changes in child bank debt
and parental liquid assets (a decrease in parental liquid assets associated with a decrease in child bank debt)
or a negative relationship between changes in child bank debt and parental bank debt (an increase in parental
bank debt associated with a decrease in child bank debt). The results in columns 4-6 show that neither of those
relationships are detectable. In sum, the results presented in Table A4 are not consistent with widespread inter
vivo transfers from parents to respondents.
Table A4: Inter vivo transfers
Δln(Child liquid assets) Δln(Child bank debt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δln(Parent liquid assets) 0.019* 0.013 0.010 -0.010 -0.014* -0.014*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Δln(Child non-capital income) 0.484*** 0.461*** 0.012 0.012
(0.032) (0.038) (0.019) (0.022)
Age 0.086*** 0.089*** -0.219*** -0.235***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020)
Age^2 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education -0.044** -0.038 0.016 0.008
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.023)
(Years of education)^2 0.002** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Δln(Parent bank debt) -0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.008)
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant 0.091*** -1.025*** -1.091*** 0.096*** 3.730*** 3.992***
(0.004) (0.209) (0.262) (0.005) (0.283) (0.331)
N 43845 43845 32110 35303 35303 27263
Adj. R-squared 0.000 0.017 0.015 0.000 0.020 0.022
Notes: OLS regressions. The table uses annual data for the period 2000-2014. Columns 1-3 show results from regressing Δln(Child liquid
assets) on Δln(Parent liquid assets) and other covariates. Columns 4-6 show results from regressing Δln(Child bank debt) on Δln(Parent
liquid assets) and other covariates. Cluster-adjusted standard errors at the child level in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The
number of observations decreases in columns 3 and 6 due to some of the parents not having bank debt.
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J Top ten percent wealthiest
Table A5 shows regressions corresponding to those presented in Table 2. However, in Table A5 the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether the respondent belongs to the ten percent wealthiest in the period 2012-2014. Even after controlling for the full set of covariates in column 8, the
results show that going from minimum to maximum patience (0 to 1) is associated with an increase of six percentage points in the probability of belonging
to the wealthiest ten percent in a birth cohort. The effect of patience is significant at the 0.1 percent level.
Table A5: Top ten percent wealthiest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Risk aversion 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort non-capital income decile dummies, 2012-2014 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-reported school grades decile dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort net assets at age 18 decile dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort parental net asset decile dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No No No No No No Yes
Constant 0.04*** -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 3634 3634 3634 3360 3360 3360 3360 3360
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12
Notes: OLS regressions. Dep. var.: Dummy for top 10 % within-cohort net asset distribution, 2012-2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Parental net assets
are measured when the respondents were 7-14 years old. ‘Additional controls’ include four variables: a gender dummy and share of the period (2012-2014) as single, with dependent children,
and as homeowner. The number of observations decreases in columns 4-8 due to some of the respondents not reporting school grades.
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K Marginal interest rates
Here we present details about the construction of marginal interest rates. We obtained access to administrative
register data from the Danish tax authority containing information on the value of loans at the end of 2013 and 2014
for all loans that the respondents held in Denmark. In addition, the data comprise interest payments during 2014
at the individual loan level. This allows us to approximate the interest rate paid on each loan as ri,l =
R14i,l
1
2 (D
13
i,l+D
14
i,l )
,
where R14i,l is the sum of interest payments on loan l for individual i during 2014, D
13
i,l is the value of the loan at the
end of 2013, and D14i,l is the value of the loan at the end of 2014. We only include non-mortgage loans and require
that the denominator in the above equation is at least 1,000 DKK. The resulting interest rates are censored at the
5th and the 95th percentiles. Our approximation of the interest rate is exact if the debt evolves linearly between
2013 and 2014. If it does not, the computation of the interest rate may introduce a measurement error.
For respondents with loan accounts, we define the marginal interest rate as the highest calculated loan account-
specific interest rate. If a respondent only has deposit accounts, we define the marginal interest rate as the smallest
account-specific interest rate among the calculated account-specific interest rates for that respondent. The rationale
is that the cost of liquidity is given by the loan account with the highest interest rate if a respondent has loan
accounts, whereas the cost of liquidity for a respondent who has only deposit accounts is determined by the
account where the lowest return is earned.
Table A6 presents results from regressions of the computed marginal interest rate on covariates similar to those
in Table 2. Across the specifications, the results in Table A6 show a negative and significant correlation between
the measure of patience and the marginal interest rate. Column 8 shows that after controlling for the full set of
control variables, going from minimum to maximum patience (0 to 1) is associated with a 0.9 percentage point
decrease in the marginal interest rate.
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Table A6: Marginal interest rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience -1.95*** -1.02** -1.02** -1.17** -1.02** -0.88* -0.92* -0.93*
(0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Risk aversion -0.65 -0.70
(0.45) (0.45)
Year dummies for educational attainment No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort non-capital income decile dummies, 2012-2014 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-reported school grades decile dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort net assets at age 18 decile dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-cohort parental net asset decile dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No No No No No No Yes
Constant 9.13*** 11.78*** 12.17*** 11.93*** 13.87*** 13.77*** 14.12*** -17.75
(0.27) (0.56) (0.66) (0.78) (0.83) (0.90) (0.93) (18.03)
Observations 3598 3598 3598 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14
Notes: OLS regressions. Dep. var.: Marginal interest rate, 2014 (%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Parental net assets are measured when the respondents
were 7-14 years old. ‘Additional controls’ include six variables: age, age^2, and dummies for gender, marital status, dependent children, and homeowner status. The number of observations
decreases in columns 4-8 due to some of the respondents not reporting school grades.
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 Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between preference heterogeneity and insurance 
demand by combining Danish administrative register data with data from an incentivized 
large-scale experiment. The experiment was conducted on the Internet with about 5,000 
Danish participants and included intertemporal choices and investment choices designed 
to elicit time and risk preferences of the respondents. Models of insurance demand predict 
a positive relationship between an individual’s degree of risk aversion and the optimal 
level of insurance coverage, ceteris paribus, but are less clear-cut on the effect of time 
preferences on insurance demand. I study insurance demand in two separate domains: 
unemployment insurance and health insurance. The results indicate positive effects of 
patience on the probability of having insurance coverage in both of the insurance domains 
and a positive effect of risk aversion on purchasing unemployment insurance.
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1. Introduction 
Research has shown that experimental measures of time preferences can predict real-world behavior 
such as smoking (Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2010), behavior on the loan market (Meier & Sprenger, 
2010; Rasmussen, 2017), body mass index and physical exercise (Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, 
& Taubinsky, 2008), and saving behavior (Epper et al., 2017). In this paper, I analyze whether heter-
ogeneity in time preferences is correlated with insurance purchasing behavior. 
A typical insurance product involves a premium to be paid in the present in order to benefit 
from insurance coverage in the future. When analyzing the demand for insurance at the individual 
level, it is intuitive to expect both risk and time preferences to play a role: Risk preferences because 
an insurance product hedges against uncertainty by promising an indemnity for future losses in ex-
change for a certain premium. Time preferences because the costs of an insurance product are up 
front while the benefits are in the future. 
It is a well-established prediction from theoretical papers on insurance demand that an increase 
in an individual’s degree of risk aversion will lead to an increase in the optimal level of insurance 
coverage, ceteris paribus (e.g. Schlesinger (2013)). However, the literature is less developed when it 
comes to the possible relationship between patience and insurance demand. One paper that considers 
this relationship is Gollier (2003). He studies a dynamic model in which consumers can self-insure 
by accumulating buffer-stock wealth. According to Gollier’s model, an increase in the consumer’s 
rate of patience will increase his willingness to accumulate buffer-stock wealth and thus decrease his 
insurance demand in the long run. Put differently, Gollier’s model predicts that patient individuals 
will substitute self-insurance for market insurance. 
The main purpose of this paper is to test whether heterogeneity in individual time and risk 
preferences can predict insurance coverage in the field – focusing on voluntary unemployment insur-
ance and health insurance. I measure the levels of patience and risk aversion for about 5,000 Danish 
respondents in a large-scale Internet-based experiment involving intertemporal choices and invest-
ment choices. The experimental choices were incentivized with monetary rewards paid directly to the 
personal bank accounts of the respondents according to decisions made in the experiment. The result-
ing preference measures are linked at the individual level to Danish third-party reported administra-
tive register data. 
I find a positive relationship between risk aversion and the probability of having unemployment 
insurance. This is in accordance with the theoretical prediction. However, contrary to the prediction 
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in Gollier (2003), I find that the measure of patience has a positive effect on the probability of having 
unemployment insurance and health insurance. Individuals who are more patient are more likely to 
be insured. This result is consistent with the following intuition: Individuals who are more patient 
discount the future less. Therefore, individuals who are more patient will be more willing to sacrifice 
current consumption and pay an insurance premium in the present in order to be covered by insurance 
in the future. The relationships between the preference measures and insurance coverage hold when 
controlling flexibly for income, wealth, educational attainment, and demographic characteristics. 
The paper is related to Greene (1963, 1964) which are the first studies to combine measured 
attitudes toward risk with real-life insurance buying behavior. Greene (1963) measures risk attitudes 
for undergraduate students using a non-incentivized questionnaire. The author finds that the measured 
risk attitudes are not significantly correlated with insurance buying behavior. He recognizes that un-
dergraduates are not ideal subjects as their insurance coverage might have been paid for by their 
parents, thus reducing the relationship between the subjects’ risk attitudes and their insurance buying 
behavior. He further argues that some of the undergraduate students might have been liquidity con-
strained and that this can have affected their insurance purchasing behavior, which again would dilute 
the relationship between risk attitudes and insurance buying behavior. Greene (1964) performs a 
follow-up study to address the shortcomings of the previous subject pool. He repeats the analysis with 
a group of adult teachers, but the result remains unchanged: The study finds no evidence that attitudes 
toward risk predict real-life insurance purchasing behavior. Most subsequent empirical studies on 
insurance demand have used demographic and socioeconomic variables to proxy for risk aversion. 
See Outreville (2014) for a review of the literature. Cutler, Finkelstein, & McGarry (2008) take a 
different approach and study how behavioral proxies for individual risk aversion relate to insurance 
purchases.1 I contribute to this research by analyzing directly how time and risk preferences elicited 
experimentally affect people’s insurance buying behavior in the field.2  
The finding that patience seems to be an important driver of insurance coverage at the individual 
level challenges the validity of empirical studies, which attempt to deduce risk preferences from ob-
served insurance choices. For example, Cicchetti & Dubin (1994) use purchasing of insurance against 
the risk of home telephone line failure to estimate consumers’ degrees of risk aversion. With the result 
1 The behavioral risk aversion proxies used in Cutler et al. (2008) include smoking, drinking, job-based mortality risk, 
receipt of preventive health care, and use of seat belts. 
2 Hansen, Jacobsen, & Lau (2016) combine claims data from an insurance company, administrative data on income and 
wealth, and experimental measures of risk and time preferences to estimate the willingness to pay for auto, home, and 
house insurance. However, contrary to the present study, they cannot link the experimental data with the insurance data. 
Thus, their analysis is based on broad population categories to which they extrapolate experimental preference measures.  
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of the present paper in mind, it might be inappropriate to infer risk preferences from whether individ-
uals have chosen to insure or not without controlling for time preferences. Other studies have used 
observed deductible choices in auto insurance and/or home insurance to estimate risk preferences 
(Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue, & Teitelbaum, 2013; Barseghyan, Prince, & Teitelbaum, 2011; 
Cohen & Einav, 2007; Sydnor, 2010). The choice of deductible also has an intertemporal element: 
The insurance premium concerns the present, but the size of the deductible concerns the future. How-
ever, among the estimation strategies to infer risk preferences from observed insurance choices, in-
ference based on deductible choices is arguably more appropriate than inference based on whether 
individuals have chosen to purchase insurance or not. Deductible choices are only made by individ-
uals who are sufficiently patient to demand insurance in the first place. This suggests that deductible 
choices are less susceptible to the intertemporal aspect of insurance and more in accordance with a 
choice among lotteries over monetary outcomes determined by risk preferences. 
Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu, & Cullen (2012) use data on employees’ option choices regarding five 
employer-provided insurance plans to investigate whether individuals display a stable ranking in their 
risk preferences across different insurance contexts. The option choices correspond to different ex-
posures to financial risk. As is the case with the above-mentioned papers deducing risk preferences 
from deductible choices, the fact that (Einav et al., 2012) only consider option choices for employees 
who have chosen to insure means that the scope for time preferences to blur the inference of risk 
preferences is reduced. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design 
and the elicitation of the measures of patience and risk aversion. Section 3 introduces the register data 
including details of unemployment insurance in Denmark. Section 4 presents and discusses the re-
sults, and section 5 concludes. 
2. Experimental design3 
The Internet-based experiment was conducted in two waves in February 2015 and June 2016. The 
main part of the experiment consisted of interactive saving and investment choice situations designed 
to elicit time and risk preferences of respondents. The order of the choice tasks was randomized. 
Besides choice tasks, respondents filled out an online questionnaire.4 
3 The descriptions of the experimental design and the measure of patience builds on and potentially repeats text from my 
master’s thesis (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2015). 
4 For example, the online questionnaire asked the respondents to state their most recent math grade obtained in school 
and to self-report their levels of risk aversion and self-control. 
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We recruited respondents who satisfied the following two criteria: 1) born in the period 1973-
1986, and 2) resided in Copenhagen Municipality (Københavns Kommune) when they were seven 
years old.5 Statistics Denmark, the central authority on Danish statistics, provided a dataset of all of 
the 36,047 individuals who met the sample criteria. The dataset contained names, current addresses, 
and civil registration numbers. We invited everyone in the gross sample to participate by sending 
personal invitation letters in hard copy. The letters were printed on official University of Copenhagen 
letterhead. 560 of the 36,047 letters bounced back. Appendix 6.1 shows an example of the invitation 
letter along with an English translation. 
The letter invited the selected persons to participate in an Internet-based study carried out by 
the University of Copenhagen and described what to do in order to participate. The letter explained 
that respondents would receive an amount of money after completing the experiment and that the 
amount would be automatically transferred to their personal bank accounts. It was pointed out that 
the size of the payout depended on the choices which the respondent made in the study. Each letter 
contained a unique username and password combination needed to log in. The letter also informed 
about a helpline (phone and email) that people could contact if they had problems logging in or had 
questions about the study. 
After logging in to the webpage, the respondents were presented with thorough instructions. To 
facilitate the comprehension, the instructions for the choice tasks were given by voice-over in ani-
mated videos. See the last section of the thesis for an English transcript of the instructions. We con-
sidered it worthwhile to implement instruction videos, as our pilot studies had demonstrated that peo-
ple found it tedious to read the instructions by themselves. In order to proceed to each of the choice 
tasks, the respondents had to answer control questions and go through a practice trial. The respondents 
received immediate feedback on the correctness of their answers to the control questions. During the 
course of the experiment, the respondents could review the relevant instructions. The respondents 
were free to leave the experiment and re-enter at the point they had reached. Appendix 6.2 shows the 
distribution of completion time.  
Decisions in the choice tasks were incentivized such that respondents were motivated to reveal 
their preferences truthfully by making considered decisions. At the end of the experiment, one of the 
choice situations was drawn at random, and payoffs were paid out according to the choice of the 
5 This geographical screening was chosen to be able to merge the experimental data with the Copenhagen School Health 
Records Register for another research project. 
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respondent in the drawn situation.6 The average payout was 251 DKK.7 The payouts were handled 
through a platform for electronic bank transfers. Danish citizens are required to have a bank account 
(NemKonto) associated with their civil registration number. Payments from employers and public 
institutions are transferred to this account. This means that the system is well known in Denmark. 
Because we had information about the civil registration numbers of all individuals in the sample, we 
could use this platform to transfer the payouts directly to the personal bank accounts of the respond-
ents. We believe that our approach to handling the payouts is advantageous compared to previous 
Internet-based experiments. In some earlier studies, respondents needed to state their bank account 
details online during the experiment. It is conceivable that some individuals would be reluctant to do 
so, and that this might increase self-selection bias. 
Additional discussion on the saving choices in the experiment is given below. 
 
Measuring patience 
All respondents were presented with 5 saving choices to elicit their levels of patience.8 In each saving 
situation, we asked the respondents to distribute 10 blocks of points between two accounts. One ac-
count promised a smaller but sooner payout and the other promised a larger but later payout. Specif-
ically, the sooner payout account would be paid out 8 weeks and two days after participation and the 
later payout account would be paid out 16 weeks and two days after participation. This front-end 
delay was incorporated in the saving situations to elicit a longer-run patience measure. If the sooner 
payout account would have been paid out immediately after participation, hyperbolic discounting 
(present bias/decreasing impatience) might induce a bias in the longer-run patience measure 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). 
Appendix 6.3 shows a screenshot of one of the saving situations. In this example, the respondent 
has allocated five blocks to the 8 weeks’ account and five blocks to the 16 weeks’ account. Each 
block allocated to the 8 weeks’ account was worth 100 points and each block allocated to the 16 
weeks’ account was worth 105 points. 100 points corresponded to 25 DKK. If this saving choice was 
selected randomly at the end of the experiment, the respondent would receive 125 DKK 8 weeks and 
two days after participation and 131.25 DKK 16 weeks and two days after participation.  
6 We adopted this random incentive mechanism to avoid portfolio effects (arising when all choices are paid at the end of 
the experiment) and wealth effects (arising if paying all choices sequentially during the experiment). 
7 1 USD ≈ 6.5 DKK during both experimental waves. 
8 The saving choices are inspired by Andreoni & Sprenger (2012). However, we used a graphical interface to present the 
saving choices and showed only one choice per page.  
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The value of the blocks on the 8 weeks’ account was kept constant at 100 points throughout the 
five 8 vs. 16 weeks’ choices. The value of the blocks on the 16 weeks’ account varied between 105, 
110, 115, 120, and 125 points. The order of the saving situations was randomized. The starting point 
for the five choice situation was that all 10 blocks were placed on the 8 weeks’ account. We then 
asked the respondents to choose a distribution of the 10 blocks between the two accounts.9 We delib-
erately framed the choice situation as a saving decision in order to make it less abstract. The instruc-
tions explained that you would get an interest income if you chose to save the blocks, i.e. place them 
on the 16 weeks’ account.  
I measure the patience level for each respondent by computing the median number of saved 
blocks across the five 8 vs. 16 weeks saving situations and normalizing by 10.10 The research question 
of the present paper requires a reliable measure of the heterogeneity in patience between respondents 
while accurate estimates of the levels of patience are not necessary. I will study between-respondent 
variation in patience levels and its relation to insurance purchasing behavior directly in terms of how 
many blocks the respondents chose to save in the saving situations rather than estimating a discount-
ing model for time preferences based on the choices. The advantage of this model-free approach is 
that I avoid introducing assumptions about parameter values. The left panel in figure 2.1 shows the 
distribution of the constructed non-parametric patience measure. 
 
  
9 To avoid status quo bias, we designed the user interface such that the respondent had to make an active choice. Specif-
ically, as the respondent moused over one of the accounts vertically, a blue saving bar summarized the outcomes of each 
allocation (see appendix 6.3). The respondent was only able to confirm his decision and move on after actively choosing 
one of the allocations. 
10 The results presented in the paper do not change if I use the arithmetic mean to aggregate the five saving situations 
instead. 
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Figure 2.1: Distributions of the patience and risk aversion measures. 
 
Notes: 5,084 respondents. Only respondents for whom a full set of register variables is available are included. 
Left-hand panel: Distribution of the patience measure. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
10
�. 
Right-hand panel: Distribution of the risk aversion measure. 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 = 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏−𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 
10
�. 
 
Measuring risk aversion 
The respondents were also given 5 separate investment situations in which they had to allocate 10 
blocks of points between a risky investment project and a risk-free account where the payout was 
certain.11 In each investment situation, there was a 50-50 probability that the investment project would 
turn out to be favorable or unfavorable (zero skewness).12 The order of investment situations was 
randomized. Appendix 6.4 shows a screenshot of a sample investment situation. In this example, the 
respondent has allocated five blocks to the risk-free account and five blocks to the risky investment 
project. The value of blocks on the risk-free account was kept constant at 100 points throughout the 
five investment situations, whereas the value of blocks in the risky investment project differed across 
the five situations. The expected value of the investment project as well as the spread between the 
point value in the favorable and the unfavorable outcome varied. The point values were 121 vs. 81, 
131 vs. 71, 135 vs. 75, 151 vs. 50, and 161 vs. 60 such that the expected value of a block allocated to 
the investment project was greater than the 100 points in the risk-free alternative in all five situations. 
11 Our procedure is inspired by Gneezy & Potters (1997), but we depict the investment situations graphically. 
12 The favorable vs. unfavorable outcome of an investment situation would only be determined if it was drawn at random 
to be the choice situation relevant for payout at the end of the experiment. 
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Similar to the patience measure, I compute the level of risk aversion for each respondent by 
taking the median number of blocks allocated to the risk-free account across the five investment sit-
uations and normalizing by 10.13 The right panel in figure 2.1 shows the distribution of this non-
parametric risk aversion measure. 
3. The data 
The experimental sample consists of 5,207 respondents. The choice data from the experiment are 
linked with Danish administrative register data at the individual level. The participants were not in-
formed that the data from the experiment would be linked with the administrative register data, and 
they were therefore not asked to give their consent to this. The Danish Data Protection Agency has 
approved the research project and this procedure. To merge the experimental data with the register 
data, the usernames provided in the invitation letters were translated into anonymized civil registra-
tion numbers. It is important for the linkage between experimental and register data that the respond-
ents in the experiment are identical to the people who were actually invited. Since the experiment 
was executed online, one cannot be certain that the respondents in the experiment exclusively consist 
of people who were invited to participate. Though the invitation letter requested that the log in details 
were not passed on to others, it is possible that some of the invited subjects let e.g. a colleague or 
another member of the household participate instead. This is problematic in the sense that the exper-
imental choices of individual x would be linked with register data for individual y. To reduce this 
source of error, the respondents were asked to state their gender and year of birth first thing after 
logging in to the experiment. 79 respondents for whom the stated gender and/or year of birth is not 
identical to the information in the register data are excluded from the analysis. The fact that the pay-
outs from the experiment were transferred directly to the personal bank accounts of the invited indi-
viduals might have reduced the prevalence of such spurious respondents. 
The following analyses will focus on the 5,084 respondents for whom a full set of register 
variables is available. The register data contain, i.a., demographic characteristics from public admin-
istrative registers and individual-level information from the income tax register. The income tax reg-
ister includes information on annual income as well as values of assets and liabilities at the end of 
each year. The value of assets includes assessed property value, market values of stocks, bonds, and 
mortgage deeds in deposit, and bank deposits. The value of liabilities includes all debt except debt to 
13 Again, the results presented in the paper do not change if I use the arithmetic mean to aggregate the five investment 
situations instead. 
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private persons. The data in the registers are organized as a panel dataset so that it is possible to 
observe income, assets, and liabilities back in time for the respondents in the experiment. These data 
are available up to and including year 2014. 
All register data are third-party reported. For instance, employers report earnings, government 
institutions report transfer payments, and information on assets and liabilities is reported by financial 
institutions. This feature of the data is an advantage compared to related literature that relies on self-
reported survey measures, which makes the accuracy of such responses difficult to assess. 
Furthermore, the registers contain information on how long time each individual has been unem-
ployed during the year. Crucial to this paper, I can also observe in the registers whether an individual 
is a member of an unemployment insurance fund by the end of each year. This information is available 
up to and including year 2013. The Danish unemployment insurance system is organized around 
unemployment insurance funds, which are private non-profit institutions that are subsidized by the 
government. In order to be eligible for unemployment benefits in case of unemployment, the typical 
worker must 1) have been a member of an unemployment insurance fund for at least one year, 2) 
have had at least 52 weeks of work within the three years preceding the unemployment spell, and 3) 
be able to take work with one day’s notice. Membership of an unemployment insurance fund and 
with it unemployment insurance is voluntary. The unemployment benefits amount to 90 percent of 
the unemployed worker’s prior wage – though no more than 4,245 DKK (≈ 653 USD) per week as 
of 2017. The maximum unemployment benefit duration is two years. 
Besides the unemployment insurance coverage, there is an additional motive for being a mem-
ber of an unemployment insurance fund: If you have been a member of an unemployment insurance 
fund and have contributed to the so-called early retirement scheme (efterløn) for at least 30 years 
beginning no later than age 30, you are eligible to receive early retirement benefits. The birth cohorts 
in the sample considered in this paper will be able to receive early retirement benefits 3 years before 
the regular retirement age. In the subsequent analysis of the relationships between risk/time prefer-
ences and unemployment insurance coverage, I perform a robustness test excluding people who have 
contributed to the early retirement scheme, such that I can rule out that the remaining respondents are 
members of an unemployment insurance fund because of the early retirement motive.  
As I know the anonymized civil registration numbers of all individuals in the gross sample, I 
can compare the register-based characteristics of the respondents and the non-respondents. Column 
(1) in table 3.1 reports the differences in means across respondents and non-respondents for everyone 
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in the gross sample with a full set of register data available. Compared with non-respondents, re-
spondents are, on average, less likely to be singles, more likely to be homeowners, have higher edu-
cational attainment, have higher income, and hold more liquid assets. Most of these differences are 
statistically significant but qualitatively small.  
The gross sample includes everyone who lived in Copenhagen Municipality when they were 
seven years old. Column 2 in table 3.1 compares the gross sample with a 10 percent random sample 
of the Danish population who are not in the gross sample (i.e., did not live in Copenhagen Munici-
pality when they were seven years old), but who were born in the same period (1973-1986). When 
comparing with the 10 percent sample, it appears that individuals in the gross sample are, on average, 
younger, more likely to be singles, less likely to have dependent children, less likely to be homeown-
ers, have slightly shorter education, have lower income and hold less liquid assets. Again, most of 
these differences are small in economic magnitude but are statistically significant because of the large 
number of observations. In section 4, I show that my results are not sensitive to the differences in 
sample composition reported in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Means of selected characteristics from register data. 
 
Notes: Variables are based on 2014 values. The random 10 percent sample of the Danish population is drawn among 
those who are not in the gross sample (i.e., did not live in Copenhagen Municipality when they were seven years old), but 
who were born in the same period (1973-1986). (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for individuals 
who satisfy the description given by the variable name. Liquid assets include bank deposits and market values of stocks 
and bonds. The table includes individuals for whom a full set of register variables is available. The number of observations 
is slightly lower than reported in the table for the two variables income and liquid assets as some of the respondents do 
not have strictly positive income or liquid assets. 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Respondents Non- Difference, Gross sample Population Difference,
respondents (a)-(b) (d)-(e)
Age                                         34.17                                34.03 0,14                                        34.05                                34.97 -0,92
Woman (=1)                                          0.50                                0.49 0,01                                         0.49                                0.50 -0,01
Single (=1)                                          0.34                                0.41 -0,07                                         0.40                                0.31 0,09
Dependent children (=1)                                        0.49                                0.48 0,01                                         0.48                                0.55 -0,07
Homeowner (=1)                                         0.33                                0.29 0,04                                         0.29                                0.51 -0,22
Years of education                                        14.41                                13.79 0,62                                        13.88                                14.33 -0,45
Ln(Total income)                                        12.63                                12.51 0,12                                        12.52                                12.63 -0,11
Ln(Liquid assets)                                        10.35                                10.03 0,32                                        10.07                                10.24 -0,17
Observations 5084                                        30611 35695                                        83464
(1) Respondents vs. non-respondents (2) Gross sample vs. 10 % of population
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4. Results and discussion 
Patience, risk aversion, and unemployment insurance 
This section investigates how preferences relate to unemployment insurance take-up. To do so, I 
consider a subsample consisting of 4,172 respondents who were in the labor force in all years in the 
period 2011-2013. 3,330 (79.8 percent) of these respondents were covered by unemployment insur-
ance in 2013. Figure 4.1 plots the local polynomial regression curves of the share of the sample with 
unemployment insurance against the patience measure and the measure of risk aversion, respectively. 
The figure shows a positive relationship between patience and the probability of having unemploy-
ment insurance, but no significant relationship between risk aversion and unemployment insurance 
take-up. 
 
Figure 4.1: Unemployment insurance plotted against patience and risk aversion, respectively.  
 
Notes: 4,172 observations. Unemployment insurance coverage is identified for each experimental respondent based on 
register information on membership of unemployment insurance funds at the end of 2013. 
Left-hand panel: Local polynomial regression of the share of respondents with unemployment insurance on the patience 
measure. 
Right-hand panel: Local polynomial regression of the share of respondents with unemployment insurance on the risk 
aversion measure. 
 
At first, it may seem surprising that the experimental measure of risk aversion is not correlated with 
the probability of having unemployment insurance. One reason for the lack of correlation could be 
that individuals are able to self-protect against unemployment risk to some extent by their educational 
and occupational choices.14 Even a risk averse respondent might not demand unemployment insur-
ance if he has self-selected into a job with a low risk of becoming unemployed. 
14 Ehrlich & Becker (1972) define self-protection as activities that reduces the probability of a loss, while self-insurance 
affects the cost of a potential loss. 
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Another reason for the lack of correlation has to do with the measure of risk aversion. Weber, 
Blais, & Betz (2002) find that risk preferences are domain-specific. In the present paper, the experi-
mental measure of risk aversion is based on the respondents’ willingness to invest in a risky invest-
ment project, which is quite distinct from the decision to hedge against unemployment risk by taking 
out unemployment insurance. Dohmen et al. (2011) find that the general risk question used in the 
German Socio-Economic Panel is the best all-around predictor of risky behavior in the field. A ver-
sion of this general question on risk-taking was also implemented in the online questionnaire that the 
respondents filled out.15 The left panel in figure 4.2 plots the relationship between the probability of 
having unemployment insurance and self-reported risk aversion. The panel shows that the probability 
of having unemployment insurance is higher for respondents who state that they are more risk averse. 
 
Figure 4.2: Unemployment insurance plotted against self-reported measures of risk aversion 
and self-control.  
 
Notes: 4,172 observations. 
Left-hand panel: Average share of respondents with unemployment insurance by self-reported values of risk aversion. 
Contrary to Dohmen et al. (2011), higher values represent higher levels of risk aversion. 
Right-hand panel: Average share of respondents with unemployment insurance by self-reported values of self-control. 
 
Table 4.1 substantiates the relationships between the probability of having unemployment insurance 
and the measures of patience and risk aversion. The table shows results from probit regressions of 
unemployment insurance coverage on the preference measures and other covariates. The reported 
coefficients are marginal effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
15 Survey question on risk aversion: Are you generally willing to take risks or do you try to avoid risks? 
   1 = very willing to take risks 
   … 
   7 = not at all willing to take risks 
The general survey-based question on risk aversion and the experimental measure of risk aversion are positively corre-
lated: Spearman's rho = 0.173; p-value = 0.000. 
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a respondent had unemployment insurance by the end of 2013. Column (1) shows output from a 
parsimonious specification that only includes the experimental preference measures. In column (2), I 
exchange the experimental measure of risk aversion which is prone to be domain-specific with the 
more general survey-based question on risk aversion introduced in the left panel in figure 4.2. Because 
of few observations in some of the answer categories, the self-reported measure of risk aversion is 
aggregated into two dummy variables indicating whether the respondent stated a risk aversion below 
or above the medium value, 1-3 and 5-7, respectively. The results show that moving from minimum 
to maximum patience (0 to 1) is associated with an increase in the probability of being covered by 
unemployment insurance of about 8 percentage points on average. Similarly, the group of respondents 
reporting below medium risk aversion are about 5 percentage points less likely to have taken out 
unemployment insurance. 
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Table 4.1: Probit regressions of unemployment insurance dummy regressed on covariates (mar-
ginal effects at means). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2013 
values unless otherwise stated. (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for respondents who satisfy the 
description given by the variable name. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent 
children, and homeownership. The number of observations decreases in column (4) due to some of the respondents not 
reporting a math grade. The interaction between risk aversion and patience is insignificant. 
 
In column (3), I add decile dummies for income and net asset holdings, flexible dummies for educa-
tional attainment, demographic characteristics, and other register based variables likely to correlate 
with the decision to take out unemployment insurance. I control for the unemployment rate within 
each respondent’s own educational group to take differences in unemployment risk into account. The 
sample is split into 60 educational groups, and the computed unemployment rate ranges from 0.0 to 
19.1 percent. These unemployment rates are computed based on all the people who were invited to 
participate in the experiment (the gross sample). As expected, the results show a positive relationship 
Risk aversion -0.025
(0.025)
Patience 0.083 *** 0.084 *** 0.037 * 0.036 *
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Self-reported risk aversion, 1-3 (=1) -0.047 ** -0.036 * -0.037 *
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Self-reported risk aversion, 5-7 (=1) 0.022 0.002 -0.005
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Unemployment rate within own educational group 0.027 *** 0.027 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
Has experienced unemployment, 2011-2013 (=1) 0.211 *** 0.208 ***
(0.012) (0.013)
Public employee (=1) 0.033 * 0.028
(0.014) (0.015)
Self-reported self-control, 1-3 (=1) 0.009
(0.024)
Self-reported self-control, 5-7 (=1) 0.045 *
(0.021)
Income decile dummies No No Yes Yes
Net asset decile dummies No No Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No No Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No No Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No No Yes
Observations 4172 4172 4172 3809
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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between the unemployment rate within own educational group and the probability of having unem-
ployment insurance. An increase in the unemployment rate of one percentage point is associated with 
an increase of about 3 percentage points in the probability of having unemployment insurance on 
average. This could suggest that respondents are aware of the unemployment risk in their own edu-
cational group and respond to it. Furthermore, I include a dummy variable, which indicates whether 
the respondent has experienced unemployment within the three years leading up to the time when I 
observe unemployment insurance coverage.16 The estimated marginal effect shows that respondents 
who have experienced unemployment in the past are, on average, 21 percentage points more likely to 
have unemployment insurance coverage. Again, this is consistent with those who are more likely to 
become unemployed having a higher incentive to buy unemployment insurance. Finally, I control for 
whether the respondents work in the public sector to control for different propensities to join an un-
employment insurance fund across the private and the public sector. As Parsons, Tranæs, & Lilleør 
(2015) point out, there could be varying degrees of social pressure to join an unemployment insurance 
fund across sectors – e.g. as a way of expressing solidarity with other workers. The results imply that 
public employees are about 3 percentage points more likely to be covered by unemployment insur-
ance. The estimate of the relationship between the probability of having unemployment insurance 
and the patience measure reduces after adding the additional control variables in column (3), but it 
remains statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
Financial literacy or cognitive ability are potential confounding factors. It is conceivable that 
both the decision on whether to have unemployment insurance and the measures of patience and risk 
aversion are correlated with cognitive ability. One could argue that this is less of a problem in the 
present analysis, as I include educational attainment and income in the regressions, both of which are 
likely to proxy for cognitive ability. However, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde (2010) study a 
representative sample of the adult German population and find that people with higher cognitive abil-
ity (measured by submodules of an IQ test) are significantly more patient and significantly more risk 
willing (measured by incentivized choice tasks). The correlations in their study remain significant 
when controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, and income.17 To address this 
concern, column (4) in table 4.1 adds flexible dummies for the most recent math grade obtained in 
16 22.1 percent of respondents have experienced unemployment in the period 2011-2013. 
17 Nevertheless, an experimental study suggests that cognitive ability is associated with random decision making rather 
than with risk preferences (Andersson, Holm, Tyran, & Wengström, 2016). 
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school (self-reported by the respondents in the online questionnaire) as an additional proxy for cog-
nitive ability and financial literacy.18 
Self-control is another potential concern. One could imagine that the observed positive rela-
tionship between the patience measure and the probability of having unemployment insurance is 
driven by heterogeneity in self-control. It could be that an individual with self-control problems is 
less likely to pay an insurance premium to be covered by unemployment insurance. Similarly, as 
Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rützler, & Trautmann (2013) argue, an experimental patience measure as the 
one used in the present paper is likely related to self-control. The right panel in figure 4.2 plots the 
relationship between the probability of having unemployment insurance and a self-reported measure 
of self-control from the online questionnaire.19 The panel shows that the probability of having unem-
ployment insurance is higher for respondents who self-report that they are better at exercising self-
control. As with the self-reported risk aversion, I aggregate the self-control categories into two 
dummy variables indicating whether the respondent stated a degree of self-control below or above 
the medium value, 1-3 and 5-7, respectively. The results in column (4) in table 4.1 show that the 
group of respondents who state that they are better at exercising self-control are about 5 percentage 
points more likely to have unemployment insurance coverage. However, the estimates of the rela-
tionships between the probability of having unemployment insurance and the measures of patience 
and risk aversion are robust to including self-reported math grades and ability to exercise self-control. 
The results in table 4.1 show that the patience measure is both statistically and economically 
significant in explaining the probability of having unemployment insurance. Figure 4.3 investigates 
how the effect of patience depends on heterogeneity in income and education. The left panel in figure 
4.3 is based on the same regression as that in table 4.1, column (4) but replaces the income decile 
dummies with income deciles and income interacted with the patience measure. The panel plots the 
average marginal effect of patience on the probability of having unemployment insurance for each 
income decile. The right panel in figure 4.3 is also based on the regression in column (4) but replaces 
the dummies for educational attainment with years of education and education interacted with the 
patience measure. The panel plots the average marginal effect of patience on the probability of having 
18 Agarwal & Mazumder (2013) find that math scores are important for household financial decision-making. In their 
study, individuals with higher math scores are less likely to make financial mistakes. Additionally, a recent publication 
by PISA documents a strong correlation between students’ mathematics performance and financial literacy (OECD, 
2017). 
19 Survey question on self-control: I am good at exercising self-control in my actions and decisions. 
   1 = strongly disagree 
   … 
   7 = strongly agree 
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unemployment insurance for different levels of educational attainment. Generally, the figure shows 
that the positive relationship between patience and unemployment insurance coverage is most pro-
nounced for respondents with lower income and lower educational attainment. This is consistent with 
a larger share of less patient respondents not having unemployment insurance in the part of the sample 
with low income and low education. Possibly, respondents with fewer years of schooling are less 
aware of the need and purpose of unemployment insurance and find it harder to evaluate its costs and 
benefits, thus amplifying the effect of patience on unemployment insurance coverage for this group.  
 
Figure 4.3: Average marginal effects of patience on Pr(Unemployment insurance). 
 
Notes: 4,172 observations. Capped spikes represent 95% CI. 
Left-hand panel: Based on the regression in table 4.1, column (4) but replaces the income decile dummies with income 
deciles and income interacted with the patience measure. 
Right-hand panel: Based on the regression in table 4.1, column (4) but replaces the dummies for educational attainment 
with years of education and education interacted with the patience measure. Years of education is censored at 10 and 20 
years. 
 
Robustness tests 
As mentioned in section 3, membership of a Danish unemployment insurance fund combined with 
paying contributions to the so-called early retirement scheme renders a person eligible to receive early 
retirement benefits. It is, therefore, possible that some people are more motivated to become members 
of unemployment insurance funds by the possibility to retire early than by the unemployment insur-
ance coverage. This poses a problem for the analysis as it suggests that there is no one-to-one con-
nection between observed membership of an unemployment insurance fund and demand for unem-
ployment insurance. Appendix 6.5 addresses this concern. Column (1) reproduces the main regression 
from column (4), table 4.1 for comparison. Column (2) in appendix 6.5 re-estimates the reference 
model reported in column (1) but excludes respondents who contributed to the early retirement 
scheme in 2013. Hence, for the remaining respondents in column (2), I can rule out that memberships 
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of unemployment insurance funds are because of the early retirement motive. The estimated marginal 
effects in column (2) show that the positive effects of patience and risk aversion on unemployment 
insurance fund membership are robust to this exercise. In sum, this shows that the reported effects of 
patience and risk aversion remain for this subsample where the unemployment insurance purchasing 
behavior is measured with less noise. 
Column (3) in appendix 6.5 takes into account the selection into the experiment. Based on the 
characteristics included in table 3.1, I have estimated the probability that an individual in the gross 
sample chose to participate. Column (3) re-estimates the reference model weighting each observation 
with the inverse of the probability that the individual participated. The idea is to inflate the weight 
for respondents who are underrepresented in terms of observable characteristics. If the observable 
characteristics predict the decision to participate adequately, the selection can be ignored after 
weighting with the inverse of the participation probability. The estimated marginal effects in column 
(3) show that the results presented in table 4.1 are not sensitive to this inverse probability weighting. 
To allow for differences between the 10 percent population sample and the respondents in terms 
of the observable characteristics in table 3.1, column (4) in appendix 6.5 re-estimates the reference 
model using inverse probability weights to adjust for this. Again, the results do not deviate from what 
is presented in table 4.1. 
 
Patience, risk aversion, and health insurance 
The Danish public health care system is predominantly financed through income tax, and treatments 
from general practitioners and treatments in the hospital sector are available free of charge. Other 
health-related expenses such as medicine and dental care involve user charges. Additionally, a 
market-dominating mutual insurance company called Sygeforsikringen “danmark” exists, which spe-
cializes in health insurance. The association will support its members financially if they fall ill by 
contributing to health-related expenses. In order to become a member of Sygeforsikringen “dan-
mark”, you have to be healthy and no more than 59 years old at the time of applying.20 
In the following, I analyze the determinants of the decision to be covered by health insurance. 
In the online questionnaire, the respondents were asked the following question: Are you a member of 
20 Further details about Sygeforsikringen “danmark” can be found on http://www.sygeforsikring.dk/Default.aspx?ID=33. 
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Sygeforsikringen ”danmark” (incl. “resting” members)?21 2,270 out of 5,084 respondents (44.6 per-
cent) stated that they are members and thus covered by the health insurance.22 Figure 4.4 plots the 
local polynomial regression curves of the share of the sample with health insurance against the ex-
perimental measures of patience and risk aversion, respectively. As was the case for unemployment 
insurance, the figure shows a positive relationship between patience and the probability of having 
health insurance, but no significant relationship between risk aversion and health insurance coverage. 
 
Figure 4.4: Health insurance plotted against patience and risk aversion, respectively. 
  
Notes: 5,084 observations. 
Left-hand panel: Local polynomial regression of the share of respondents with health insurance on the patience measure. 
Right-hand panel: Local polynomial regression of the share of respondents with health insurance on the risk aversion 
measure. 
 
Table 4.2 extends the analysis by showing estimated marginal effects from probit regressions in which 
health insurance coverage is the dependent variable. The control variables are similar to those used 
in the unemployment insurance analysis, while the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if a respondent has health insurance and 0 if not.  
 
  
21 The insurance premium for “resting” members is lower than that for regular members. A “resting” membership means 
that the member is not currently covered by the health insurance, but that he can choose to pay the regular insurance 
premium at some later point in time to get the coverage, even if he does not meet the requirements about age and health 
then. 
22 About 42 percent of the Danish population are members of Sygeforsikringen ”danmark”. Thus, the survey responses 
seem plausible. 
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Table 4.2: Probit regressions of health insurance dummy regressed on covariates (marginal 
effects at means). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for respondents who satisfy the description given by the 
variable name. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent children, and homeown-
ership. The number of observations decreases in column (4) due to some of the respondents not reporting a math grade. 
The interaction between risk aversion and patience is insignificant. 
 
Fang, Keane, & Silverman (2008) find empirical evidence that cognitive ability is positively related 
to the demand for health insurance. The authors argue that individuals with high cognitive ability may 
be more knowledgeable about potential health risks, which could increase their demand for health 
insurance. If patience and risk aversion are also correlated with cognitive ability as documented in 
Dohmen et al. (2010), it is important to try to control for heterogeneity in cognitive ability in the 
regressions. I do this in columns (3) and (4) of table 4.2 by including income, educational attainment, 
and self-reported math grades. The table shows a positive and remarkably stable relationship between 
the patience measure and health insurance coverage across the four specifications. Going from mini-
mum to maximum patience (0 to 1) is associated with an increase in the probability of having health 
insurance of 8-9 percentage points on average. The relationship is significant at the 0.1 percent level. 
Risk aversion 0.022
(0.027)
Patience 0.093 *** 0.090 *** 0.079 *** 0.082 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Self-reported risk aversion, 1-3 (=1) -0.016 -0.009 -0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Self-reported risk aversion, 5-7 (=1) 0.018 -0.003 0.004
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Self-reported self-control, 1-3 (=1) -0.053
(0.030)
Self-reported self-control, 5-7 (=1) -0.036
(0.023)
Income decile dummies No No Yes Yes
Net asset decile dummies No No Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment No No Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No No Yes Yes
Math grade dummies No No No Yes
Observations 5084 5084 5084 4642
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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The estimated marginal effect is also economically significant compared to the baseline probability 
of having health insurance of 44.6 percent in the sample. 
The marginal effects of the experimental and the self-reported measures of risk aversion have 
the expected signs but are not significant at the 5 percent level. When interpreting this result, it is 
important to keep in mind that all the respondents are covered by the free Danish health care system. 
The health insurance provided by Sygeforsikringen ”danmark” should be regarded as an additional 
layer of insurance coverage. 
Figure 4.5 analyzes how the effect of patience on the propensity to buy health insurance depends 
on income and education. Both panels are based on the regression in table 4.2, column (4). In the 
regression underlying the left panel, income decile dummies are replaced by income deciles and in-
come interacted with the patience measure. In the regression underlying the right panel, dummies for 
educational attainment are replaced by years of education and education interacted with the patience 
measure. The left panel shows that the positive effect of patience on health insurance coverage exists 
across the income distribution, whereas the right panel displays that the positive relationship between 
patience and health insurance coverage is most pronounced for respondents with lower educational 
attainment. This could be due to less educated respondents being less aware of the purpose of this 
additional health insurance and finding it harder to evaluate its costs and benefits, thus leading their 
health insurance purchasing behavior to be more influenced by their preferences for consumption 
possibilities in the present vs. in the future.  
 
Figure 4.5: Average marginal effects of patience on Pr(Health insurance). 
 
Notes: 5,084 observations. Capped spikes represent 95% CI. 
Left-hand panel: Based on the regression in table 4.2, column (4) but replaces the income decile dummies with income 
deciles and income interacted with the patience measure. 
Right-hand panel: Based on the regression in table 4.2, column (4) but replaces the dummies for educational attainment 
with years of education and education interacted with the patience measure. Years of education is censored at 10 and 20 
years. 
-.15
-.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
Ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 P
r(H
ea
lth
 in
su
ra
nc
e)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income deciles
-.15
-.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
Ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 P
r(H
ea
lth
 in
su
ra
nc
e)
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Years of education
117
 
Appendix 6.6 tests whether the health insurance results are sensitive to the selection into the experi-
ment. Column (1) replicates the main regression from column (4), table 4.2. Column (2) re-estimates 
the reference model weighting each observation with the inverse of the probability that an individual 
in the gross sample chose to participate. The participation probabilities are based on the characteris-
tics included in table 3.1. Column (3) repeats this exercise based on the observable differences be-
tween the 10 percent population sample and the respondents. The results in appendix 6.6 show that 
the marginal effect of patience on the probability of having health insurance is robust to these adjust-
ments. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates relationships between experimental preference measures and choice of insur-
ance coverage in the field at the individual level. I combine evidence from a large-scale incentivized 
choice experiment with objective third-party reported data from administrative registers. Based on 
intertemporal choices and investment choices in the experiment, I construct measures of patience and 
risk aversion for about 5,000 Danish respondents. In accordance with theoretical predictions, I find a 
positive relationship between risk aversion and the probability of having unemployment insurance. 
However, contrary to the prediction in Gollier (2003), I find that patience has a positive effect on the 
probability of having unemployment insurance and health insurance. The positive empirical associa-
tion between patience and insurance coverage is intuitively appealing: The more patient an individual 
is, the less he discounts the future relative to the present. Therefore, a more patient individual will be 
more willing to pay an insurance premium in the present in order to be covered by insurance that 
might benefit him in the future. Relationships between the preference measures and insurance cover-
age are maintained when controlling for objectively reported income, wealth, educational attainment, 
and demographic characteristics. 
The result that patience seems to be an important driver of insurance coverage at the individual 
level suggests that it is worthwhile to incorporate time preferences into models of insurance demand.   
Furthermore, the observed intertemporal aspect of insurance purchasing behavior challenges the va-
lidity of empirical studies, which attempt to infer individual-level risk preferences from observed 
insurance choices without taking heterogeneity in time preferences into account. 
 
  
118
6. Appendix 
Appendix 6.1: Invitation letter. 
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English translation of the invitation letter. 
 
Dear «name», 
 
University of Copenhagen invites you to participate in a study on the Internet. The study is part of a 
research project about understanding the basis for the Danes’ financial decisions. We already know a 
lot more about people's personal financial decisions than we did before the financial crisis, but there 
is still much we need to understand - and that is why we are asking for your help. 
It takes about 30-50 minutes to complete the study. When you are finished, you will typically 
receive prize money and it will be automatically transferred to your NemKonto. The amount depends, 
i.a., on the choices that you make during the study and will on average correspond to a decent hourly 
wage. 
The study is conducted on the Internet. You will consider questions concerning savings and 
investments, among other things. The rules will be explained once you have logged in. The study is 
open for participation through «date». 
The Data Protection Agency has approved the research project, which means that our proce-
dures comply with the Act on Processing of Personal Data. An important part of the Data Protection 
Agency’s requirements is that your answers will be treated anonymously. To ensure anonymity, we 
have formed a random username for you. To participate, please log in at the following website: 
analyse.econ.ku.dk. 
 
Username: «username»                    Password: «password» 
 
The invitation is personal and we therefore ask you not to pass on username and password to others. 
Please feel free to contact us if you are having trouble logging in or have any further questions. You 
can call project coordinator Gregers Nytoft Rasmussen at phone number 35 33 02 77 Monday-Thurs-
day 2:00 p.m. – 5:30 p.m. or write to the address analyse@econ.ku.dk. 
 
Sincerely yours,  
 
Søren Leth-Petersen 
Project manager, professor 
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Appendix 6.2: Distribution of completion time. 
 
Notes: The histogram is truncated at 120 minutes. Some respondents spent considerably more time as it was possible to 
exit the experiment and re-enter later on. The median completion time was about 47 minutes. 
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Appendix 6.3: Screenshot of a saving choice. 8 vs. 16 weeks. 
 
Notes: The blue saving bar summarizes the outcome of the allocation. In this case, the respondent chose to keep 500 
points in the 8 weeks account (left) and save 500 points (right) such that he would get 525 points in 16 weeks. 
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Appendix 6.4: Screenshot of an investment choice. 
 
Notes: The blue investment bar summarizes the outcome of the allocation. In this case, the respondent chose to keep 500 
points on the risk-free account (left) and invest 500 points in the risky investment project (right) such that he would get 
750 or 1255 points in total depending on the outcome of the investment project. 
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Appendix 6.5: Probit regressions of unemployment insurance dummy regressed on covariates 
(marginal effects at means).  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2013 
values unless otherwise stated. (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for respondents who satisfy the 
description given by the variable name. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent 
children, and homeownership. Column (1) reproduces the main specification in column (4), table 4.1. Column (2) restricts 
the sample to respondents who did not contribute to the early retirement scheme in 2013. Column (3) estimates the main 
specification using inverse probability weighting where probability weights are based on respondents vs. non-respond-
ents. Column (4) presents results from estimating the main specification using inverse probability weighting where prob-
ability weights are based on respondents vs. population. The number of observations is slightly lower in columns (3)-(4) 
as some of the respondents do not have strictly positive income or liquid assets. 
 
 
  
Patience 0.036 * 0.042 * 0.045 * 0.047 *
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Self-reported risk aversion, 1-3 (=1) -0.037 * -0.041 * -0.048 * -0.045 *
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Self-reported risk aversion, 5-7 (=1) -0.005 -0.011 -0.017 -0.013
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
Unemployment rate within own educational group 0.027 *** 0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.028 ***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Has experienced unemployment, 2011-2013 (=1) 0.208 *** 0.230 *** 0.232 *** 0.189 ***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Public employee (=1) 0.028 0.025 0.037 * 0.029 *
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Self-reported self-control, 1-3 (=1) 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.011
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Self-reported self-control, 5-7 (=1) 0.045 * 0.048 * 0.040 0.055 *
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Income decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Net asset decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Math grade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3809 3543 3721 3721
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Appendix 6.6: Probit regressions of health insurance dummy regressed on covariates (mar-
ginal effects at means). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Register variables are based on 2014 
values. (=1) indicates a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for respondents who satisfy the description given by the 
variable name. Demographic characteristics include age, age2, gender, marital status, dependent children, and homeown-
ership. Column (1) reproduces the main specification in column (4), table 4.2. Column (2) estimates the main specification 
using inverse probability weighting where probability weights are based on respondents vs. non-respondents. Column (3) 
presents results from estimating the main specification using inverse probability weighting where probability weights are 
based on respondents vs. population. The number of observations is slightly lower in columns (2)-(3) as some of the 
respondents do not have strictly positive income or liquid assets.  
Patience 0.081 *** 0.084 *** 0.089 ***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
Self-reported risk aversion, 1-3 (=1) -0.006 -0.001 -0.018
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Self-reported risk aversion, 5-7 (=1) 0.004 0.004 -0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Self-reported self-control, 1-3 (=1) -0.054 -0.045 -0.046
(0.030) (0.032) (0.034)
Self-reported self-control, 5-7 (=1) -0.037 -0.046 -0.049
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
Income decile dummies Yes Yes Yes
Net asset decile dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies for educational attainment Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Math grade dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4642 4517 4517
(1) (2) (3)
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English transcript of introductory instructions 
 
Welcome! 
This survey is being conducted by the University of Copenhagen and will be used for research into 
how people make financial decisions.  
When you have completed the survey, you will receive a sum of money in your NemKonto. The size 
of the amount will depend on your decisions during the survey and will, on average, be the equivalent 
of a decent hourly wage. 
The survey revolves around three types of decisions: 
 1. INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
 2. SAVING DECISIONS 
3. DIVIDING SUMS OF MONEY BETWEEN YOURSELF AND ANOTHER  
  PERSON 
 
Your task is to make decisions. Within each of the three decision-making areas you will be making 
12-15 decisions.  
 
In each decision situation, you will make a decision about a particular amount of points. 
100 points is the equivalent of DKK 25. 
One of the decision-making situations will be chosen for payout at the conclusion of the survey. The 
points you earned in this situation will be converted into DKK and transferred to your NemKonto. 
You will not have to pay tax on the amount. The University of Copenhagen has already settled this 
issue with the Danish Customs and Tax Administration (SKAT). Accordingly you will not have to 
declare it to SKAT.  
At the conclusion of the survey you must spin the pointer on the wheel shown below. The place where 
the pointer stops will determine the decision-making situation, for which you will be paid. So you 
should be careful about each decision you make. 
 
 
 
Please note that there are no right or wrong decisions. It is important to base the investment, saving, 
and distribution decisions you make on your own assessments and preferences. 
All data will be stored anonymously. 
The survey consists of four steps: 
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 1. Questionnaire 1 
 2. Decisions within the three decision-making areas 
 3. Questionnaire 2 
4. Selection of the decision-making situation you will be paid for, and determination of  
 your prize in this situation. 
 
Prior to each part of the survey you will be given detailed explanations. 
The grey bar at the top of the window shows you where you have got to in the survey at any given 
time. 
Click on 'Next'. 
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English transcript of instruction video regarding saving decisions 
 
[001] Now we have reached the next part of the survey. [002] It is about saving. You need to 
make 15 saving decisions. 
[003] At the start of each saving decision you have 1000 points. [004] These 1000 points are 
divided into 10 blocks of 100 points. 
[005] You can hold on to each and every block in your account or save it. 
 [006] There are three types of accounts: 
1. [007] A day account. The points in this account will be credited on the next banking day. 
2. [008] A short-term savings account. The points in the short-term savings account will be 
credited on the next banking day at the end of an 8-week period. 
3. [009] A medium term savings account. The points in the medium term savings account 
will be credited on the next banking day at the end of a 16-week period. 
[010] In each saving situation you will be presented with two accounts. We will ask you to 
divide the green blocks between the two accounts. 
[011] In the following example, you can divide the points between the day account and the 
short-term savings account. [012] At the start, there are 1000 points in your day account. 
[013] You can save a number of blocks by transferring them to the short-term savings ac-
count. [014] By doing this you will get an interest payment. [015] In the example, you get 125 
points in an 8-week period for every 100 points you save. 
[016] You make your saving decision by positioning the light blue saving bar, which appears 
on one of the blocks after the first click. [017] You can move this bar as many times as you 
want before you continue with ‘Confirm’. 
[018] Once you have clicked on ‘Confirm’, you can no longer change your decision. 
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[019] If this saving decision were selected for payment at the end of the survey, you would 
have 700 points credited on the next banking day and 375 points credited in 8 weeks. 
[020] The points will be converted into DKK on the day in question, and the respective 
amount will be transferred to your NemKonto. 
[021] One final remark: You will also be presented with saving situations, in which your 
points are initially placed in the short-term savings account. Then you need to divide the 
points between this account and the medium term savings account. [022] In this case, these 
points will be credited either after an 8-week period or after a 16-week period. 
 
  
[023] Now we will show you some examples of situations. [024] It is important to acquaint 
yourself with how they work prior to making your actual saving decisions. [025] You can 
watch this video again at any time by clicking on the ‘Help’ button at the top right of the 
screen.  
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 English transcript of instruction video regarding investment decisions 
 
[001] Now we come to the next part of the survey. [002] It is about investment. [003] You 
need to make 15 investment decisions. 
[004] At the start of each investment decision you have 1000 points in your account. 
[005] These 1000 points are divided into 10 blocks of 100 points. 
 
 [006] You can hold on to each and every block or invest it in a project. [007] This project may 
turn out favorably or unfavorably.  
[008] In the following example, if you invest 100 points you will earn 130 points in the event 
of a favorable, green outcome, or 70 points in the event of an unfavorable, orange outcome. 
 
  
 
[009] The wheel shows the probability of the investment project turning out favorably or 
unfavorably. [010] The green area indicates the likelihood of the project turning out 
favorably, and the orange area indicates the likelihood of the project turning out unfavorably.  
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 [011] In this example an average of 60 % of all investment projects turn out favorably, and 40 
% of all investment projects turn out unfavorably. 
[012] Now you can choose how many of the ten red blocks you want to hold on to in your 
account, and how many you would like to invest in this project.  
[013] At the start of each investment decision you can see all the red blocks in your account. 
 
 
  
[014] You make your investment decision by placing the light blue investment bar, which 
appears on one of the blocks after the first click. You can move this bar as many times as you 
want before you continue with ‘Confirm’. [015] Once you have clicked on ‘Confirm’, you can 
no longer change your decision. 
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  [016] In this example you are investing eight blocks. 
[017] If this investment decision were selected for payment at the end of the survey, either 
way you would hold on to the uninvested 200 points: in other words, regardless of whether 
the project turned out favorably or unfavorably. [018] You would also get a return that 
depended on the project’s outcome. [019] In the best-case scenario the return would be 8 x 
130 points: i.e. 1040 points. [020] In the worst-case scenario the return would be 8 x 70 
points: i.e. 560 points. [021] These amounts are indicated in the light blue bar. 
[022] The points will be converted into DKK, and the amount will be transferred to your 
NemKonto. 
[023] The outcome of the project will be determined by the place, at which the pointer 
happens to stop in the wheel. [024]. You can spin the pointer yourself by [025] clicking on the 
wheel. [026] If the pointer happens to stop in the green area, the project has turned out 
favorably. [027] If the pointer happens to stop in the orange area, the project has turned out 
unfavorably. 
 
[028] In this example, the pointer stops in the orange area. [029] In other words, you earn 200 
points from the uninvested amount PLUS 560 points in investment return. That makes 760 
points in total.  
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 [030] Now we will show you some examples of situations. [031] It is important to acquaint 
yourself with how they work prior to making your actual investment decisions. [032] You can 
watch this video again at any time by clicking on the ‘Help’ button at the top right of the 
screen.  
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